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Abstract 
The linking of I creativity' with the economic in policy discourses marks a 
relatively recent attempt to rethink the constituent elements of a competitive 
economy and, by extension, the nature of adequate policy interventions upon it. 
While it is widely recognised that notions of expertise playa pivotal role in who 
does this kind of rethinking, comparatively little attention has been paid to how 
such expertise is produced and situated in relation to the policy process. This 
thesis explores the geography of this expertise, focusing especially on how it is 
situated in transnational epistemic communities, and its relationship with the 
geography of the policy process across transnational space. 
The emergence of creativity is explored through a policy concept that centres this 
capacity: the creative industries. This policy strand is tracked through its 
emergence in the UK and transfer to other countries, focusing especially on New 
Zealand. There are three key findings. First, it is argued that policy is co-
constituted with expertise. When the creative industries policy concept first 
emerged in the UK in 1998 through the production of the Creative Industries 
Mapping Document (DCMS, 1998), a variety of actors working in areas understood 
to be cognate with the concept recast themselves as creative industries experts 
and sought to use this emergent capacity to shape ongoing creative industries 
policy development. Second, policy transfer is a process of translation that 
changes the form of a policy. The transfer of the creative industries policy 
concept to New Zealand occurred through circuits of embodied and codified 
knowledge that linked policy-making sites in either country, but their policy-
development has followed different paths and produced different policy 
programmes, resulting in transnational policy formation rather than simply 
formation in one place followed by transfer to another. And third, this 
transnational policy formation is occurring alongside the emergence of a 
transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy experts, a 
process analogous to that described in the first finding, supported by a 
transnational infrastructure of conferences, research institutes, policy networks 
and written texts. This epistemic community is a key source of expertise in the 
making of the I creative economy'. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Creative world? 
There is an incongruous regularity to creativity these days. No longer just the 
rare impulse of individual or collective genius, creativity is, we are told, 
everywhere (Osborne, 2003). While its presence has long been recognised in the 
arts, and even the sciences, creativity is now seen as a vital component in 
domains historically less associated with it, such as business, industry, education 
and even government. For example, the recent Cox Review of Creativity in Business, 
commissioned by the UK Chancellor at the time of the 2005 Budget, asserts that: 
'creativity, properly employed, carefully evaluated, skilfully managed and 
soundly implemented, is a key to future business success - and to national 
prosperity' (Cox, 2005: 3). Creativity here is not something 'new', a recently 
discovered technique of business practice: rather it is understood as a latent 
condition only now being recognised for its utility. This is apparent in a 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport (henceforth DCMS) document entitled 
Culture and Creativity: The Next Ten Years in which: 
(e)veryone is creative. From the pre-school child to the most distinguished 
scientist or artist, imagination, innovation and original expression are vital 
components of what it is to be human and to be part of society ... In the years 
ahead, people's creativity will increasingly be the key to a country's 
economic identity, to its economic success, and to individuals' well-being 
and sense of fulfilment (DCMS, 2001a: 5). 
These arguments have been repeated ad infinitum with the remarkable 
production of policy and policy-oriented research around the world in the last 
ten years that emphasises or centralises 'creativity' in the economies and societies 
of the 21 st century. 
The place of creativity in the economy has been subject to a range of different 
research investigations that have directly and indirectly informed, drawn from, 
and expanded these policy developments. John Howkins (2001) populist book 
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The Creative Economy: How People Make Money From Ideas, for example, argues that 
the rapidly growing economic importance of the creative industries augurs the 
emergence of a new kind of economy: 
Creativity is not new and neither is economics, but what is new is the nature 
and extent of the relationship between them, and how they combine to 
create extraordinary value and wealth (2001: viii). 
For Howkins, participation in this economy depends on exploiting one's inherent 
creativity within a strong intellectual property framework that balances private 
and public claims and maximises the value of a particular creative act for society. 
Such a framework is still very much in development but increasingly constitutes 
a key concern for national and international governing institutions around the 
world (see Bainbridge, 2006). 
A different kind of policy orientation can be found in the work of Richard Florida 
(2002; 2005; 2008) on the rise of what he calls the creative class. For Florida this 
class is a stratum of individuals for whom creativity is a key aspect of their work 
- everyone from the 'super-creative core' of artists, film-makers, scientists, 
writers and other producers of 'new' things, to the' creative professionals' who 
work in knowledge-intensive sectors like finance, technology development and 
so on working around what is produced by this core and participating in 
everyday problem-solving work. Florida argues that in the emerging 'creative 
age' (2002: 19), this group create a disproportionately high degree of economic 
value and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. This means that it is 
now imperative for cities and countries to find ways to attract and retain creative 
talent through policies that create the kind of place that this creative class will 
want to live. Programmes inspired by this vision have been put in place by 
many, especially urban, administrations around the world (see Peck, 2005). 
Less poliCY-Oriented and more academically-minded work has also emerged in 
recent years exploring the dynamics of creativity in economic processes and 
practices. Special issues of international academic journals have been dedicated 
to the topic. For example, the Journal of Organizational Behaviour featured a special 
issue on the paradoxes of managing creativity where contributing papers 
explored the practices and practicalities of balancing creative and routine work in 
cultural organisations (DeFillippi et al., 2007). Similarly, within geography 
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Environment and Planning A has had a special issue on Placing the Creative 
Economy: Scale, Politics and the Material (Rantisi et al., 2006) with contributions 
exploring creative industries including video games, advertising and art at the 
national and urban scale. Meanwhile, 2008 has seen the launch of the new 
Creative Industries Journal providing an outlet for research exploring issues 
specific to this economic sector (e.g. Cunningham and Higgs, 2008). It is clear that 
in academic, popular and policy discourses the creativity's importance to the 
economy is increasingly recognised, promoted and acted on. 
This emphasis on creativity is relatively new, but as an attempt to rethink and 
redraw the constituent elements of the economy it is only one of the more recent 
endeavours. Indeed, Mitchell (1998; 2002; 2008) has argued convincingly that the 
very idea of 'the' economy was invented soon after World War Two through the 
efforts of a number of economists and politicians, most famously John Maynard 
Keynes, to create a system of government that would prevent the circumstances 
that led to the previous half century of conflict and economic instability from 
occurring again. Before this, the concept of economy referred almost exclusively 
to what are today called micro-economics - the study of the organisation and 
distribution of commodities through markets and the dynamics of trade between 
different places. Although this science of political oeconomy had been influential in 
the creation of systems of government for the previous few centuries (Polanyi, 
1957; Foucault, 1991a; Buck-Morss, 1995), the significant move made by Keynes 
and his colleagues was to create a system for measuring and controlling 
economic activity at the national scale. This included, for example, practices of 
demand management which would act on employment and inflation to mitigate 
the extremes of the cycle of booms and recessions that had provided fertile 
ground for conflict to develop. 'The economy' came to be understood as 
coterminous with the territorial jurisdiction of the state and the contemporary 
nation-state was born. 
Since then other concepts have reinvented the way that the economy is 
understood to work. In the 1980s 'the market' was reasserted as a central feature 
of economic life and a far more efficient and desirable mechanism for organising 
distribution than the demand management of the Keynesian state (Tickell and 
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Peck, 2003; Harvey, 2005). This period also saw the spectre of the 'global 
economy' haunting the national economy and taking increasing precedence over 
it, making the latter subservient to its dynamics (Hindess, 1998; Lamer, 1998). 
Following on from this, the 1990s saw 'knowledge' and 'information' 
increasingly privileged in contemporary economies as the key to remaining 
competitive in an increasingly interconnected world (Leadbeater, 1999; Castells, 
2000). Much like knowledge, in the early 21st century creativity is now seen as a 
very human capacity that drives the economy. 
Although their significance has varied, each of these often novel ways of 
rethinking and reinventing the economy are linked to certain systems of 
government and policy programmes. As a result they have been implicated in 
different rounds of restructuring. Keynes's ideas were central to the development 
of the suite of policies and institutions that constructed the Welfare State model 
that was dominant in the Western world for much of the second half of the 20th 
century. The political possibilities of 'the market' and the threat of 'the global 
economy' were central to the deconstruction of this state form during the 1980s 
and 1990s and the creation of new multi-scalar governance regimes (Jessop, 2002; 
Brenner, 2004). This is often described as a period of neoliberalism, a term 
denoting this political philosophy of 'more market less state', taking hold around 
the world (Tickell and Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2001; 2003; 2004; 
Harvey, 2005). More recently the idea of the centrality of knowledge to economic 
progress has resulted in the creation of programmes for instituting 'knowledge 
economies' and 'knowledge societies' which emphasise education and invest in 
knowledge-intensive economic activities. The rise of creativity has encouraged 
the development of similar 'creative economy' programmes which aim to 
increase this capacity amongst a population, but perhaps more significantly 
which have broken down the political distinction between culture and economy 
and resulted in policy interventions which claim to act on both. 
This highlights the importance of what I will call policy knowledge to the policy 
programmes that shape economic practice. Policy knowledge is that knowledge 
which informs the development of policy by delineating, describing and 
analysing the social world it is to act upon. The economy is itself an object of this 
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knowledge, and as different approaches to describing its constitution and 
dynamics have emerged and developed over the course of the second half of the 
20th century, the policies which act upon it have been altered in often profound 
ways. As policy knowledge changes over time so policy programmes, and their 
associated regimes of government, are constantly disassembled and reassembled. 
This means that the significance of the different kinds of research investigation 
into the economic role of creativity is not limited to producing a more detailed 
representation of a particular aspect of the economy: this research is implicated 
in a process of reinventing the economy for policy purposes, and as such in the 
reinvention and reconstruction of economic life. 
1.2: Epistemic communities and the economy 
This thesis examines the formation of policy knowledge about the economy from 
a geographical perspective. It builds on arguments that the taken-for-granted 
economy that exists' out there' in much economic and political discourse is not as 
objectively real or tangible as it seems (Coe et al., 2007: 31-55). Rather, these 
political and economic discourses, and the knowledge that informs them, shape 
the economy they purport to describe. This perspective has emerged in economic 
geography as a result of the' cultural turn' (Thrift and Olds, 1996; Castree, 2004) 
and theoretical and methodological influences from outside and inside the 
discipline, including postcolonialism (Escobar, 1995; Power, 1998) and feminism 
(McDowell, 1997; Rose, 1997). As these approaches have become increasingly 
influential over the last three decades more and more questions have been raised 
about the ethnic, colonial-imperial and gendered nature of economic processes 
that have been subsumed in conventional accounts, about the supposed 
distinction between economic and socio-cultural processes, and about the 
apparent I naturalness' of the economic sphere in general. Many of these accounts 
have been influenced by post-structuralist thought which argues knowledge, 
including knowledge about the economy, is not neutral, cumulative and 
essentially descriptive of the world around it but power-laden, multiple and 
constitutive of the world (Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2000; Doel, 1999; Massey, 2005; 
Murdoch, 2006). As such they ask how knowledge of the economy is produced, 
and how it engenders the particular discourses and practices described as 
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'economic' (Barnes, 1996; Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2006; CalIon, 1998; Mitchell, 
1998; 2002; 2008; du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Thrift, 2005; MacKenzie et al., 2007). 
While much of this research has focused on the moments where particular 
knowledge, such as that of the economist is applied or translated into practice, 
this thesis considers the moment before this when knowledge that can be applied 
or translated is produced. This is an inherently geographical process, and not 
only because these moments occur in sites that have particular institutional 
geographies of their own (Peck, 2008). This is because knowledge is at all times 
situated in space: it does not emerge everywhere at once in the same abstract 
form. Explorations of the geography of knowledge have made a general 
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge, arguing that they have different 
spatial characteristics: while the former tends to be embodied in the 'know-how' 
of particular individuals and therefore tends towards being limited in its spatial 
extensiveness, the latter is codified in books, manuals and other texts and is 
reproducible in any site with the capacity to do so (Maskell and Malmburg, 1999; 
Bathelt et al., 2004; Maskell et aI., 2006). Building on this basic insight, and 
demonstrating the variety of spatialities that different types of knowledge may 
have, geographers have explored the complex geographies of knowledge, and 
their consequences for particular industries, that have emerged as actors in 
economic space have sought to take advantage of or overcome the problems and 
opportunities produced by the spatiality of different knowledge forms (Allen, 
2000; 2002; Grabher, 2002; 2004; Gertler, 2003; Amin and Cohendet, 2004; 
Williams, 2006; Weller, 2007; Halt 2007; Faulconbridge, 2007). The particular 
spatial formations of knowledge that are revealed do not map easily onto pre-
given spaces like cities, regions and countries, or institutional categories like 
states, industrial sectors and academic disciplines. 
One of the spatial formations of policy knowledge that crystallises is the epistemic 
community (Haas, 1992). This concept, developed in the political science tradition, 
describes a community of individuals, such as climate scientists or free market 
economists, linked by their commitment and/ or privileged access to a certain 
body of knowledge. For outsiders to the community its members possess a high 
degree of expertise and the ability to speak authoritatively on topics relating to 
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that knowledge. As political actors they are comprised of more specific expert 
systems that are strategically linked to certain policy-making sites. The ideas of 
Keynes and others like him are influential not just because they provide for the 
creation of workable policy programmes and institutions: their situation as 
experts occupying certain positions within policy networks allowed for their 
ideas to be heard. As a result epistemic communities have a high degree of 
political agency as it is through them that certain knowledges, including policy 
knowledge, are developed and deployed. They provide the strategically situated 
expert with the necessary knowledge to speak authoritatively on some aspect of 
the economy and so, as a collective, they can shape policy programmes. This 
means that in order to understand how some particular knowledge of the 
economy came to be dominant in policy circles it is necessary to understand how 
the particular epistemic community associated with this knowledge came to 
influence policy-makers. 
As such, there are two principal aims of this thesis: first, to show how the concept 
of creativity came to be understood as a significant feature of the economy to the 
point that policy is now developing around it. This will emphasise the role of 
certain epistemic communities (and one in particular) and expert systems in 
generating this knowledge and how this is linked to policy processes. Second, I 
aim to provide an approach to conceptualising the relationship between 
epistemic communities and the policy process more generally. By considering 
how I creativity' came to be seen as an element of the economy we can gain an 
insight into how the knowledge that informed previous rounds of restructuring 
emerged, consolidated and became hegemonic through the work of politically 
engaged epistemic communities. More than this, however, the thesis aims to 
show how space is an important element in the policy process as the always 
already spatialised nature of policy and their associated epistemic communities is 
one of the key drivers of change in dominant economic knowledges. 
1.3: Policy transfer and the creative industries 
Remaining true to the (linked) multiplicity and spatiality of knowledge requires 
an analysis of the emergence of creativity that does not attempt to account for it 
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I all at once' by locating it within the logic of some overarching narrative such as 
capitalism, modernity or globalisation. The emergence of creativity as a broad 
policy category has come from a number of interweaving strands of knowledge 
comprised of embodied and codified knowledge forms that circulate between 
different networked sites, changing these, and themselves, as they go. Starting 
from specific beginnings, as these strands have been weaved and articulated 
together they have become increasingly ubiquitous, to the point that the 
specificity of their emergence is obscured or dismissed as irrelevant and they 
take on the character of an accepted truth about the economy. This thesis tracks 
the dynamics of one of these strands. 
There are a number of policy programmes and associated concepts that draw on 
or refer to the human capacity for creativity and the economic benefits this can 
entail: Richard Florida's I creative class' in which certain creative individuals are 
the wellsprings of economic success; the concept of the I creative economy' where 
human creativity is seen as the key resource; the I creative cluster' of enterprises 
drawing on their own stocks of creativity as well as those in the enterprises 
agglomerated around them (see Gospodini, 2006; Mossig, 2008). The particular 
policy concept that this thesis will focus on, however, is the creative industries. The 
worldwide circulation of this concept over the last ten years has meant it is an 
important constitutive element of the transnational emergence of creativity in 
policy discourses and programmes. 
The creative industries are a policy concept that describes a particular economic 
sector comprised of industries deemed to rely on human creativity for the 
production of value. It includes those industries that until the late 1990s were 
more typically referred to as the cultural industries - for example music, the 
performing and visual arts, film, television and publishing - as well as a number 
of other industries seen as dependent on creativity - for example advertising, 
architecture, video game production, design and fashion. For their proponents 
(e.g. Hartley, 2005), they are a reflection of the creative impulse translated 
directly into a profitable enterprise par excellence. It is argued that they seem to 
capture so much about the future of the economy, not just on their own, but as 
creative enablers to other industries. Not only this, they are seen as having 
8 
potentially ameliorative and empowering social effects and as the solution to the 
incessant problem of cultural funding shortfalls. The creative industries owe their 
existence in policy to their ability to be articulated with the solutions being rolled 
out for the kinds of problems governments are dealing with today. Hence, for 
Hartley, 
it is in this context that the idea of the creative industries makes most sense; 
not merely as an area of economic development but more as an idea -
namely that creativity can have decisive economic and social effects (2005: 
4). 
What is interesting about the creative industries for the purposes of this thesis is 
that they are a historical project, albeit very recent history, invented at a specific 
moment (Cutmingham, 2002; Hartley, 2005). This is generally recognised as 
occurring some time in 1997 in the UK soon after the election of Tony Blair's New 
Labour to power. With the creation of the Creative Industries Taskforce and the 
release of the first Creative Industries Mapping Document (CIMD) by DCMS (1998), 
the creative industries were first defined and described in a policy form. Chris 
Smith, then Secretary of State for Culture and responsible for the Creative 
Industries Taskforce, makes it clear that the crucible in which the creative 
industries were forged was fired by the implied powers and possibilities of 
creativity: 
Creativity ... (is) important for what it can do for each of us as individual, 
sensitive, intelligent human beings; fulfilling ourselves and our potential. It 
is important for what it can do for our society, because creativity is 
inherently a social and interactive process, and it helps to bind us together as 
people. And it is important for what it can do for our economy, for those 
great surging industries that promise to provide real opportunities if we 
nurture them well... How can anyone possibly argue that this is not the 
proper province of governmental interest? (Smith, 1998: 148). 
From here it has gone all over the world. Since being described at DCMS in 1998, 
the creative industries policy concept, often accompanied by the definition and 
constitutive industries listed in the CIMD, can be found in policy documents in 
places as diverse as New York, China, Tanzania, South Africa, Taiwan and the 
European Union. 
Importantly, this transnationalisation of the policy concept has a complex 
geography. Policy programmes do not emerge everywhere at once in identical 
forms: the work of making a policy travel over space is far from simple. The 
9 
transnational spread of neoliberal policy to the developing world, for example, 
rested to a considerable extent on specially designed 'Structural Adjustment 
Programmes' that required countries receiving money from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank conformed to the policy imperatives of the 
'Washington Consensus' (see Williamson, 1993) which would open those 
countries up to foreign investment, privatise their state assets, marketise their 
social provisioning systems and reduce the influence of the state. The creation of 
such coercive programmes shows how policy does not simply diffuse from one 
site to another but that such action relies on the creation of channels linking them 
up. In this case they ensured neoliberalism would not just be a 'Western' 
phenomenon (Kelsey, 1999; Harvey, 2005; Davis, 2006; Peet, 2007). But the need 
to overcome space in this way can have important impacts on the policies 
themselves: making policy transferable means turning it into a form removed 
from its original context and packaged in such a way that makes it able to move 
across space easily - as a set of bullet-pointed and universal directives like the 
Washington Consensus for example (Peck and Theodore, 2001). This process of 
universalisation inevitably means change in the particularities of the policy 
programme, as will the moment of re-contextualisation as a transferred policy is 
made to I fit' with the perceived context of a different place. Thus space is not 
neutral here: the fact of policy always being situated in space is of consequence. 
This thesis argues that it is through the engagement of this problem of space that 
the nature of an epistemic community and the particular kind of power it has to 
shape policy can be revealed. They will be implicated in these processes of 
universalisation and re-contextualisation and be responsible for explaining away 
or engaging and incorporating the different effects that pertain in different policy 
sites. Through this role they can continue to shape and reshape policy. But they 
too are situated in space and as such will need to change and reshape themselves 
as policy knowledge circulates to new and different sites. The process of transfer 
and its related creation of difference have consequences for the epistemic 
community and particular expert systems associated with the policy programme. 
The problem of space, and the situation of policies and expertise in it, means 
continuous change for both. The emergence of policy and its associated epistemic 
community is a highly spatialised process. 
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These issues are explored in this thesis through an analysis of creative industries 
policy transfer. In recent years the topic of policy transfer has come to be of 
increasing interest to social scientists as it provides an avenue for thinking about 
what are increasingly understood as transnational processes of change in a 
globalising world. Initially developed in political science, and breaking the 
developmentalist shackles of the discipline's policy diffusion and convergence 
studies (see Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Dobbin et al., 2007), policy transfer studies 
have focused on policy transfer as a policy-learning process involving particular 
agents, institutions and infrastructures (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000; Stone, 
2000; 2004; Evans, 2004). In doing so they have highlighted an important 
transnational process driving global change and identified the kinds of actors 
involved. The study of policy transfer can show how the globalisation of policy is 
actually occurring in space. 
As a result this theme has been engaged by geographers in recent times (Peck, 
2001; 2002; 2003; Peck and Theodore, 2001; Ward, 2006; 2007a; England and 
Ward, 2007; England et al., 2007; McCann, 2008). The major contribution of these 
scholars has been to argue that policy does not simply transfer across a neutral 
platform of space; it fundamentally changes the spaces it travels between. Policy 
transfer, then, is not just the movement of a policy from one site to another site, it 
is a process constitutive of, in this work, neoliberalisation (Ward, 2006; 2007a; 
England et aI., 2007), urban policy (McCann, 2008), and a shift in the state system 
towards more multi-scalar governance regimes (Jessop and Peck, 1999; Peck, 
2001; 2002; 2003; Peck and Theodore, 2001). At arms length from this work has 
been research in geography and other social science disciplines that have 
emphasised the importance of circuits and networks of knowledge for changing 
and producing new spaces and subjects (Bockman and Eyal, 2002; Dezelay and 
Garth, 2002; Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Thrift, 2005; Swain, 2006; Bockman, 2007). 
In different ways this work challenges ontologies organised in relation to the 
nation-state and suggests what is often called globalisation is a set of processes 
working at a more fundamental level, such as the level of social relations or 
circulating knowledges, than the zero-sum reduction of their significance. 
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This whole body of work, from political science, geography and other cognate 
disciplines, provides a useful avenue for thinking about the spatiality of policy 
and their associated epistemic communities. As I have argued, policy will often 
be associated with particular epistemic communities and their constituent expert 
systems, and as such policy transfer will also involve these groups. However, the 
relationship between them and the policy process has never been well specified 
in spatial terms. Rather, the tendency has been to see epistemic communities as 
little more than an explanatory variable providing the requisite knowledge and 
authority necessary for particular policy programmes to be developed. But when 
read through the lens of policy transfer, it becomes necessary to think about how 
these communities come to gather at certain sites and to create links between 
them, how they insert themselves in the policy process at key moments and in 
alliance with other kinds of actors, and how they clear the ground for transfers to 
occur. Epistemic communities take shape in space, and as that space they are 
situated in changes, they too will change. 
In practice this means taking a methodological approach that focuses right in on 
the moments of a particular policy transfer. For this, the thesis examines the 
transfer of the creative industries policy concept between the central 
governments of the UK and New Zealand in the early 2000s. This means the 
focus is on two empirical I zones'. The first of these is concerned primarily with 
policy formation and change through a focus on creative industries policy in its 
place of origin - the United Kingdom. This zone has been selected both because 
its I ground zero' status makes it an obvious place to start if we are going to think 
about creative industries policy transfer, and because there have been important 
shifts in the policy within the UK that sheds light on how policy formation and 
change occur. The second zone will be a place where creative industries policy 
has (seemingly) been transferred to - New Zealand. The creative industries sit at 
the heart of the Fifth Labour Government's economic strategy - the Growth and 
Innovation Framework - alongside biotechnology and information and 
communication technology as a growth sector to be targeted for government 
support. This suggests that this is a textbook example of policy transfer. But a 
closer look at the story reveals that the creative industries first entered New 
Zealand via channels that had quite different concerns around cultural renewal 
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and development. This indicates immediately how complex policy transfer can 
be. 
The analysis considers how policy develops and transfers in relation to expertise. 
In particular, it focuses in on how experts are involved in moments of 
problematisation and translation; respectively, the creation of particular political 
problems requiring policy or other governmental solutions (Dean, 1999) and the 
making of a policy solution feasible in a site other than that of its original 
formulation (Latour, 2005). These are the moments that experts are able to have a 
significant influence. They also constitute the points around which epistemic 
communities will orientate and develop. As the policy concept continued to 
circulate to more and more policy sites, more and more individuals became cast 
as creative industries experts linked in different ways to a growing epistemic 
community, and the different policy programmes enacted in different places as 
the concept was translated and recontextualised gave the members of the 
community something to talk about. There is now a rapidly growing 
infrastructure of conferences, journals, research projects and policy networks 
supporting, reproducing and growing this community. 
Hence, by these means the creative industries policy concept has I globalised' 
(Sheppard, 2005). It has been deployed in distant policy sites and joined with 
other I creativity' policy concepts to become a constitutive element of the 
emerging policy focus on creativity in the economy. This has been conducted 
through a range of particular policy networks and expert systems linked to an 
evolving transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy experts. This 
community provides the requisite combination of policy knowledge and expert 
authority that makes the creative industries a practical and increasingly 
mainstream policy concept. Consequently, the creative industries are now 
regularly understood in many countries as a significant economic sector 
alongside manufacturing and finance. For example, one site of creative industries 
expertise, The Work Foundation headed by the economist Will Hutton, has 
recently claimed in a major report on the economic performance of the UK's 
creative industries that their size makes them I a national asset in multiple ways' 
and that I (t)he livelihood of a growing proportion of British citizens ... depend(s) 
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upon the sector maintaining its trajectory of growth' (Work Foundation, 2007: 
16). 
As will be demonstrated, there is no simple causative link between the epistemic 
community and the prevalence of creative industries policy or creativity policy 
more generally: the community has developed alongside the continuing 
development of the policy. As the policy has transnationalised or I globalised' so 
has the community. Despite this, the policy concept still depends on the 
authority that the epistemic community provides for its viability, but this 
authority comes not just from the community's claim to knowledge - it comes 
from their ability to engage with moments of problematisation and translation 
when and where they occur. Thus particular policy concepts, like creativity, that 
restructure the way that the economy is thought about and acted upon in policy 
circles do not necessarily emerge directly from the deliberations of particular 
epistemic communities: to be influential these entities must engage spatial 
aspects of the policy process which in turn serve to reshape the communities 
themselves and the very knowledge they engage with. 
1.4: Structure of the thesis 
This thesis argues that an epistemic community has emerged around the transfer 
and circulation of the creative industries policy concept, contributing to the 
apparently global uptake of the idea of creativity as a vital feature of the 
economy. The argument is developed in the thesis in two halves. Chapters 2 to 4 
consider a range of conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues pertinent to 
this study and discuss the approach taken in this thesis. Chapters 5 to 7 develop 
the argument in relation to the empirical material through a discussion of the 
formation and transnationalisation of creative industries policy. 
Chapter Two makes a case for thinking epistemic communities as grounded 
political actors that are not aligned or co-extensive with any particular 
institutional complex and yet are able to shape policy programmes in certain 
ways. They are especially useful for thinking about transnational processes of 
policy change because they are knowledge centred, agent oriented and do not 
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map onto pre-given social formations while still being situated in space. They 
provide for a conception of the policy process that is not disembodied, 
functionalist or centred on any particular set of institutions. However, it is 
argued that for these benefits to be realised it is necessary to think epistemic 
communities as in process alongside, and linked with, the policy process. This 
possibility is explored through a review of a diverse literature that in different 
ways explores the internationalisation of policy regimes as an important feature 
of the policy process. This includes the political science literature on policy 
diffusion, convergence and transfer, the geographical literature on policy 
transfer, and a more heterogeneous literature that explores the circulation of 
knowledge across transnational space. It is concluded that in order to understand 
the particular nature and power of epistemic communities it is necessary to see 
them not as an explanatory variable but as co-constituted with policy. This allows 
for a perspective on how epistemic communities are involved in the policy 
process and how the knowledge they produce shapes policy. 
Building on this, Chapter Three theorises the co-constitutive relationship that 
pertains between epistemic communities and policy formation and transfer. 
Drawing on literature from the post-structural tradition, it is argued that 
knowledge does not so much more or less accurately represent the world as 
shape the kinds of practices and actions which are expected to act on it. Epistemic 
communities are a key actor in the production of this knowledge. However, it is 
not the case that what these communities produce is immediately converted to 
policy form. Rather, epistemic communities themselves take shape around 
particular problematisations and translations, concepts borrowed from the post-
structural literatures of governmentality and actor-network theory respectively, 
which are moments that can result in policy forming or transferring. It is argued 
that a key element in this are material circuits of knowledge around which 
knowledge in embodied and codified forms move and which link up policy-
making sites with different epistemic communities. By strategically engaging this 
circulation of knowledge at moments of problematisation and translation, 
epistemic communities are integrated into the policy process, but will themselves 
be changed as a result of the engagement. Thus policy expertise is constituted in 
relation to the policy itself. 
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Chapter Four lays out the methodological strategy utilised in this research. This 
involved an approach that combined the ethic of Foucauldian genealogy with an 
analysis of the data that allowed for a theory of creative industries policy transfer 
to be built from this basis. The spatialised genealogical approach deployed in this 
thesis traces the material links that exist between different instances of the 
creative industries policy concept being spoken in different places. It is a 
poststructural method consistent with the theoretical approach of this thesis 
because it deliberately avoids explaining linkages in terms of grand 
homogenising abstractions such as I globalisation' and provides for sensitivity to 
difference across space and time. The Chapter itself discusses this methodological 
orientation before discussing the particulars of data collection and analysis. Three 
main data sets were used in the research: policy and policy-related documents; 
secondary documents that engaged with the creative industries policy concept; 
and semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 38 participants who were involved 
in different ways with creative industries policy. The analysis of this data was a 
process of I theory building' informed by the genealogical ethic out of which 
empirically and theoretically rich narratives of policy formation and transfer 
were produced for the remaining chapters. 
The remainder of the thesis uses the empirical material to build on the theoretical 
base laid out in Chapters 2 and 3. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 5, explores 
the initial emergence of the creative industries policy concept in the UK and 
some of the effects that this has had in that national context. In doing so it shows 
how policy and expertise exist in a co-constitutive relationship. Beginning with 
the 'original' creative industries policy document, the Creative Industries Mapping 
Document (CIMD), it is argued that this emerged from the circulation of policy 
problematisations borne of new and inherited ways of knowing the economy and 
culture of the UK around the spaces of the newly elected New Labour 
Government. The CIMD's representation of the creative industries has resulted in 
the emergence of a framework of policies, agencies and institutions who act upon 
the newly constituted policy object of the creative industries. The Chapter 
emphasises the way that the policy concept has also seen existing epistemic 
communities recast themselves as possessing creative industries expertise 
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through a discussion of the role of a group calling itself the Forum on Creative 
Industries, or FOCI, in the creation of a policy document, the DCMS Evidence 
Toolkit (DET) (DCMS, 2004), that would guide future policy-oriented research on 
a number of the creative industries. Thus this particular epistemic community 
has changed itself in relation to the creative industries policy concept and 
allowed for an engagement that has changed a feature of the national creative 
industries policy programme. 
Chapter 6 makes a more direct engagement with the way space shapes policy 
formation and development through an analysis of the transfer of the creative 
industries policy concept to New Zealand. The chapter explores the development 
of national policy for the creative industries in New Zealand: a story that is 
demonstrably different to that of the UK. But the differences, it is argued, are not 
trivial: they show how although spatially disparate policy-making sites are 
connected by circuits of policy knowledge, these circuits move through complex 
social, economic and political landscapes. As knowledge on these circuits make 
connections between different policy-making sites at different times and is 
translated into new circumstances alongside other policy knowledges, policy 
programmes in different sites that otherwise look very similar can end up going 
down quite divergent paths. Thus we see not so much policy formation in one 
site and then transfer to another as a process of transnational policy formation 
that is spatially and temporally distributed across a range of policy-making sites 
linked up by a variety of knowledge circuits. 
Chapter 7 argues that the transnationalisation of creative industries policy, which 
I've suggested can be thought of as transnational policy formation, has been 
associated with the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of 
creative industries experts. This is a process analogous to that described ill 
Chapter 5: in the same way that local or national policy formation will produce 
new epistemic communities, so transnational policy formation produces new 
transnational epistemic communities. However, the transnational nature means it 
has a different character which is sketched out in the chapter. Experts previously 
associated with local or national policy expert systems have found themselves 
resubjectified and needing to learn new practices and skill sets as foreign and 
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external policy systems have called on them to provide authoritative knowledge 
for their own creative industries policy development programmes. They have 
transnationalised as they enter transnational policy circuits and networks to 
become part of a more spatially extensive epistemic community. This community 
is supported by a transnational infrastructure of sites of knowledge exchange -
conferences, forums, seminars and so on - and of knowledge production -
university departments, research institutes, think-tanks and so on - where 
creative industries policy knowledge is exchanged and produced. These sites also 
facilitate the expansion of the community, and of the policy knowledge at their 
disposal, through the articulation of the creative industries with other policy 
concepts, particularly those concerned with creativity and the economy. Thus the 
circulation of the creative industries policy concept has been partly constitutive 
of the emergence of I creativity' in economic policy discourses around the world. 
The conclusion summarises the key contributions of the thesis. It is argued that 
the processes described here are part of the transnational assembling of the 
creative economy, not as a particular sphere or object' out there' to which we 
must respond, but as a particular governmental regime. This is linked to the 
emerging transnational epistemic community. How epistemic communities have 
been conceptualised in the thesis is discussed through an argument that the 
geographical reimagining of the concept produces a different focus to that of 
political science, one that emphasises how these communities are both 
differentiated across space and how they are held together despite this 
differentiation. The conclusion also discusses some of the methodological issues 
raised by the type of investigation this is, how these were dealt with, and some of 
the shortcomings that resulted. It concludes with a discussion of how these 
shortcomings may be overcome in future research projects. 
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Chapter 2: Epistemic communities and transnational policy 
2.1: Introduction 
In a world that understands itself as modern, scientific knowledge has a 
particular significance. It suggests that it is possible to know and act on the world 
by providing the basis for truth claims to be made (Giddens, 1998a). As such, in 
the policy-making arena the testimony of those experts who are considered to 
have privileged access to this knowledge has a special status in processes of 
policy formation and transfer. These experts are housed in epistemic communities -
held together by shared access and commitment to certain kinds of knowledge 
(Haas, 1992) - that form bastions of expertise whose power comes from the 
apparent neutrality that access confers upon them. As such, epistemic 
communities are a particular kind of political actors with a particular kind of 
power in modern society. They provide the basis for conceiving or 
deconstructing policy programmes with an air of scientific authority difficult to 
critique or dismiss as political. Even in policy arenas less connected with 
phenomena that can be studied under the natural sciences the recent vogue for 
I evidence-based policy' suggests that this authority and neutrality is desired by 
policy-makers (see Labour Government, 1999; Wells, 2007). Given all this, 
epistemic communities constitute a fertile site for investigating the dynamics of 
power, policy and politics. 
This chapter discusses the concept of epistemic communities and how they have 
been, and can be, used in the analysis of political change in relation to policy. 
Initially conceived as a relatively static explanatory variable for international 
policy coordination (Haas, 1992), diffusion and convergence (Dobbin et al., 2007), 
the development of literatures that have focused on producing process-centred 
accounts of policy transfer (e.g. Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Peck and Theodore, 
2001; Evans, 2004; Ward, 2006) has provided an opening for more process-
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centred conceptions of epistemic communities to emerge. Therefore, the chapter 
reviews and engages two strands of research: one that focuses on epistemic 
communities, and a more heterodox set of literatures that have been concerned 
with changing geographies of policy and knowledge. Thinking these literatures 
through simultaneously allows for reflection on, for one, the relationship 
between epistemic communities and policy and knowledge geographies and, in 
addition, how each can inform the other for a stronger understanding of both. 
This can give us an insight into the particular kind of power that epistemic 
communities have in relation to policy making processes. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections after this introduction. Section 2 
argues that the epistemic community is an appealing concept because of the way 
it centres knowledge in a world where expertise figures prominently in the 
production of governable subjects and spaces, the way it understands policy 
change through the actions of certain actors rather than disembodied macro-
trends, and because these communities are not co-extensive with pre-defined 
institutional spaces like nation-states. However, the way that epistemic 
communities have been studied has analytically marginalised these strong points 
by treating them as an actor equivalent to agents like lobby groups, advocacy 
coalitions and policy networks, and therefore as having only a very particular 
role. Epistemic communities need to be rethought so that their integral influence 
on the form and knowledge of these other actors is understood and analysed 
appropriately. 
Section 3 introduces theories concerning the internationalisation of policy 
regimes through an examination of some of the political science literature. The 
policy diffusion and convergence literatures treat epistemic communities as an 
explanatory variable which fails to grasp them as any more than mono-
dimensional. The emerging policy transfer literature, on the other hand, 
emphasises process, providing more scope for analysing exactly how actors like 
epistemic communities impact on these tendencies. But these approaches remain 
tied to conventional methodologies which fetishise space and categories like the 
nation-state. The epistemic communities concept remains subservient to these 
other ideas and still acts as little more than an explanatory variable. 
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Sections 4 and 5 step outside of political science to engage with geographical and 
cognate literatures exploring issues of policy and knowledge transfer. These 
literatures are concerned with the need to overcome space in order for a policy to 
transfer and with the way that this effort reshapes space in its wake. Section 4 
looks at a number of geographical studies that explore how policy transfer is a 
technique in the ongoing neoliberalisation of space. They argue that through 
these processes spaces and times are being reordered and the state restructured 
in line with, if not in exact replication of, neoliberal principles. This shows that 
policy change is often driven by epistemic communities that have been able to 
ingratiate themselves into strategic policy-making sites to make themselves more 
effective, but also that this process has resulted in the community having to 
reshape and reconstruct itself several times over. Section 5 provides a different 
take on this notion of epistemic communities as I in process' by engaging the 
diverse literature that explores the transnational circulation of knowledge and 
the material circuits that support this. This invites us to see policy transfer as a 
moment which produces various subjects, spaces and socialities and the 
knowledge that animates these. Epistemic communities become something that is 
produced in part by the political and knowledge opportunities of policy transfer, 
as well as the other way around. This suggests a novel approach to thinking 
about policy transfer as a process co-constituted with the epistemic communities 
that shape our world. 
2.2: Epistemic communities as political actors 
In recent years the concept of the epistemic community has emerged to describe a 
particular type of collective policy actor. These are, according to a classic 
definition, 'network(s) of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area' (Haas, 1992: 3).1 The concept is 
1 They can be contrasted with the concept of communities of practice which are united by 
engagement in a particular practice, such as census-taking for example, and regular 
communication across the community about how these activities are conducted. In 
reality, as Amin and Cohendet (2004) argue, the difference between these two categories 
is not particularly marked as both I are deeply implicated in processes of non-deliberate 
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intended to describe a certain kind of collectivity of actors with a particular 
function in the policy arena discernable from other collectivities such as lobby 
groups, interest groups, advocacy coalitions and policy networks. This revolves 
around its members sharing particular epistemologies and ontologies which are 
expressed through certain knowledge practices and knowledge forms. Haas 
(1992) understands these as cohering around shared principled and causal 
beliefs, notions of validity and a common policy enterprise. To this extent the 
legitimacy that is bestowed upon the epistemic community is derived from the 
privileged access they are perceived to have to especially scientific knowledge 
and, crucially, it is this knowledge that is seen as the glue which holds the 
community together over and above any shared political or material interests 
and/ or class positions (Gough and Shackley, 2001). Hence, although they are 
defined as collective political actors their unity as a community comes from this 
shared commitment to knowledge over and above their shared commitment to a 
political cause. This differentiates them from other collective policy actors which 
cohere around, and obtain their unity from, particular political issues or causes. 
The epistemic communities concept has been used to analyse the involvement of 
a wide range of the natural and social scientists in the development of policy 
forms. These have included, for example, the development of programmes and 
policies for HIV / AIDS policy (Vandormael, 2007), 'safe motherhood' practices 
(Shiffman et al., 2004), water management (Galaz, 2005), bioethics (Salter and 
Jones, 2005), innovation policy (Albert and Laberge, 2007), monetary and fiscal 
policy (Verdun, 1999; King, 2005) and data privacy (Newman, 2008). It has been 
used to understand particular social movements including 'environmental 
stewardship' (Gray and Hatchard, 2007) and international labour movements 
(Van Daele, 2005). Recent interest in the role of economists in the production of 
post-Welfare State economic policy has identified epistemic communities of 'free 
market economists' (Afonso, 2007), 'neoliberal economists' (Chwieroth, 2007), 
and competition policy officials (van Waarden and Drahos, 2002) shaping policy 
programmes across transnational space. Furthermore, as Chilvers (2007) shows, 
learning that are rooted in doing, despite the varying degree of the intentionality of the 
knowledge within each' (ibid.: 78). There is little to separate them in terms of how they 
function, sociologically or geographically. 
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they are not just useful for understanding the diffusion of particular policy 
knowledges, they can also help to reproduce particular practices of policy 
development, as in his example of an emergent epistemic community of 
participatory appraisal experts who facilitate public engagement with policy 
processes. Despite objections that in practice epistemic communities are difficult 
to identify and delineate and their impacts even more difficult to pin down 
(Dunlop, 2000), it is clear that the concept has a wide appeal to analysts. 
There are several reasons why the epistemic community is a useful and 
appealing concept. For one, it is knowledge-centred (Cinquegrani, 2002; Ladi, 
2005). It emphasises the ways knowledge shapes policy programmes around the 
world. Under modernity it is taken for granted that the world can be known and 
acted upon (Giddens, 1998a). As a result of this, expertise in a variety of forms 
has become a key aspect of regimes and structures of government (Rose, 1999a; 
Dean, 1999; 2007; Mitchell, 2002;). Epistemic communities are, by definition, 
policy actors situated in the production and mobilisation of particular kinds of 
knowledge. They are one of the bastions of expertise that render the world 
knowable for the policy-making process. The study of epistemic communities can 
therefore provide insights into the role that knowledge plays in political 
processes, not only through the reduction of uncertainty and the framing of 
policy (Haas, 1992), but through the privileging of certain knowledges ahead of 
others, such as monetarism ahead of Keynesianism in economics for example 
(Hall, 1993), resulting in the emergence of particular dominant conceptions of the 
world. Epistemic communities, then, are a key provider of the means by which 
differently constituted policy actors, such as lobby groups, advocacy coalitions 
and policy networks, are able to act by providing them with relevant knowledge 
resources and delineating zones for engagement between them (Sebenius, 1992). 
Second, epistemic communities privilege a more agent-oriented approach to 
policy change over a systemic and/ or structural one. For Haas, this stems from 
the assumption that I state actors are uncertainty reducers as well as power and 
wealth pursuers' (1992: 4). This means that policy choices are not reducible to 
simple economic or geopolitical determinism - they need to be understood as 
negotiated settlements produced by actors drawing on the expertise different 
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epistemic communities provide. Taking this further I would argue analyses that 
emphasise the role of epistemiccommunities avoid explanations that reduce 
processes of policy change to consequences or features of the kinds of large-scale 
changes that they are, in fact, partly constitutive of. For example, describing an 
incidence of policy convergence on an international scale as the globalisation of 
policy comparable to the globalisation of capital, labour and production tells us 
little about how such circumstances coalesced and risks sliding into a teleological 
narrative of inevitable disembodied progression towards a global future. A focus 
on epistemic communities recognises the way that the policy changes which 
produce convergence depend upon a variety of actors facilitating and engaging 
the necessary linkages across space which constitute the process of globalisation 
in an uneven and undetermined fashion (aIds, 2001). 
And third, epistemic communities d9 not map easily onto particular political 
formations, such as the nation-state, or institutionally-defined groupings, such as 
academic disciplines, but they do have consequences for their geographies 
(Gough and Shackley, 2001). Epistemic communities imply a network approach 
to the study of social forms in which the relational links between actors are 
emphasised rather than the particular institutional spaces they individually 
occupy (see Knox et al., 2006). This has methodological and conceptual benefits. 
Methodologically, the emphasis on relations rather than structures means that 
cultural and institutional explanations for policy change can be accommodated 
without privileging either (O'Brien, 2003). Although Haas originally conceived 
epistemic communities in opposition to institutional explanations which analyse 
policy change and coordination as resulting from the self-interested actions of 
institutional actors by suggesting that the latter can be directed in their actions by 
the former, recent studies which emphasise their network character have 
suggested that there is no need to see the particular cultures these communities 
are situated in as entirely separate from those that institutional actors are situated 
in, or for the relationship between them to be only unidirectional (Lidskog and 
Sundqvist, 2002; Halfon, 2006; Sharif, 2006). Epistemic communities are forced to 
contend with a variety of institutional and cultural imperatives, the negotiation 
of which is central to their existence. There is no need to limit an analysis of 
24 
policy change to one type of explanation at the expense of another when 
epistemic communities constitute the focus. 
Conceptually, thinking of epistemic communities primarily as networks means 
that they are relatively amorphous, but this does not mean that the shape they 
take is inSignificant. Epistemic communities may be quite concentrated in a small 
number of agencies and comprised of a number of equivalent individual 
knowledge workers. Or they may be spatially diffuse, spread across 
transnational space through relationships of varying intensity and with a variety 
of individual roles within the community taken across space and time despite 
their shared epistemology and ontology. This will partly be a result of the variety 
of roles that individual actors within the community have, such as laboratory 
technician, academic, science communicator, journalist and so on. The relative 
influence of the epistemic community, however, will be dependent on its shape, 
especially with regard to how well integrated they are into policy-making sites. 
In Haas's (1992) formulation, under conditions of uncertainty particular 
epistemic communities can come to be influential in a variety of policy-making 
sites and scales. An epistemic community's presence can explain how the same 
policy might be reproduced in different nation-states. Conversely, the lack of an 
epistemic community can explain why such reproduction does not happen (Kim, 
2007). This means that the shape of an epistemic community across space is 
intimately associated with changing policy geographies, and with changing 
political geographies more generally. 
In sum, the notion of epistemic communities is appealing because it 
conceptualises expertise as an active and distinctive agent that is not necessarily 
reducible to a particular institution or bounded space. It allows us to talk about 
expertise as effective in non-abstract terms while avoiding centring it on 
particular spaces or socialities such as certain nations (e.g. the USA), institutions 
(e.g. the International Monetary Fund), disciplines (e.g. economics) or professions 
(e.g. accountants). But despite these strengths there are important weaknesses in 
the approach that need to be considered and overcome. 
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The most common complaint has been that approaches which centre epistemic 
communities overstate the tole of scientists and scientific knowledge in the 
policy-making process while obscuring other equally important influences like 
national politics (Westrup, 2007), institutions and interests (Harrison, 2002), and 
non-expert political actors (Farquharson, 2003). These kinds of observations have 
led to the conclusion that epistemic communities are only effective and important 
under particular conditions and at particular times (Peterson, 1992; Houlihan, 
1999; Zito, 2001). Mendelson (1993), for example, argues that an epistemic 
community will be effective under three conditions: access to leadership, 
partiality of the leadership to its ideas, and the ability of the leadership to take 
action. More stringent critiques argue that the approach fails because it does not 
recognise the social construction of knowledge and hence the importance of the 
conditions under which the knowledge of the community has been produced, 
resulting in the epistemic communities approach imagining a non-existent space 
of pure, unsocialised scientific knowledge (Toke, 1999; Harrison, 2002). 
These critiques conclude that epistemic communities need to be understood as 
interacting with a variety of other kinds of groups when it influences policy 
(Dunlop, 2000). Some of the work that alludes to epistemic communities argues 
that it is most usefully conceived as complementary or ancillary to other concepts 
like advocacy coalitions, lobby groups or policy networks (Coleman and 
Skogstad, 1995; Elliot and Schlaepfer, 2001; van Waarden and Drahos, 2002; 
Meijerink, 2005). This is useful for demonstrating the relationships between 
different policy actors and suggests a way of relativising the role of scientists and 
scientific knowledge in the policy-making process. 
However, treating epistemic communities as equivalent with these more specific 
policy actors risks reproducing the idea of them as situated in some separate 
scientific sphere and, as a consequence, situating knowledge there as well. These 
approaches line up epistemic communities to take on a very particular role in the 
policy-making process and hence to have only a very particular influence when 
scientific knowledge is called upon in I conditions of uncertainty'. Such an 
analysis marginalises the role that they play in defining the terms and 
delineating the spaces of engagement for other policy actors. Epistemic 
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communities will interact and intersect with advocacy coalitions and such like 
through particular individuals and agencies involved in, or connected to, both 
scientific research and advocacy (Gough and Shackley, 2001). This means that 
while a particular policy action might be put down to the work of an advocacy 
coalition or lobby group, the possibility of conceiving and mobilising the action 
often depends on the translation of 'scientific' knowledge into 'political' action, 
hence blurring the line between the two (Barry, 2001). For example, the 
possibility of action on climate change, launching a protest at a major airport for 
example, depends to a large extent on the links that are drawn between 
particular activities and knowledge about climactic changes. Without the 
authority of the science, the politics would not be conceivable, let alone actionable. 
In this way knowledge is distributed through-out the policy-making process and 
epistemic communities are a key source of its authority. Epistemic communities 
are not simply a heretofore unrecognised policy actor but a distinctively modern 
social form that acts as a source of expertise facilitating authoritative action on 
the world. 
The problem is that epistemic communities are theoretically coupled to particular 
conceptions of policy as produced in a sphere of action separate from but 
influenced by other spheres: 'society', 'economy' or 'culture' for example. If we 
are to take seriously the way that knowledge is integral to policy it is necessary to 
stop thinking of policy as being produced in response to knowledge claims 
alongside a variety of other influences by autonomous actors occupying a 
separate sphere. As I have discussed in this section, the epistemic community 
concept has a lot to offer in this regard. Later I argue that this still requires a more 
integrated conception than that provided by Haas (1992), one which recognises 
the co-constitutive nature of knowledge when it is engaged with policy actors 
(Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002; Halfon, 2006). In the next section, however, I will 
consider the way that the diverse literature on the international spread of policy 
works with a conception of the epistemic community that gives it only limited 
analytical purchase. 
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2.3: Diffusion, convergence, transfer: mobile policy and epistemic 
communities 
For the most part the epistemic communities concept has been used to 
understand and analyse the intemationalisation of policy regimes. This refers to 
a complex process whereby policy-makers increasingly look to policy ideas 
developed within other national formations for inspiration, as well as the 
emergence of transnational policy development and coordination bodies (Jessop, 
2002). Processes variously described as international policy coordination (Haas, 
1992), diffusion (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), convergence (Knill, 2005), learning 
(Rose, 1991) and transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) are features of this trend. 
The argument developed here will also approach epistemic communities in the 
context of this trend, but suggests that how these processes are thought about 
effects how epistemic communities are understood as social formations. If the 
advantages of the epistemic community concept discussed above are to be 
realised, and its shortcomings overcome, it needs to be situated in a conception of 
policy change that does not underplay or marginalise their role. The remainder of 
this chapter discusses some of the different ways the internationalisation of 
policy regimes has been thought about and the consequences these have for our 
conceptions of epistemic communities. 
2.3.1: Policy diffusion, policy convergence 
The more established areas of study are those researching policy diffusion 
(Ingraham, 1993; Grossback et al., 2004; Simmons and Elkins, 2004) and policy 
convergence (Bennett, 1991; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Knill, 2005). While the 
latter is interested in the spatial patterns which track how a particular policy 
moves from one administrative setting to another and the latter focuses on how 
policies in different settings come to resemble each other over time, both share a 
common project which inherits the legacy of developmentalist and 
modernisation paradigms by focusing on the extent to which policies spread and 
even out across space (Bennett, 1991; Banks et al., 2005). As such their focus tends 
to be on policy only, not the institutional milieu in which they are situated or the 
specific links between particular policy programmes. Differences within what are 
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considered broadly comparable policy programmes tend to be written out or 
played down as reflecting local context. As a result these analyses are about 
tracking the extent of policy homogeneity across space. 
These studies try to explain the presence or absence of policy homogeneity 
through the consideration of particular variables, resulting in a specific 
conception of actors like epistemic communities. Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 
(2007) identify four approaches within the literature which each emphasise 
different variables for explaining policy diffusion and convergence: coercion 
approaches consider the influence of particular powerful nation-states or supra-
national institutions, competition theorists· argue that increased economic 
competition between countries will over time produce policy convergence in a 
race to the bottom, learning theorists suggest that countries learn from their 
experiences and from each other, and constructivists point to the role of certain 
expert groups and international organisations who define rules and norms. 
Epistemic communities are emphasised in this last approach. The focus on 
causality implied in these approaches which tries to explain policy 
diffusion/ convergence by way of particular variables reifies the latter as objects 
with well-defined boundaries, consistency and integrity. It tells us little about the 
role of entities like epistemic communities in shaping the policy programme or 
indeed the way that they come to be integrated into the policy-making 
environment. Hence, although these studies recognise the existence of epistemic 
communities and therefore the importance of knowledge to policy, the nature of 
their agency is reduced to a causal association with a particular policy 
programme and the nature of their spatiality, while transnational, is so only in a 
mono-dimension of presence or absence. 
2.3.2: Policy transfer 
In recent years these limitations have generated the emergence of a new literature 
that self-consciously refers to policy transfer as a distinct process driving these 
wider trends (Bennett, 1997; see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000; Evans, 2004). In 
a widely-cited review Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer as: 
29 
a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of 
policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time 
and/ or place (1996: 344). 
By emphasising process this approach is set apart from diffusion/ convergence 
studies. While the latter start from the fact of parallel policies the policy transfer 
approach focuses on how this situation came about in specific instances. This has 
opened up a productive research agenda (Evans, 2004). Studies have included, 
for example, policy transfers in telephone regulation (Zarkin, 2005), 
environmental policy (Buhrs, 2003), health policy (Jacobs and Barnett, 2000), 
workfare/welfare policy (Deacon, 2000; Daguerre, 2004) and pay-for-
performance in the public sector (Mintrom and Vegari, 1998). From a different 
perspective policy transfer has been used to examine transnational policy 
relationships; John and Cole (2000), for example, show how international policy 
transfer is more likely to occur in economic policy than in education policy. A 
number of studies have examined the British uptake of American ideas, 
suggesting a sender and receiver situation (Dolowitz et aI., 1999; Deacon, 2000; 
Daguerre, 2004). Other work has sought to problematise this by showing how 
policy flows often come from a range of countries (e.g. Pierson and Castles, 2002). 
The approach of policy transfer studies is to discern the particular moments 
when and where an external policy came to be influential for a particular policy-
making process. Not only does this introduce more specific policy-making agents 
but, unlike diffusion and convergence studies, this specificity means that there is 
more scope for considering the particular types of transfer that take place. This 
ranges from examining the nature of the process as coercive or voluntary, to the 
spectrum from direct emulation to partial adaptation and negative lesson-
drawing (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000; Evans, 2004). Each of these types and 
degrees of transfer can be far more easily observed through the policy transfer 
framework than that of diffusion or convergence. 
Moreover, different approaches have emerged which highlight different aspects 
of the policy transfer process. Although much of this work still begins with elite 
policy actors situated in policy-making sites rationally seeking solutions in a 
'marketplace of ideas', these are being extended or complemented by approaches 
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often borrowed from other traditions. For example, what Evans (2004: 16-18) 
refers to as 'ideational' approaches emphasise the systems of ideas and ideologies 
that shape the policy development process. These have focused on the 
complementary ideologies of sender and receiver policy-making sites (e.g. 
Dolowitz, 2001), policy paradigms such as Keynesianism or the competition state 
(e.g. Hall, 1993; Evans and Davies, 1999), non-state institutions like think-tanks 
(Stone, 2000) and new meta-discourses like globalisation or Europeanisation 
(Evans, 2004). 
Policy streams theory (Kingdon, 1984; Zahariadis, 1999) takes this further by 
suggesting policy formation occurs at the intersection of three' streams'; a stream 
of problems and events, a stream of policy ideas, and a stream of politics 
constituted by elements like national mood, lobbying and the electoral cycle. 
Michael Volkerling (2001) has already applied such an analysis to the adoption of 
creative industries policy in the New Zealand context. For Volkerling, the lack of 
a clear policy direction for the creative industries in both the UK and New 
Zealand, where they have been otherwise enthusiastically adopted, points 'to 
forces at work in the policy process quite unlike the procedures for rational 
choice that are often represented as normative' (2001: 447). Policy formation 
resulted from the coupling of a particular policy problem, in this case cultural 
funding, with a solution, the creative industries, by policy makers and policy 
entrepreneurs. However, there is a tendency for these studies to assert that ideas 
and ideologies matter without showing it empirically (Evans, 2004). Although, in 
response to Evans assertion research into the emergence of policy 'brands' offers 
a way of thinking about how ideas and ideologies get translated into the policy 
transfers themselves (Ogden et aI., 2003). 
Another example has been the development of institutionalist perspectives on 
policy transfer processes. Bulmer and Padgett (2004), for example, show that in 
the context of the EU, transfer processes and outcomes have varied depending on 
whether they have been driven by hierarchical or multilateral governance 
systems. Other studies argue that institutional isomorphism is not only a 
condition in which policy transfer may occur (Erlingsdottir and Lindberg, 2005), 
but is a potential strategy for stimulating policy transfer in institutions lacking 
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legitimacy, such as within the European Union (Radaelli, 2000). In different ways 
these approaches highlight the politics of transfer and the role of actors, 
institutions and events in these processes. 
This literature's focus on the moment of transfer allows for a more specific 
analysis of the particular type of agency that actors like epistemic communities 
have in policy formation. Rather than being just a causal actor that is either 
present or absent, epistemic communities are recognised as having a particular 
role within institutions or through the production of ideas. However, this 
emphasis on agency is let down within the literature by a tendency to retain the 
mono-dimensional quality that is given to epistemic communities and similar 
actors in the diffusion/ convergence literature. They tend to be understood as 
working on particular platforms of space provided by the nation-state. 
This stems from a tendency towards methodological nationalism in much of this 
work (Stone, 2004). Methodological nationalism refers to the propensity to 
understand processes in terms of the scale of the nation-state so that global space 
is constituted by a series of relatively self-contained political systems between 
which policy transfers. Although this may seem like an inevitable consequence of 
this kind of study given they focus on the movement of policy between the 
political systems that constitute, reproduce and reify these spaces, there is a 
tendency to conflate national politics with particular ideas about the national 
context. Hence Dolowitz (2001) argues from an ideational perspective that the 
adoption in the UK of American policy ideas concerning child maintenance 
stemmed from the shared neoliberal ideology each country was being governed 
under. Daguerre (2004), from an institutionalist perspective, argues that British 
adoption of American workfare policies occurred because each country has 
similarly structured labour markets and institutionally similar welfare state 
systems. These approaches tend to work with a single national dimension of 
effectivity in which particular policy-makers act in a manner determined at that 
scale. Such analyses further reify the nation-state as a container of co-extensive 
ideologies, labour markets, politics and so on, resulting in a limited analysis of 
policy transfer that understands this as a moment of connection between 
otherwise separately evolving national systems. While epistemic communities 
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may be recognised as particularly transnational or local in these formulations, 
their agency will be understood through their impact on nation-state platforms. 
2.3.3: Transnationalising policy transfer 
The tendency in social science to think in a methodologically nationalist fashion 
has been under challenge for a number of years by approaches which emphasise 
the multiple and relational scales, from the local to the global, at which state and 
economic systems are organised (Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 2004) and/ or the myriad 
networks, commodity chains and material flows which cut across and constitute 
multiple, apparently national spaces (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Castells, 
2000; Slaughter, 2005; Coe et al., 2008). The policy transfer literature is 
increasingly embracing these approaches by emphasising the constitutive role of 
the transnational dimension to policy transfer. 
Of particular significance has been the emergence of what have been called 
multi-level approaches to policy transfer (see Evans and Davies, 1999; and the 
works collected in Evans, 2004). These synthesise different aspects of policy 
formation and transfer with theoretical trajectories that emphasise scale 
especially. These have predominantly utilised a realist methodology and 
structuration theory to develop a multi-level model which places the actions of 
actors involved in policy transfer within a wider historical and socio-economic 
context. The highest level focuses on global, international and transnational 
structures, such as the global economy, which constrain the behaviour of actors 
at the two lower levels. The second level is the level of the relatively autonomous 
state, recognised in its historical context and its potential for strategic selectivity 
within the structures of the first level. Finally, the third level is the policy transfer 
network which is made up of indigenous and endogenous agents with some 
level of autonomy involved in processes of policy transfer. The model argues that 
events at this level can often be explained by reference to the interaction of levels 
one and two. This brings analyses of policy transfer into conversation with wider 
theoretical and empirical concerns associated with changes in the state and the 
global economy. Like ideational and institutionalist approaches, it moves policy 
transfer analysis beyond 'pluralist' description to frameworks that are capable of 
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considering questions about distributions of power. However, to date this 
analysis has tended to be about whether policy has been transferred voluntarily, 
through states independently seeking policies from elsewhere, or coercively, 
where states have been forced to adopt particular policies under pressure from 
more powerful actors like the International Monetary Fund (Evans, 2004). 
In her recent work, Diane Stone takes the issue of methodological nationalism 
head on by emphasising the role of international organisations and non-state 
actors in 'transnationalising' policy (see Stone, 2004). Drawing on earlier work 
which sought to identify 'soft' forms of policy transfer by organisations like 
think-tanks which spread ideas and norms across international space (Stone, 
2000), she combines this with an analysis of the transfer of 'hard' policy tools, 
structures and practices through policy agencies. She argues that transfer activity 
takes place within and between overlapping national and international agencies 
as emergent governance structures she describes as 'global public policy 
networks'. These networks transcend national and international space and need 
to be analysed as such. This frees the analysis of policy transfer from being about 
transfer between self-contained nation-states to think about the dynamics of 
these multiply-constituted global networks cutting across these spaces and 
carrying policies into them. For Stone (2004) this means thinking about policy 
transfer as the transnationalisation of policy: the emergence of transnational 
policy-making structures which increasingly shape policy at this scale. 
Both of the approaches represented by Evans and Stone place the study of policy 
transfer in transnational perspective. It elevates the study of policy transfer from 
being about national political systems to consider how these are integrated into 
global systems through processes like policy transfer. Because this requires multi-
scalar and multi-spatial thinking, actors like epistemic communities can be 
recognised as emergent and effective in a variety of sites situated at a variety of 
political scales. Working within these frameworks allows the analytical 
advantages of the epistemic communities conception - their focus on knowledge, 
their centring of agency, and their networked and multiple spatiality - to 
flourish. At this point, however, it remains tied to the initial project of Haas to 
identify an actor that could shape policy by virtue of its claim to scientific 
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expertise. There is a lack of theorisation regarding how epistemic communities 
form or how they become influential in policy debates. This will be rehearsed in 
these approaches because of their focus on theorising policy transfer by 
identifying the actors involved in the process and the dynamic spaces they 
perform in. By going one step further and recognising that policy transfer, policy 
actors (including epistemic communities), and the spaces of transfer are all co-
constituted, a more powerful conception of the place of epistemic communities 
can be advanced. 
To be sure, despite their sophisticated approaches to policy transfer, both Evans 
and Stone still work with relatively static conceptions of space. This means that 
while they recognise that the international state system is changing they 
understand this as being the result of a global political-economic system being 
layered on top of the existing nation-state system, resulting in new roles for the 
latter. Hence Evans argues that global structures, such as the 'global economy', 
places constraints on the actions of actors at 'lower' levels. Stone's argument 
focuses on the emerging transnational governance system which she argues has 
similar impacts on nation-states. Although she does not wish to 'deny the 
continuing power and impact of nation-states', their role is reduced to producing 
'difference and diversity' (2004: 561) in the face of the emerging governance 
regime. The power of the 'higher' scales is assumed rather than explained. Actors 
like epistemic communities become powerful because they are able to be effective 
in spaces located at these higher scales. But does their movement into them really 
explain this power? Or is it that their power explains the apparent power of these 
higher scales? 
Epistemic communities, in their networked spatial form, need to be understood 
as constitutive of space, and spatialised power relations, through their 
involvement in the production of policy knowledge. This means thinking about 
epistemic communities as in process rather than as static formations. This requires 
that certain aspects of Haas's conception, particularly the idea of consistently 
'common' notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise, are suspended or 
treated as tendencies rather than empirical realities. This leaves space for the 
possibility the community will grow, shrink or fragment. It also requires a 
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conception of policy transfer that takes account of how these processes are 
integral to the constitution and production of space. The remainder of this 
chapter will turn to the critical human geographical and cognate literatures to 
reflect on how this can be achieved. 
2.4: Policy transfer in human geography 
The possibility of thinking about epistemic communities as in process is 
borrowed from Jamie Peck's argument that there is emerging a much needed 
focus on policy processes in general: 
the underlying parameters, ideological orientations, and conspicuous 
silences of the policy-making process ... are beginning to receive increased 
attention in human geography and in the linked realms of political sociology 
and international political economy, particularly on the part of those 
concerned to investigate the myriad boundary skirmishes, turf disputes, and 
institutional struggles that are characteristic of state restructuring processes. 
One of the strengths of this work is that it conveys an understanding of the 
state, not as some lumbering bureaucratic monolith but as (political) process 
in motion (2001: 449, emphasis in original). 
For Peck and a number of his colleagues this has set the agenda for a research 
programme exploring policy transfer and its role in the production of new kinds 
of spatial formations. There is now a small but growing literature within 
geography which engages directly with the concept of policy transfer and offers 
some solutions to the problems encountered in the political science literature 
through their more spatially sensitive accounts. 
Research conducted by Peck and some of his colleagues (see Jessop and Peck, 
1999; Theodore and Peck, 2000; Peck and Theodore, 2001; Peck, 2002; 2003) on the 
formation and transfer of workfare policy in the United States and United 
Kingdom has made several steps in this direction. The research has focused on 
the way that a set of local and state initiatives carried out in the US and 
characterised as 'workfare' have been particularly influential in the UK and 
around the world.2 This work explicitly engages with conceptions of scale insofar 
2 Workfare marks a shift from the entitlements system of the welfare state to one which 
renders 'residual entitlements to nonwage incomes strictly contingent on local labour 
market conditions in a general sense and individual employability in a specific sense: 
workfare seeks to maximise rates of employment by eroding benefits packages and 
activating transitions into work, a key objective being to foster localised institutional 
experimentation around these general goals' (Peck, 2002: 342). 
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as workfare entails the decentralisation of delivery and encourages local 
autonomy, responsibility and experimentation, leading to a reinvention of the 
relationship between the local and national scale which, under the welfare state, 
had the former in a subservient position delivering the programmes of the latter 
(see Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 2004). This approach to scale allows engagement with 
how scales are being actively reconstructed as policy transfers take place rather 
than assuming that ideology circulating at the global scale automatically 
translates down to local variations on the ground. 
In this work policy transfer is implicated in changing state spatialities. They are 
linked to efforts to understand the transitions that are occurring in the state after 
the breakdown of the Keynesian welfare settlement in the 1970s (Peck, 2001). 
Given this concern, policy transfer is analysed in terms of the role it plays in the 
transition to new state forms around the world. Jessop and Peck (1999) analyse 
policy transfer as an integral aspect of the restructuring of the Keynesian welfare 
nation-state to what they describe as a Schumpeterian workfare post-national 
regime (SWPR) (see also Jessop, 2002). They argue that we are seeing a 
reordering of economic and social policy in space and time produced through a 
combination of 'fast policy' transfers and localised disciplinary mechanisms. The 
resulting rearrangement of social and economic space-time marks out the 
parameters of the emergent SWPR. Such a sensitivity considers spatiality and 
temporality as integral to policy transfer and not just the platforms and timelines 
of the policy transfer process. 
A particular strength of these analyses is that they recognise the work that goes 
into making policy transferable across space. In effect, space must be made 
traversable for policy. The particular type of policy transfer that is described here 
is 'fast policy' transfer, a distinctive pattern of policy formation that has proven 
particularly apposite for the spread of 'neoliberal' policies like workfare (Peck, 
2002; Jessop and Peck, 1999; Peck and Theodore, 2001). For these authors, the use 
of fast policy explains why so many policy-making bodies, including national, 
regional and urban administrations, have adopted neoliberal policies despite the 
probability that these will not be in their best interests (Theodore and Peck, 2000; 
Peck and Theodore, 2001). Fast policy operates in a political context privileging 
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speed and seeking policy solutions to particular problems as soon as possible. 
Policy making is therefore conducted with haste in the context of a constructed 
crisis demanding urgent action, often justified by invoking the accelerated pace 
of the real world. Relatedly, fast policy demands quick results which affect policy 
targets, sites of implementation and the criteria selected for evaluation (Jessop 
and Peck, 1999). It is characterised by the use of local success stories as the basis 
of their argument combined, ironically, with the essentialisation and delocalisation 
of the reform itself in order to make it transferable, the use of charismatic' agents 
of persuasion' to circulate the policies (see for example Peck, 2005; Gibson and 
Klocker, 2004), the decoupling of the moment of reform from the results of the 
reform, the creation of what Peck (2002: 349) describes as 'transferability 
packages' - effectively how-to manuals for particular policy transfers - and 
importantly the use of particular metrics of assessment which frame the debate in 
particular ways and close out other perspectives on the issue. 
An outcome of the work that must go into the process of policy transfer is the 
production of particular transnational policy transfer channels and networks. In a 
study of the transfer of the Business Improvement District3 (BID) model of urban 
governance across sixteen countries, Kevin Ward (2006, see also 2007b) has 
investigated how these programmes became 'policies in motion'. Focusing on the 
transfer of BIDs between 'export' and 'import' zones in the US and the UK, Ward 
shows how the 'local' political conditions of certain cities in each country were 
engineered to make the possibility of setting up a BID attractive and plausible. 
The forty-plus BIDs in New York City became constructed as 'models' of the BID 
programme in the UK as particular actors interested in setting up BIDs worked to 
produce the necessary institutional conditions - in this case in the form of town 
centre management partnerships with mixtures of private and public 
representatives - while conducting and drawing on studies of New York that 
marked it out as a success story. Eventually, the flow of certain actors and 
documents back and forth across the Atlantic, facilitated by think-tanks, trade 
organisations and such like, resulted in a more or less successful policy transfer 
3 BIDs are usually private-public partnerships that manage public space in certain areas 
of a city in the interests of improving it for the business community and consumers 
(Ward, 2006; 2007b). 
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realised when the UK Government introduced legislation to allow for the 
creation of BIDs in the UK in the early 2000s. 
Ward illustrates the complex geographies and politics that underlie the 
emergence of policy' diffusion channels and distribution networks' (2006: 70) and 
demonstrates what occurs with policy transfer. Furthermore, he argues that 
processes of policy transfer involve not just the creation of new transnational 
structures but the re-subjectification of state actors involved in the process along 
the lines of certain values associated with the policy - in this case to be more 
enterprising and entrepreneurial in their execution of public roles. In conclusion 
he argues that this opens up the 'black-box' of neoliberalisation (2006: 71) and 
reveals how what we recognise as neoliberal is constructed and not as all-
encompassing as it seems. Policy transfer is recognised as a constitutive process 
that changes and produces subjectivities and spatialities instead of simply a 
process that occurs across pre-existing spaces and subjects. 
This nascent geographical literature goes some way to shoring up the 
shortcomings of the political science policy transfer literature described in the 
previous section. The work of Peck and colleagues on workfare recognises the 
inherent spatiality of policy, in this case the redefinition of interscalar 
relationships that result from a policy transfer, meaning policy transfer can often 
contribute to the apparent power of certain scales as well as being beholden to 
them. This work also tightens the link between the nature of the transfer, both in 
terms of the content and the particular strategy of transfer utilised, and the kinds 
of spaces and scales that are produced as a result, hence emphasising the 
importance of the former. Ward adds to this by focusing on the production of 
policy transfer charmels connecting up I export' and I import' policy zones. By 
highlighting the work that goes into making the space separating two 
administrative units traversable by a particular policy, Ward shows how policy 
transfer needs to be analysed as a moment in the creation and/ or maintenance of 
structures, what he calls policy transfer channels, which link disparate places. 
Interest in policy transfer within this literature has coalesced around efforts to 
understand how broader processes of change are being worked out, in this case 
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the process of neoliberalisation (see England and Ward, 2007). Neoliberalism, the 
application of market principles in the management and governance of the state 
and its subjects, has for these authors become ubiquitous in state restructuring 
processes over the last thirty years. From a geographical perspective, rather than 
being the relatively unproblematic rolling out of an aspatial marketisation 
programme, the process of neoliberalisation has been highly uneven, negotiated 
and contingent (Peck, 2001; 2003; 2004). It is in this context that these studies 
understand policy transfer: as a way into studying how this process is occurring 
- an effort to open up the 'black-box' of neoliberalisation (Ward, 2006). Policy 
transfer is understood as a technology of neoliberalisation (England et al., 2007). 
Making policy transfer an integral feature of a state system 'in motion' (Peck, 
2001: 449) suggests that static conceptions of policy actors like epistemic 
communities will be inadequate. As state systems change as will the means by 
which policy actors are integrated into the state policy-making apparatus. Peck 
(2008) conveys a sense of this in his discussion of the emergence of neoliberalism 
as a political project. For Peck any suggestion that neoliberalism can be portrayed 
as a coherent linear passage from the ideas of a self-contained group of 
intellectuals into a policy programme mistakes the nature of the project. Rather, it 
was cobbled together out of a number of critiques of laissez faire and the welfare 
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state emerging from a variety of institutional sites situated in North America and 
Europe but connected together by networks like the Mont Pelerin Society. 
Through the negotiated formation of alliances between different intellectuals and 
eventually with powerful actors in Atlantic states, and the opportunistic 
deployment of neoliberal policy solutions and their subsequent negotiation of 
success or failure, the neoliberal project has been continuously constructed and 
periodically remade since World War Two. This is an epistemic community 
insofar as its members make a collective claim for a particular kind of non-
Keynesian economic expertise, but it is held together by fuzzier notions than 
shared concepts of validity and causality. It is better understood through the 
shared commitment to a certain set of knowledges regarding the power of the 
market, the undesirability of the state for governing society, and, importantly, the 
policy enterprise associated with this. A commitment to this policy knowledge 
over shared notions of validity and causality, or a desire for power in itself, has 
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characterised the 'neoliberal' community's efforts to ingratiate themselves into 
policy-making circles, and the willingness to reconstruct that enterprise in more 
politically palatable forms to remain there. 
This suggests a rethinking of epistemic communities which recognises that while 
it is shared knowledge that defines them, their relationship to policy, and to 
policy-making, is not one way. The neoliberalisation of the state system has been 
a negotiated process which has resulted in an epistemic community needing to 
reconstruct its knowledge, and itself, in line with the demands of negotiating 
alliances and the circumstances in which it has had to work. Driving policy 
transfer involves epistemic communities actively reshaping themselves and their 
knowledge to allow the traversal of space so that their broad policy enterprise 
might be realised. This 'in process' notion of epistemic communities prevents it 
from becoming a static conception. 
However, this research, while empirically showing how epistemic communities 
are not external to the state system but linked into it in particular ways, centres 
the power of the state. The capacity of the state to produce policy is linked to its 
role shaping social relations at a variety of scales. Epistemic communities 
intervene on this process in an effort to make the state perform this role in a way 
that will accomplish their desired outcomes. As such, these approaches do not 
wholly overcome the separation of different spheres of action. While spheres 
where particular kinds of social action take place, such as the sphere of 'politics' 
(where policy-making happens), 'society', 'culture' and so on, are made to 
collapse onto each other or overlap, this approach reinscribes the separation in 
terms of power so that agency rests with state actors. The focus on broad trends 
of state restructuring in which particular political actors are implicated, including 
epistemic communities, reflects this preoccupation with the state as a powerful 
macro-entity . 
2.5: Circulating knowledge 
Overlapping with this policy transfer research is work less concerned with 
describing broad state restructuring processes like neoliberalisation than with the 
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circulation of knowledge and how this is constitutive of emergent new, fractured 
and cyborg subjectivities and spatialities. At one end this research has sought to 
delineate the circuits in which knowledge is produced, transformed and 
distributed across space. At the other end research drawing more on post-
structuralist and feminist approaches has tended to focus on the role of specific 
circulating material technologies and practices which condition and govern 
bodies through the ritualisation of certain performances. These approaches do 
not presuppose the state as an abstract principle 'holding' power, focusing 
instead on the way political power works on and through bodies and sites. 
Although this research has tended to not engage with the question of policy 
transfer directly (with the exception of McCann (2008) below), it can provide us 
with a number of insights into these processes and into their relationship to 
epistemic communities. 
While there is a large amount of diversity in the approach and empirical focus of 
these studies, they all share a concern for how knowledge travels across space 
and takes on a transnational, and by association universalised and naturalised 
(Tsing, 2005), character. They suggest that the circulation of knowledge via 
certain actors and texts and through certain conduits and channels reflects the 
carving out of transnational relational geographies (Massey, 2005) which interact 
with spaces of policy to produce new policy geographies (e.g. Hall, 2007). This is 
not a new structure layered over existing ones and forcing them to adapt (e.g. 
Stone, 2004), it emerges within the existing structures and transforms them in the 
process. Recent work by Richard Peet (2007) argues that the involvement of 
certain institutional sites in promoting, both through coercion and persuasion, 
certain kinds of policy for circulation through these means has resulted in a 
global geography of power that has been shaping and reshaping economic policy 
around the world. In Peet's Gramscian mo<,iel certain hegemonic institutions, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, produce policy 
knowledge and policy ideas that are transferred to sub-hegemonic institutions 
situated in the policy centres of nation-states where they are made into 
something considered workable in that country's political and economic context. 
Through these means certain policy regimes (such as neoliberalism) become 
global, although there remain sites of counter-hegemony - in Peet's view 
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currently situated in events like the World Social Forum and the governments of 
South American countries like Venezuela and Bolivia where alternative policy 
knowledges are provided. 
Peet's approach is highly reductive: it marks a clear line between hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic policy knowledge when this division is historically, and in 
practice, decidedly blurry (Bockman, 2007; see below). It also continues to centre 
power in the state system and remains committed to drawing out the contours of 
neoliberalism (alongside neoconservatism and neo-imperialism). But it does 
draw the analytical gaze towards the transnational character of the institutional 
geography of policy formation. The circulation of policy knowledge, ideas and 
programmes requires the existence of such sites - whether they are relatively 
enduring or ephemeral - to drive them on. These transnational, networked 
structures are produced for, with, and through policy transfer. 
Peet's project aside, one important difference this research presents to the 
geographical work discussed above is the focus on the particulars of the 
development and circulation of specific knowledges, rather than reading them as 
constitutive of wider trends and processes. Hence Sheppard (2005) takes a long 
view to the circulation of a particular idea - one that is nowadays associated with 
neoliberalism - through an analysis of the concept of free trade as a 'global 
knowledge'. Sheppard argues that free trade was initially, like all knowledge, a 
local epistemology (see Longino, 2002) that emerged from the particular 
conditions and concerns of certain economic and political actors in Manchester at 
the turn of the nineteenth century. After a successful episode of 'scale-jumping' 
through the repeal of the Corn Law in 1846 this local epistemology began to gain 
traction as more generalisable 'knowledge'. Sheppard shows how the knowledge 
then I globalised' through an uneven and complex spatio-temporal path that at 
various times found a place in the spaces of the British Empire, Europe, the USA, 
and nowadays in the World Trade Organisation. What interests Sheppard is the 
way what remains still essentially a local epistemology managed to gain global 
truth-like status through these movements. 
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The question of the way these circuits are implicated in the production of truth 
becomes more apposite when we consider some of the more post-structuralist 
influenced work in this area. Eugene McCmUl (2008) has expanded conceptions 
of the processes by which policies transfer through a study of what he terms 
I urban policy mobilities'. He refers to the transfer of a I four pillars' drug strategy 
around North American, especially Canadian, cities seeking to ameliorate the 
illegal drug problem through treatment, education, enforcement and harm 
reduction. This last I pillar' reflects the fact that drug abuse is defined in this 
approach as a medical rather _ than criminal matter. This point is important 
because McCann recognises that what is transferring is not just a set of policies 
written on paper or spoken by a policy maker, but a specific way of knowing and 
acting on the drug problem. McCaIUl therefore locates policy mobilities in the 
global circulation of particular knowledges and recognises the role of travelling 
policy experts and their associated texts in producing this. These experts do more 
than just carry a policy from one place to another, they set up spaces of 
emulation and competition through practices like benchmarking, and they 
actively produce and reproduce the policy models by translating them into new 
contexts. McCaIUl also recognises the necessary spaces of mediation which 
facilitate the circulation of policy further. This includes the work of the media 
itself (which he has written about elsewhere, see McCann, 2004), the production 
of documentaries about policy programmes in certain places, academic and 
practitioner journals which publish policy research, and regular international 
conferences where ideas and results can be shared and compared. McCann 
therefore recognises policy transfer as involving a myriad of actors and a range of 
types of expertise, and, importantly, as tightly bound up with the circulation of 
knowledge and the production of truth. 
McCann highlights the means by which policies become mobile and transfer 
between places, but unlike Peck and Ward he is less concerned with describing a 
more general trend in state restructuring through identifying a policy transfer 
chatmel between two particular places than with describing the formation of a 
system of expertise about a particular policy programme and its object. The 
circulation of this expertise and the knowledge it carries with it is a key factor in 
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the transfer of policy. As McCann demonstrates, the emergence of such a system 
reshapes the landscape through which it passes. 
Analyses of such circulatory systems can provide powerful insights into the 
nature of apparently structural forces. A significant example of this is Nigel 
Thrift's work on the nature of capitalism (see the collected studies in Thrift, 2005, 
on which the following discussion is based; see also Olds and Thrift, 2005; 
Bryson, 2000). Drawing together and synthesising a number of theoretical strains, 
Thrift has purposefully destabilised established notions of capitalism and 
reconceived it as an incoherent and cobbled together assemblage of networks, 
spaces and subjects attaining stability and consistency of reproduction for only 
short and spasmodic periods. For Thrift, capitalism is forever changing, forming 
and reforming into an unevenly distributed disunity, held together only by the 
networks that traverse it. Central to this has been his conceptualisation of the 
cultural circuit of capital (CCC), which is made up of practices such as business 
seminars, texts such as management books and similar literature, and experts 
such as management consultants and gurus. The CCC circulates around the 
spaces of capitalism, spreading new philosophies, new theories and new ideas 
about how the global economy works and how firms and individuals can and 
should behave within it. In its stead it produces new spaces of business practice 
and new types of management subject attuned to, and therefore reproducing, the 
(purported) fast-paced world of the global economy. For Thrift this represents 
what is distinctive about contemporary capitalism: its turn to being reflexive 
about itself and its status in the world. 
For the purposes of the present work, it is clear that policy regarding' creativity' 
policy similar to that of the creative industries is travelling on such a circuit. For 
example, Gibson and Klocker (2004) track the movement of particular Anglo-
American books and experts concerned with the relationship between creativity 
and policy - such as Richard Florida and Charles Landry - south to Australia and 
the impact that they had as their visions are translated into policy. Peck (2005) 
has tracked the travelling of Florida and his' creative class' discourse to seminars 
with local government around the United States and elsewhere. This allows us to 
think about what types of social practices are implicated in policy transfer of 
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different types - indeed the CCC seems particularly amenable to the fast policy 
transfer described by Peck. But this adds something further. Policy forms off the 
back of the knowledges that travel around these circuits; from the expertise 
embodied in academics and business thinkers; the ideas codified in their texts; 
the communal production and dissemination of knowledge that occurs at the 
points in space where the circuit rests. 
Thinking about how the CCC and similar circuits function opens up the potential 
sites of investigation into processes of policy transfer. For example, Swain (2006) 
draws on the concept of the CCC to explore the development of a 'transition 
industry' in the Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union. This 
comprised networks of experts, especially professional and academic economists, 
linked to various supra-national institutions, government departments from 
Western nation-states, universities, research institutions and think-tanks. As this 
developed a canon of 'transition theory' formed, backed up by new university 
departments and academic journals. This provided the blueprint for transition 
economies as they moved into capitalism. Circuits formed which allowed 
economists to visit, study, write about and advise the governments of these 
economies, backed up by the legitimated and potentially coercive hand of the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and US State Department. Swain 
underlines the importance of this industry by showing how 'academic and 
professional economic discourses were, at least initially, more influential than 
money, markets and the state in forging, stabilizing and aligning economic 
identities' (2006: 209). 
Although this account of the influence of foreign academics is convincing, the 
model of Western ideas being imposed upon a vacant East is less so. Bockman 
and Eyal (2002) reach further back in time in their analysis to show how a 
transnational network of economists that spanned the East and the West had 
been in place for some time, providing for 'neoliberal' thinkers an ideal 
laboratory to research and explain their ideas. They argue that the drafting of 
transition blueprints after 1989 was a continuation of this network with new 
power dynamics beginning to take hold. This elevated these economists to the 
status of experts with privileged insights into the workings of capitalism. 
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Bockman (2007) argues further that neoliberal knowledges developed in 'liminal 
spaces' between the capitalist West and Soviet East where academics of a variety 
of political persuasions, not just of the right, produced knowledge about 
socialism and capitalism that would be used in utopian neoliberal projects in the 
future. These projects required this knowledge to be able to take shape. In a 
similar vein, Dezalay and Garth (2002) have shown how the adoption of 
neoliberal policy in South America was the result of the combination of the 
circulation of individuals between North American universities and research 
institutes and South American policy centres and the political circumstances and 
histories of South American power struggles. The growth of neoliberal policy 
was not the result simply of American policy imperialism but the 
internationalisation of these regional and national struggles. 
These studies suggest that the moment of circulation, and in the context of this 
discussion the moment of policy transfer, is a moment of potential. By 
emphasising the relationships between the production, movement and 
embodiment of knowledge, they show how expertise emerges in the figure of 
'the expert' able to make links between the knowledge circulating and particular 
political contexts and situations. But the expert is not simply a cipher. They 
negotiate both the circuit and the political context. They produce new knowledge 
informed by both. They communicate this to the circuit and to other political 
actors. They cast themselves as a particular kind of expert that is nonetheless part 
of a wider community. The circuit is the continuous production of new and 
reconstituted knowledge and new and reconstituted experts. 
This results in a subtly different take on epistemic communities to that suggested 
in the previous section. It suggests that we need to think about policy and 
epistemic communities as co-constituted. Policy initiatives can open up a space 
for a range of different previously unconnected actors to cast themselves as 
policy actors, potentially forming into an emergent epistemic community. Hence 
it is not just that epistemic communities will drive processes of policy transfer, 
policy transfers will provide a space for knowledge, that is potentially 
constructive, destructive or transformative of the community to emerge. The 
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hegemony, it was a space in which a cabal of actors was able to form itself into 
'transition industry' experts (Swain, 2006). It was an opportunity for a pre-
existing epistemic community to recast itself in policy terms (Bockman and Eyal, 
2002). Policy transfer can be understood as more than a feature or technology of 
an existing, more general trend, but a site and a moment where something novel 
might take shape. 
2.6: Conclusion 
This chapter has rethought the concept of epistemic communities by sitting it 
alongside a variety of approaches to policy and policy knowledge transfer. In its 
initial form and alongside the policy diffusion and convergence literature, the 
epistemic community is a relatively static conception and amorphous 
explanatory variable, defined geographically in terms of presence or absence at a 
particular political site, and with waxing or waning influence. The growing 
political science policy transfer literature has forced the epistemic community 
concept to take account of how it is implicated in policy formation and transfer 
processes, opening the way for thinking about these as networked social 
formations which have a particular shape and influence on spatial power 
relations. By engaging the geographical literature this possibility is further 
developed through their concern to understand how space is traversed by policy 
and the way that an epistemic community will need to change and reshape itself 
to be able to achieve it. This idea of epistemic communities as 'in process' is 
enhanced when we engage with work on circulatory systems of knowledge 
which suggest that epistemic communities emerge and change in the space. of 
expertise between these circuits of knowledge and the particular political 
situation calling on them. 
The result of this rethinking is to situate policy and knowledge in an interactive 
dynamic through the concept of the epistemic community. This disintegrates the 
notion of epistemic communities as an explanatory concept which policies form 
'in response' to in the political sphere. With regard to policy formation and 
transfer they need to be understood as a double moment. First, how they 
influence policy programmes and policy transfer. Second, how the transfer 
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shapes and reshapes the community. Epistemic communities, and the knowledge 
they represent, are co-constituted with the formation and transfer of policy. This 
means that the particular power of epistemic communities stems from their 
ability to authoritatively intervene on policy-making processes, but these very 
processes will result in changes to the community. 
In conclusion, the study of epistemic communities can be the study of political 
change. The tradition of studying epistemic communities has always been 
concerned with how certain knowledges have come to be influential in the 
formation of policy and providing an explanation for certain policy programmes 
that does not turn to narratives of structural change or institutional power 
games. This chapter has argued that by thinking about the expertise contained by 
these communities as formed through the interaction of policy and knowledge 
they can be thought of as a process within and alongside other processes of 
change. This means that understanding how particular communities form and 
change can give us a powerful insight into how political change is occurring 
more generally. The next chapter will develop this further by outlining more 
fully the theoretical approach that will be taken in this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Policy, knowledge and the constitution of expertise 
3.1: Introduction 
The transnationalisation and internationalisation of policy regimes is one of the 
defining trends of the world today (Jessop, 2002). The previous chapter discussed 
how under conditions of modernity, where knowledge is understood as a neutral 
arbiter for informing policy, the epistemic communities that hold this knowledge 
have come to be recognised as powerful political actors (Haas, 1992), and how 
their transnational, networked character has made them a powerful explanatory 
variable for policy transnationalisation. However, this role of explanatory 
variable has failed to show how they are engaged with these processes. There 
remains an insistence on a separate policy-making sphere that epistemic 
communities are external to. 
Recent literature focusing on processes of policy transfer has offered insights into 
how epistemic communities are involved in policy transnationalisation. These 
literatures can be used to analyse how epistemic communities are constantly in 
the process of integrating into emergent policy-making structures. However, this 
work has been preoccupied with processes of state restructuring at a variety of 
scales, leading to a conception of epistemic communities as powerful only 
through their integration into the state system and implication in restructuring 
processes. By drawing on post-structuralist inspired work on the circulation of 
knowledge that suggests these circuits have power of their own as they reshape 
and realign subjectivities and spatialities in the spaces that they pass through, it 
is possible to dec entre power from the state and think about the particular power 
that epistemic communities express. 
This chapter draws on a range of post-structural literatures to theorise the 
relationship between epistemic communities and policy formation/transfer. It is 
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argued that these exist in a co-constitutive relationship mediated by I circuits of 
knowledge' through which different knowledge forms circulate and interact with 
both. At specific moments of problematisation and translation, circulating 
knowledge forms associated with particular epistemic communities will be 
implicated in the production of policy programmes. As those programmes 
circulate out of the site they will engage, and potentially change, different 
epistemic communities. Problematisation and translation, terms developed in 
governmentality and actor-network theory respectively, here refer to moments in 
processes of political change when knowledge about the world takes centre-
stage. For problematisation: how particular problem-situations are rendered, 
understood, and acted upon through policy presupposes particular ways of 
knowing. For translation: how policies developed in one context can be used in 
another requires knowledge of both, or at least knowledge that is able to assume 
away any differences. These moments are significant because they do not 
necessarily occur under the auspices of I the state', but they have consequences 
for policy and the constitution, government and transcendence of subjects and 
spaces. 
The argument proceeds in a series of steps. First, the post-structural critique of 
knowledge is used to highlight the particular type of power < that epistemic 
communities wield. Knowledge, it is argued, is not reflective but constitutive of 
reality. Most knowledge, however, especially that which informs policy, 
understands itself within a modernist frame which assumes knowledge to be 
singular, cumulative and neutral (Gibson-Graham, 2000). This means that policy 
is implicated in the constitution of reality in more ways than one, it also means 
that epistemic communities have power not just because the knowledge they 
possess is highly specialised but because that knowledge has constitutive effects 
on the world. 
The next two steps show how knowledge is constitutive with regard to policy 
programmes. First, problematisation is discussed by drawing on the 
governmentality literature. This literature focuses on the way particular problems 
of governing emerge at particular times and in particular places which engage 
forms of knowledge that are able to define the problem and couple this with a 
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'solution'. The resulting governmental programme, which can include policy 
programmes, attempts to act on the conduct of individuals and collectives to 
constitute governable subjects and spaces. Second, translation is discussed with 
reference to actor-network theory. Within this approach, translation refers to the 
way that a network is extended through the negotiation of co-existence of 
previously separate and disparate actors and/ or spaces. With regard to policy 
transfer it describes the knowledge work that goes into making a particular 
policy able to traverse space with the effect of changing both the space from 
which the policy transferred and the space into which it transferred. Through 
knowledge circuits epistemic communities are involved in both problematisation 
and translation, but are never in total command of either. 
The final section of the main body of the chapter argues that while programmes 
of government, including policy programmes, are recognised, an aspect often 
underplayed in the post-structural literature is the way that epistemic 
communities form around processes of problematisation and translation. From 
here it outlines an approach to the study of epistemic communities and policy 
formation/ transfer that understands them as co-constituted through these 
processes. Through the circulation of knowledge forms between them, both 
epistemic communities and policy programmes will form and reform in relation 
to each other. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the implications of 
this argument. 
3.2: Post-structuralism and space 
Post-structuralism has made a significant impact on the social sciences, including 
human geography, in recent years (Gibson-Graham, 1996; Doel, 1999; Massey, 
2005; Murdoch, 2006). Beginning as a movement in French philosophy in the 
second half of the twentieth century, post-structural thought has found its way 
into geography as so many post-structuralisms (Murdoch, 2006) through a 
catalytic or guiding influence on such moments as the cultural turn (Barnett, 
1998), the relational turn (Massey and the collective, 1999) and more recently the 
'practice' turn (Jones, 2008). While not representing a coherent philosophical 
edifice or programme of research, post-structuralism emerged from critiques of 
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structuralism which had made its project to uncover the underlying processes and 
structures governing all social life (e.g. Levi-Strauss, 1963; Althusser, 1998). 
Through such strategies as Deriddean deconstruction and Foucauldian 
genealogy, post-structuralism focuses on how abstract and eternal truths and 
meanings are constituted in language and discourse and linked to particular 
social forms and material practices. 
Post-structural approaches to geography have emphasised the multiplicity and 
constitutive power of knowledge. This stands apart from modernist or 
enlightenment conceptions of knowledge as singular, cumulative and neutral 
(Gibson-Graham, 2000). For post-structuralism, there is no knowable ultimate 
truth outside of the particular systems in which so-called truths are produced 
and spoken, leading to an anti-enlightenment critique of methods, ranging from 
science to hermeneutics, which claim to access this truth, and of the 
knowledgeable subject able to use these methods to stand back from the world 
and see it as a whole. The aim of post-structuralism, however, is not to claim that 
this knowledge is 'wrong', but to ask how it came to be privileged over other 
forms of knowledge, and how this privileging has given rise to particular social 
formations. Hence, knowledge does not exist only in an abstract and simple 
binary relation of right and wrong knowledge but in multiple relations with 
other knowledges expressed through material and discursive constellations of 
power. How, for example, scientific knowledge has at present come to claim the 
status of the ultimate producer of truth and meaning is a question of how 
particular institutions, discourses and practices have been able to dominate, 
absorb or marginalise other knowledges. The consequences of such 
rearrangements realises the constitutive power of knowledge. Hence, post-
structuralism is not rehashed idealism in which the world is made in the image 
of the knowledge produced about it but a concern to recognise that knowledge is 
present in the world, not an abstraction from or reflection of it. 
The work of the post-structuralist and post-colonial scholar Timothy Mitchell has 
indicated the nature of this 'presence' by conceptualising the way that 
knowledge about social science objects like 'the economy' contributes to their 
emergence. Mitchell's (1991; 1998; 2002; 2008) project has demonstrated the role 
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of knowledge that understands itself to be 'modern' - in other words singular, 
cumulative and neutral - has had in the colonisation of Egypt. He argues that 
colonisation was not just a matter of dominance, civilisation and/ or exploitation 
but the assertion of modernist knowledge in the colonial government of Egypt. 
For Mitchell, it was a particularly modern and distinctively Western attitude to 
knowledge about the world that would eventually produce the country of Egypt, 
its economy, its army, its population of peasants and so on as the particular social 
forms we 'know' today. This attitude is a separation between the representation 
of the world and the 'reality' that lies behind this (see also Foucault, 1970; Thrift, 
1996). This refers to the way knowledge is produced after the Enlightenment as 
essentially an attempt to represent the world through theories, models, diagrams, 
metaphors - representations.4 The apparent naturalness of this approach to 
knowledge is a result of the enlightenment tradition that dominates much 
Western thought. The way this binary works is not the replacement of the real 
with the representation but the suggestion in the mind of the observer of a 'really 
real' that representations represent in a variety of ways and with varying degrees 
of accuracy and/or ideological slant, but never with perfect simulation (see 
Derrida, 1981). The modernist mindset, therefore, does not think of 
representation itself as 'truth' but it does see critically-defined good 
representation as providing an insight to a truth that still exists' out there'. 
The effect of this is a process Mitchell (1991) calls 'enframing' which works at the 
supposed spatial and social boundary of the object being represented. When a 
social object is represented in such a way that convinces programmers of various 
types that it exists and needs to be acted on for some defined purpose, 
programmes of action will be put in place that' act' on the object, producing a 
variety of expected and unexpected effects. Hence, enframing orders and 
4 As Foucault (1970) has argued, this approach to knowledge in the West came after other 
approaches which had different systems, described by Foucault as 'resemblance'. What 
Mitchell indicates is that this was not a wholesale change across the world but something 
that has spread out slowly from Europe. What Mitchell's discussion of the shift to a form 
of knowledge that favours the representation-real binary shows is that there existed in 
the villages of Egypt the 'resemblance' form of knowledge (Mitchell, 1991: 34-62). But this 
unevenness is not a lag in the inevitable progression towards a 'better' form of 
knowledge, it is not a case of an approach to knowledge based on superstition or 
whatever else losing out to a necessarily more rigorous, accurate or productive way of 
understanding the world. It is, as Mitchell argues throughout his work, a colonisation of 
thought that results directly from the effect of the representation-real separation. 
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populates space in a way that makes particular categories visible, comparable 
and governable. It emerges as the rapprochement of systematic thought and the 
arrangement of human and nonhuman entities and spaces. In regard to the 
colonisation of Egypt, Mitchell (1991) shows how the production of model 
villages, reproduced across Egypt, ordered space so that the 'productive powers' 
of the nation could be measured and potentially improved. Enframing 
establishes potential objects of knowledge which are in themselves what Nikolas 
Rose (1999a: 32) describes as 'irreal'; not quite real, not quite imaginary. Thus, 
through the real-representation binary that Mitchell identifies we can see how 
modernist knowledge is constitutive of the social and spatial landscape. 
The process of enframing marks the social science object upon the landscape. The 
economy is a relevant example of this.5 Theories of how the economy works and 
how policy impacts upon it gather at certain policy-making sites. Based upon this 
knowledge, policy is constructed that polices certain' economic' activities, such as 
exchange and property accumulation, in a way that expects the economy to 
develop in a certain prescribed fashion. Particular sites are created for, or 
enrolled, in this process, such as the courts, the customs service, the taxation 
department and so on, and arranged to enframe the economic. Within these sites 
'each rule, procedure, understanding, constraint, enforcement and sanction' 
(Mitchell, 2002: 292) are what make the economy possible. They provide the 
arena for economic action without being the actions themselves. But everyone of 
these framing devices is a point with a constitutive outside: 
At every one of these points the 'frame' opens up and reveals its dual nature. 
Instead of acting as a limit, containing the economic, it becomes a series of 
exchanges and connections that involve the act of exchange in a potentially 
limitless series of further interactions ... The problem is that the frame or 
border of the economy is not a line on a map, but a horizon that at every 
point opens up into other territories (2002: 292). 
What enframes the economy will also be constituted by unintended (on the part 
of the programmers) relations intersecting with these sites, producing new 
knowledges which can change the way the economy is understood. The frame in 
which the economy is conceived is necessarily constantly negotiated in techno-
5 For perspectives on how the economy is constituted as a 'natural' object for political 
intervention, see Mitchell (2002); Buck-Morrs (1995); Foucault (1991a); Polanyi (1957). 
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political disputes which claim to be about accuracy and ontology but, this 
analysis suggests, have more at stake (see Mitchell, 2005; 2008). 
Social objects like 'the economy' take on an apparent material presence when 
they are performed into being by all the bodies that have their particular 
dispositions and practices shaped by these framing devices. The particular 
performances that constitute market exchange are one example. This is not to 
suggest that similar, or even the same performances of exchange did not exist 
before the emergence of 'the economy' as a represented social object. It is to 
argue that these performances are now understood as situated within broader 
processes that make them comparable with performances taking place in other 
spaces which could also be described as exchange, and also subject to changes in 
those broader processes (CalIon, 1998; CalIon et al., 2007; Mackensie et al., 2007). 
Hence, insofar as the social object of 'the market' is a site of exchange and 
therefore a constitutive feature of the economy, the way that this constitutive 
relationship is understood (for example where the economy is healthy if markets 
operate under conditions of perfect competition) will shape how particular 
markets are constructed, reconstructed and managed in terms of the arrangement 
of bodies, spaces and performances of exchange (Garcia-Parpet, 2007). 
As a result we can see how the spaces in which our lives are conducted get 
reproduced by the very representational knowledge that purports to simply 
describe or analyse them. The economy is not the only example. Institutional 
edifices such as 'the state' (Bartelson, 2001) and networked groupings such as 
'the community' (Rose, 1999a) are similarly produced, reproduced and changed 
through the particular practices that express knowledge about their limits and 
powers. We can also see how new and novel kinds of spaces emerge. New 
techniques of enframing can produce definable spaces policed at certain sites and 
in certain ways. Barry (2006) refers to the creation of 'technological zones' that 
are constitutive of the European Union where differences between certain 
procedures have been reduced and common standards have been established; 
the introduction of common food safety practices in different countries for 
example, or the development of a common form of measurement. These are 
managed at particular strategically situated sites where agencies perform the 
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necessary practices to ensure the integrity of the zone. The EU gains its coherence 
as much from these kinds of policy-based practices as from lines on a map. The 
result is a topology of relations interacting with space to produce new and 
different landscapes and geographies. 
This section has described the particular kind of post-structural ethic informing 
the approach of this thesis to policy formation/ transfer and epistemic 
communities. The next two sections will contribute to the development of this 
approach by discussing two more particular and systematised post-structural 
literatures, governmentality and actor-network theory, to show how post-
structural thought has played out in specific research programmes and draw out 
key concepts from these literatures, problematisation and translation 
respectively, which are central to the approach to policy formation/ transfer and 
epistemic communities outlined below. 
3.3: Problematisation 
Policy is a particular form of knowledge that emerges at particular times and in 
particular places. It is a form of knowledge because it establishes a particular 
world view on some social object, almost anything from single mothers to the 
national economy, and sets out a plan for acting upon it. But this action-
orientation is not the unique feature: it is the ability for the action to be realised in 
some way through the particular powers that have accrued to policy-makers by 
virtue of their position in a state institution. In many instances it is a key step in 
the enframing of an object of knowledge. The sections that follow will discuss the 
concepts of problematisation (from governmentality) and translation (from actor-
network theory) in order to think about processes of policy formation and 
transfer from a post-structural perspective in which this policy knowledge is a 
constitutive feature of social forms. 
The notion of problematisation is drawn from the Foucauldian tradition of 
governmentality. This literature is known for providing post-structural analyses 
of governmental systems that bracket out questions of the state and other macro-
actors, preferring instead to focus on specific moments of governing at the micro-
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scale of the body. Problematisation describes those moments where such 
government became a problem and the kinds of governmental solutions that 
were put in place to I fix' these. The focus on policy here means that certain' state 
actors' are implicated, but they are state actors viewed through the lens of 
governmentality where their power accrues to them through their position in 
emergent and evolving constellations of power rather than from the state itself. 
The first subsection will discuss the governmentality approach and the kinds of 
insights it can provide into political processes. This will be followed by a 
discussion of problematisation, how this is linked to governmentality studies, 
and how these moments produce governmental regimes. 
3.3.1: GovernmentaIity 
Derived from Foucault's later work, governmentality is concerned with the 
I conduct of conduct': how individuals come to conduct themselves in line with 
ideas about appropriate behaviour within a particular social formation (Foucault, 
1991a; for overviews see Barry et aI., 1996; Rose, 1999a; Dean, 1999; Rose et aI., 
2006). This plays on the notion of I government' by understanding it not as a noun 
describing a particular institutional edifice but as the verb meaning' to govern'. It 
suggests that if we are to understand how society is organised today we should 
not start from some macro-entity such as I the sovereign', 'the state' or 'the 
economy' and work our way I down', but from how individuals and collectives 
are governed in particular situations and work our way I up'. As such, this 
approach brackets out notions like the state, civil society and the economy to 
focus on the micro-physics of power. 
There are two linked ways that the term governmentality can be understood. 
From a historical perspective, Foucault argues that since the seventeenth century 
we can see the progressive I governmentalisation of the state'. This formulation 
states that during this time liberal mentalities of rule have asserted themselves by 
arguing that individuals should be freed from the yoke of the sovereign in order 
to govern themselves. But this has not simply been the relinquishing of sovereign 
power. The rise of what Foucault calls biopower results from the proliferation of 
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new sites for the training and disciplining of individuals so that they had the 
necessary tools to conduct themselves appropriately as free subjects: these 
included schools, armies, prisons and mental hospitals (Foucault, 1977). This 
coincided with the rise of statistics which rendered the populace as a population 
visible as a new object of government. This object had its own characteristics, 
tendencies, trends and laws which could be manipulated still further. Sites of 
biopower became where this population could be simultaneously studied and 
instructed in the arts of self-government. The populace was simultaneously 
individualised and collectivised, and government could be 'of each and of all'. 
Following on from this, governmentality can be seen as an analytics of 
government in which the way that individuals and populations are governed 
whether under a liberal, neoliberal, socialist, authoritarian or any other mentality 
of rule is analysed (Rose, 1999a; Dean, 2002; Hoffman, 2006). This approach 
adopts the same perspective on government by emphasising particular moments 
where individuals are governed, through what means, and with what 
consequences. Through emphasising the particular they show how power does 
not need to be thought of in a hierarchy with the state or the sovereign at the top 
acting on the powerless at the bottom. Government, rather, is enacted through 
dynamic constellations of agencies and institutions where power is never 
absolute but accrued through the arrangement of forces. The analytical arithmetic 
is reversed so that the apparent power of the state emerges from the arrangement 
of forces rather than from its ability to assert itself on society. 
Governmentality studies focus on the rationalisation and programmatisation of 
particular technologies of government which simultaneously individualise and 
collectivise members of the population by marking, measuring, counting, 
classifying, orientating and/ or activating them in some way. They include all the 
minutiae of modern life such as passports, audits, census forms, codes of 
conduct, welfare applications and self-help books which subjectify individuals 
and collectives by making them aware of their status, their potentialities, and 
their limitations. By making certain courses of action thinkable and possible, and 
others unthinkable and impossible, these technologies will direct, though not 
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compel, individuals and collectives to behave in certain ways: to have their 
conduct conducted. 
At particular moments these technologies can be arranged in governmental 
programmes guided by particular political rationalities that frame up desired 
outcomes and the appropriate conduct required to achieve these. Hence, 
globalisation is not a descriptor of a particular set of economic arrangements but 
a political rationality that will demand certain kinds of conduct and hence new 
arrangements of governmental technologies (Larner and Le Heron, 2002). The 
result is emergent and often unstable assemblages of policies, concepts, agencies, 
institutions, practices, discourses, spaces and subjects held together and made 
coherent by particular political rationalities (Rose, 1999a; Larner, 2000; 2001; Ong 
and Collier, 2005; Collier and Ong, 2005; Collier and Lakoff, 2005; Collier, 2005; 
Olds and Thrift, 2005; Ong, 2006; Li, 2007a; 2007b). These assemblages give 
objects of government their material existence. 
Governmentality studies seek to denaturalise the taken-for-granted nature of 
governmental systems through their focus on its technical aspects. One way they 
do this is by focusing on the genealogy of technologies. Technologies do not 
appear out of thin air or as the perfect realisations of some state project. They 
have often existed in previous incarnations intended to perform under different 
political rationalities, or they are amalgamations or hybrids of other existing 
technologies. By showing how the technologies that conduct conduct are often 
contingently produced assemblages or reimagined and reworked existing forms, 
governmentality is able to trouble the coherence of governmental programmes 
and reveal their often precarious nature. Furthermore, this focus can reveal the 
way that power is congealed in these often mundane and seemingly neutral 
technologies (Huxley, 2007), and the way that government does not occur only 
within the bounds of the state: many programmes of government emerge from 
distinctly non-state sites such as the insurance industry (O'Malley, 1996) and the 
self-esteem and empowerment movements (Cruikshank, 1999). 
The aim and outcome of programmes of governmentality is the production of 
governable subjects and spaces (Rose, 1999a). This production relies on the ability 
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to both know a particular subjectivity or spatiality and to represent it in such a 
way to make it amenable to governmental intervention. These representations 
are made to line up with particular rationalities and mentalities of rule that can 
shape programmes of government which 'conduct conduct'. For example, 
Rankin (2001) shows how micro-credit programmes aimed at poor women in 
Nepal relied on the idea that this population could behave in an economically 
rational manner given the correct incentives and appropriate resources. The 
possibility of 'rational economic women' being able to break out of the cycle of 
poverty provided the impetus for the creation of the programme along these 
lines. In a study of the Latrobe Valley region in Victoria, Australia, Gibson (2001; 
see also Gibson-Graham, 2006) argues that vanous techniques of 
governmentality, particularly here the enrolment of the place of the valley and 
the people of it in tables of rational economic calculation, produced a view of the 
region as socially constructed and subservient to the 'reality' of the broader 
economy. This meant that the movement of the mining industry out of the region 
by large corporations were generally accepted as the result of changes in the 
national economy that overrode the needs of the people of the area. 
Technologies of subjectification and spatialisation are accompanied by 
technologies of activation which discipline bodies and minds into producing 
certain types of performance (Dean, 1999). For example, Larner and Le Heron 
(2002) have argued that the explosion of benchmarking practices amongst private 
and public institutions has served to create spaces and subjects attuned to very 
particular codifications (usually numerical measurements) of who their peers are 
and how they compare in terms of aspects of their performance. These' spaces of 
comparison' discipline individuals and workplaces in line with certain 
aspirations and direct them to compete on these terms, producing a particular 
type of globally-oriented subject. Academia has not been immune to these 
benchmarking technologies, the impact the rapid rise of numerous university 
ranking tables around the world is having on universities and governments is a 
testament to this (Larner and Le Heron, 2005; Dill and Soo, 2005). All of these 
governmental technologies work with ways of knowing the world that subjects 
intemalise and reshape their practices through, resulting in their being rendered 
governable. 
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In sum, governmentality provides a way of thinking about how governmental 
regimes are constituted at the level of discursive and material practice as 
contingent, unstable and dynamic assemblages of spaces and subjects. It has 
troubled the coherence of governmental programmes by showing the extent to 
which they are contingent lash-ups of different technologies reimagined and 
reassembled under some emergent rationality. It has blurred the state/civil 
society / economy tripartite which informs much social science analysis by 
shOWing how populations are governed through the arrangement of different 
technologies that have their origin and their action in both' state' and 'non-state' 
sites. The following subsection will discuss the role of knowledge and expertise 
in these processes and how these reproduce and change a governmental system 
through the process of problematisation. 
3.3.2: Problematisation and expertise 
Governmentality, as practice and analysis, proceeds from particular 
problematisations. This particularity is important. As Dean points out, 
'problematisations are relatively rare. They have particular dates and places, and 
occur at particular locales or within specific institutions or organisations' (1999: 
27). They are produced when the practice of governing, of conducting conduct, is 
presented with a problem that makes the way things have been carried out to this 
point no longer rational, conceivable or even possible. The art of government is 
to couple this problem-situation with a solution, a programme of government, 
which shapes conduct in new ways and produces new subjects and spaces. 
Hence, problematisations drive the constitution of governmental systems. 
Problematisations rely on knowledge. A problem situation presupposes the 
existence of a normative framework constructed out of knowledge generally 
accepted as 'true' through an appeal to some arbiter of truth, such as scientific 
rationality. More than this, in order for a problem solution to become apparent it 
must be represented as such by drawing on that normative framework in a way 
which successfully marginalises counter-claims (Li, 2007a). Hence in processes of 
problematisation the apparent neutrality of scientific rationality can give great 
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power to scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge. In this sense 
expert knowledge is central to problematisation, and by extension to the 
constitution of governmental systems. How the world is rendered intelligible by 
these experts, through certain representations of it for example, will present 
certain situations and contexts as problematic and hide or marginalise others 
(Rose, 1999a). 
Studies of governmentality, then, set their analytical gaze on the need to make 
the world intelligible for governmental action through the utilisation and 
mobilisation of expertise. The figure of the expert, who will be situated in and 
largely constituted by one or more epistemic communities, is essential to the 
production of authoritative knowledge in particular areas of government. These 
experts provide the representations that make particular situations visible, the 
language that makes them analysable, and the programmes that make them 
solvable. The discursive resources and authority these experts offer is vital for the 
envisioning and successful implementation of governmental programmes. 
Experts, and their epistemic communities, are integral to the emergence of 
problematisations and the changes to governmental arrangements that ensue. 
However, the governmentality literature does not situate expertise on a plane 
beyond the spaces of the political from which it exercises its influence on the 
latter: experts too are governed by the systems they are implicated in. Expertise, 
while realised in the individual, is as much based on their situation within 
governmental systems. The expertise of the psychologist, the economist, the 
climate scientist or the sociologist is constituted by the institutionalised networks 
of their epistemic communities, with all the particular rituals and practices 
associated with membership, and the networks through which they are connected 
to state hierarchies, resource distributors, publishers, journalists, research 
subjects and all the other actors that attempt to govern, or be governed by, them. 
While experts work with problematisations, they are also shaped by them. The 
deployment of usually calculative technologies of activation, like benchmarking 
(Larner and Le Heron, 2002), audit (Power, 1997) and contractualism (Yeatman, 
1998), highlights the way that experts are governed along with other societal 
actors. While they are expected to render the world governable through the 
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deployment of their expert knowledge, they are also expected to perform in line 
with the requirements of these calculative technologies. This results in a 'diagram 
of power' (Deleuze, 1988; Rose, 1999a) where individual capabilities and 
constraints are realised in tables measuring targets, comparing performance and 
distributing rewards and punishments in a rationalised fashion. 
Due to the central role of expertise, problematisations have a relationship with 
epistemic communities. They also have a relationship with policy programmes. 
This means the notion of problematisation is useful for thinking about the 
relationship between epistemic communities and policy, but also makes clear 
that this is a complex relationship. This will be returned to shortly. The next 
section will discuss the ANT concept of translation. 
3.4: Translation 
One of the consequences of post-structuralism, alongside other influences, has 
been the rise of 'network thinking' (Knox et al., 2006). This focuses not on pre-
formed containers in which social action happens but on the networks of human 
and non-human actors and objects that shape social formations. Hence network 
analysis allows boundaries produced through material concepts like the nation-
state, the firm, the community and even the individual to be transgressed while 
still maintaining analytical coherence (aIds and Yeung, 1999; Hughes, 2000; 
Yeung, 2000; Faulconbridge, 2007). It is along such networks that policy transfer 
occurs and the conscious and unconscious production and reproduction of them, 
even if it is just for the time it takes to make the transfer, is a key component for 
understanding how policy transfer works (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 
2004; Stone, 2000; 2004). This section looks at a distinctive kind of network theory 
that has been, often uncomfortably, dubbed actor-network theory. The following 
sub-section will discuss first what the project and approach of actor-network 
theory (ANT) has been over the last twenty years and how it has come to be of 
interest to geographers. This will be followed by a discussion of a key concept in 
ANT, translation, and how this concept is useful for thinking about processes of 
policy transfer. 
64 
3.4.1: Actor-network theory 
Whether networks are conceived specifically as a particular type of 
organisational form, or at a more general level as the basic social form, it is clear 
they require relational thinking, forcing us to 'theorize socioeconomic processes 
as intertwined and mutually constitutive' (Mitchell, 2000: 392). Methodologically 
this shares ground with ANT (see esp. Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour, 2005), 
although the latter is not strictly a network approach. The term network itself is 
nebulous within the literature, one of the main protagonists, Bruno Latour, has 
himself swung back and forth concerning the usefulness of the term and of the 
whole naming of ANT itself (compare Latour, 1999 and 2005). However, there is 
no doubt that it has been influential in human geography's relational turn. This is 
because the concept of the actor-network bypasses dualisms like structure-
agency by postulating that the actor is a network of traces made up of various 
types of connections (Murdoch, 1997). As in governmentality there are no 
overarching structures like 'society' or 'the global economy' or some basic 
building block of 'the individual' or 'the family'. Actors are not distillations of 
'global' processes, but they are not inherently 'local' either as they are realised 
through actor-networks that can stretch out over space. The ANT dictum of 
'follow the actors' attempts to trace all the human and non-human connections 
that stabilise into a particular social formation. 
Associated especially with the work of Bruno Latour (see Latour, 2005), Michel 
CalIon (see CalIon, 1986) and John Law (see Law, 1994), ANT concerns the 
creation and maintenance of the relationships that are constitutive of an actor or 
object and as such is a ruthless application of semiotics: 'entities take their form 
and acquire their attributes as a result of their relationship to other entities' (Law, 
1999: 3; see also Bingham, 1996). The individual, for example, is de-centred 
because it is an artefact of an actor-network rather than a pre-defined and 
essential being inserted into actor-networks. This requires sensitivity to the work 
that goes into the formation of the actor-networks that make up institutions and 
formal networks as well as taken-for-granted societal stratifications such as class 
and ethnicity. The social world, then, is not composed of these social 
stratifications and institutions in the first instance but of heterogeneous actor-
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networks of humans and non-humans assembled deliberately, contingently or 
accidentally in socio-technical arrangements. 
ANT was developed to understand how science had come to attain the power it 
has in modern society in the wake of the 'science wars' of the 1970s when the 
self-evidence of scientific practice was questioned by sociologists studying the 
social construction of scientific 'truth' (Longino, 2002). Developing ideas that 
were in part attributable to Foucault, ANT theorists sought to understand how 
relations were developed between the laboratory and the 'outside world' 
wherein the knowledge produced in the laboratory (the science) came to be seen 
as authoritative. It is argued that through the active construction of networks 
connecting up humans and non-humans knowledge created in sites like the 
laboratory is able to circulate to a range of sites and be accepted by a range of 
other actors. If such work of construction is successful we see not so much the 
enlightenment of society based upon the knowledge as the rearrangement of 
relations and reconstitution of practices that are constitutive of social formations. 
Latour's (1988) classic study of the 'Pasteurisation of France' demonstrates how 
this can occur. First, in the site of the laboratory, Louis Pasteur performed a 
number of tests which, for the first time, rendered microbes visible as a societal 
actor creating the plague of anthrax. These laboratory-like conditions were then 
reproduced, as best as possible, in the field, and the vaccine shown to have been 
effective in the laboratory was shown to be equally effective in this reconstituted 
field site. The movement from field - where samples were collected - to the 
laboratory, where the samples were made visible and connected to anthrax for 
vaccination development - and back to the field - where the vaccine was shown 
to be effective against anthrax - made Pasteur's laboratory a key site for the 
production of socially useful knowledge about anthrax, microbes and 
vaccination. As the possibility of the prevention of anthrax spreads, more and 
more farmers become enrolled in an extensive network with Pasteur and his 
laboratory in the centre. In the process farming society is transformed as new 
farming practices (e.g. vaccination) are utilised, farm space is reconceived (as 
requiring particular sanitation practices), and a new actor in farming, and wider 
society, is paid heed (microbes). Many French farms came to be enrolled in this 
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network through Pasteur. Through the role of his laboratory in reconstituting 
French society he became a powerful actor, despite this power coming from the 
existence of the heterogeneous network itself. The bundling of this with other 
laboratory-based work under the name of I science' has made this a powerful 
source of knowledge in modern society. 
The contribution of ANT in the last two decades has been to destabilise the 
giveness of seemingly stable entities by focusing on the connections and traffic of 
the networks that constitute those entities (Thrift, 2000). By bringing non-
humans, everything from microbes to laboratory equipment, into the equation 
and treating them as symmetrical with humans boundaries between society and 
nature, structure and agent, and other powerful dualisms have been done away 
with. The focus becomes on the particular processes through which networks are 
formed and held together. The next sub-section discusses these processes in more 
detail with regard to how they can help us think about processes of policy 
transfer. 
3.4.2: Translation 
For the purposes of this thesis the key insight of ANT comes from its unrelenting 
focus on processes of network formation, particularly the role of translation 
(Latour, 2005). The enrolment of other actors in a network requires practices of 
engagement that consolidate their membership but that reconfigure the network 
in ways that can involve more than just its extension (Murdoch, 2006; see also 
Massey, 2005). Key to this is the translation of an encounter into a relationship. 
This process is central to the formation and maintenance of actor-networks. It 
refers to the way that relational associations are formed through the negotiation 
of the co-existence of two or more actors (see CalIon, 1986; Law, 1999; Latour, 
2005). Through the performance of these relationships they become ties that bind 
and the actor-network attains some stability. As a result actor-networks are 
forever in flux because of the constant process of translation, but conversely they 
are stabilised by the repetition of performance. This repetition is sought after by 
centres of calculation, such as Pasteur's laboratory, which want a stable network. 
Through the deployment of metrological systems and the routinisation of sets of 
67 
practices, achieved via the circulation of 'immutable mobiles' like documented 
sanitation procedures, relatively enduring actor-networks can result. 
Processes of translation implicate knowledge in a number of ways. For one, the 
ANT literature describes the role of 'immutable mobiles' in holding a network 
together. These are materially stable knowledge forms, including documents, 
papers, reports, visual material, books and people, that circulate between the 
nodes of an actor-network and contribute to the reproduction of the relationships 
between them. These mobiles are the means by which a network is held together. 
Two, the process of translation often requires expertise of some form to ensure it 
is successful. A translation requires a way of knowing the two different nodes that 
makes them able to be linked in a relationship that will often change both of 
them in some way. This will often depend on the work of coalitions of expertise 
distributed across the different nodes. Finally, this production of some way of 
knowing two different nodes so that a translation can occur and a relationship 
can form will often result in new forms of knowledge that emerge from the work of 
expert coalitions (Czarniawska and Sevon, 2005; Lofgren, 2005). Hence Williams 
argues that: 
the notion of translation takes us beyond simplistic ideas about transferring 
immutable knowledge, and leads to consideration of knowledge creation. 
There is a very fine line between knowledge translation and creation (2006: 
593). 
Like problematisation, processes of translation implicate knowledge and 
expertise in a variety of complex ways. 
Returning to the question of policy networks, what ANT suggests is that the 
formation of a network is about more than just creating a link between actors: it 
is also about negotiating a space in which the link is able to take hold. The 
process of translation in the formation of a network can result in changes in the 
network and in the localised site that the network is linking into (Czamiawska 
and Sevon, 2005). This is the key lesson for thinking about policy transfer 
networks which are often not as deliberate or centred as Pasteur's network. As 
Murdoch (1997; 2006) suggests, these latter networks are 'panoptic' because an 
established centre is able to exert a high degree of control over the aligned spaces 
and actors. He describes these as network 'spaces of prescription'. Policy 
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networks, however, will usually have more in common with network I spaces of 
negotiation' in which the links are 
provisional and divergent, where norms are hard to establish and standards 
are frequently compromised. Here the various components of the network 
continually negotiate with one another, forming variable and revisable 
coalitions, and assuming ever-changing shapes so that no clear centre 
emerges. While this second type may be seen as an early version of the first -
once relations are settled then a dominating centre will emerge and norms 
will be imposed - it does not always work out this way; sometimes networks 
take shape in non-centred ways (Murdoch, 2006: 79). 
This tends to be the situation with policy transfer as these networks are often 
only formed temporarily and will dissipate or change into a different kind of 
network when the transfer is over. Policy transfer, then, will often be about the 
coordination of a policy transfer actor-network rather than the establishment of 
permanent and semi-permanent relations around a definite centre. 
Drawing on ANT brings certain aspects of policy transfer into focus. The 
coalition of actors driving the policy transfer needs to make the connections 
between policy-making sites. This involves the enrolment of different kinds of 
policy actors at both I sending' and I receiving' sites and the translation of the 
policy, of the object of the policy, and of the objectives of the actors involved to 
the point that their interests are sufficiently aligned for the desired transfer, or 
some form of it, to be achieved. This means that the formation of a policy transfer 
actor-network will be a strategic enterprise as different and often competing 
interests are negotiated, marginalised and transformed. It is here that expertise, 
and the epistemic communities they are situated in, can play an important role. 
Through the strategic production, deployment and marginalisation of knowledge 
- about the policy, the object to which it is directed, and what it is expected to 
achieve - in other words processes of translation, policy actors with different 
interests can be aligned around a particular course of action and a particular 
policy transfer, however temporary that alignment may be. What ANT directs 
attention towards for policy transfer, then, is the need to make a policy 
transferable not because a policy network has been developed, but through the 
development of the policy network. Policy transfer is not just about connecting 
disparate policy-making sites, but making the connection a strong one by making 
the use of a particular policy in each site make sense. 
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3.5: Co-constituting expertise 
Post-structural approaches have proven a very productive route for thinking 
about the role of especially modernist knowledge in producing and reproducing 
social relations. However, they have tended to focus only on the way that it is 
implicated in the constitution of social formations. Governmentality has been 
concerned with the way that government is made possible through the 
production of governable subjects and spaces. ANT has analysed how social 
formations have emerged out of socio-technical assemblages of previously 
disparate objects and subjects. Timothy Mitchell's (1991; 2002) post-colonial 
project has been about colonialism as the production of the nation, the national 
economy and the national population as objects of government for colonial 
powers. These all recognise the power of expertise but tend to underplay how 
that expertise is produced. In this section it is argued that by recognising 
knowledge and expertise as situated in epistemic communities there is an 
opportunity for thinking more systematically about how expertise is constituted 
and mobilised for the production of social relations. 
While knowledge has been recognised as existing in a co-constitutive relation 
with the spaces and subjects with which it is entangled, the balance has tended to 
be towards a focus on the spaces and subjects that result from knowledge 
interventions. This has meant that while this work recognises the way that 
knowledge is changing - for example the way the 'economic' is increasingly 
thought to involve 'non-economic' factors - and the implications that has for the 
kinds of spaces and subjects that are being produced, the question of the specifics 
of who is producing that knowledge, and how and why they are doing this, have 
tended to be underplayed. While the spaces and subjects of governmental and 
other types of intervention are historicised and recognised as multiple, fractured 
and incomplete, there is a tendency to not extend this courtesy to the experts and 
programmers who are made the co-extensive embodiment of the governmental 
rationality in question (Wilson, 2006; Tamas, 2007). 
This shortcoming leaves certain aspects of the literature open to criticism. At one 
level expertise is often treated as expressing, or expressive of, a broad rationality 
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often associated with a particular institutionalised space. Hence Mitchell's (1991; 
2002) analysis gives the impression of a relatively homogenous 'Western' 
knowledge colonising a similarly homogenous 'Egyptian' knowledge: the 
possibility of difference or conflict within either is subsumed. At another level 
expertise is understood only in simple terms as definable under pre-given 
categories. Hence ANT theorist Michel CalIon's analysis of the performativity of 
economics and its role in the production of the economy (see CalIon, 1998; CalIon 
et al., 2007) tends to treat economists as all similarly constituted and the 
economics discipline as coherent and consistent across space when it is neither 
(Fine, 2003). At another level the frequent failure to engage with the constitution 
of experts through their relations with each other and with those they govern, and 
how practices of resistance can subvert or denature expertise resulting in the 
expert being reconstituted themselves, does not do justice to the extent that 
knowledge is always already socialised, spatialised and implicated in relations of 
power (Allen, 2003, see especially his critique of Nikolas Rose, 1999a, pgs 139-
151). 
This does not need to be the case: the production of expertise is in itself a project, 
and a problem, of government. Recent work in critical development studies have 
emphasised the professionalisation of development as a process that engages 
with, and is implicated in, processes of neoliberalisation (Bondi and Laurie, 
2005). This work highlights the way expertise is associated with certain forms of 
'cultural capital' (see Bourdieu, 1986) resulting from particular kinds of Western 
university education, association with certain agencies from supranational 
organisations like the World Bank to smaller and more specific Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and access to particular technologies 
(Walker et al., 2008). This draws attention to the discourses, sites and techniques 
that constitute certain actors as 'experts' through the professionalisation of 
development both in Western-based NGOs (Kothari, 2005) and 'indigenous' 
agencies (Laurie et al., 2005). These experts, it is argued are produced in part 
through their enculturation with particular neoliberal technologies and cultures, 
such as audit and contractualism, that mark them as development professionals. 
Although there is a danger here of substituting 'Western' or colonial imperatives 
for neoliberal ones so that the production of expertise becomes co-extensive with 
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neoliberal rationality (Barnett, 2005), Laurie et al. (2005) show how I counter-
spaces' are able to open up through, in their example, indigenous leaders using 
their professionalisation to enable an engagement with neoliberal development 
while producing alternative development plans. What these studies show is the 
way that the constitution of expertise is entangled with the complications of 
instituting programmes of government. This means rather than thinking of 
expertise simply as the means through which these programmes are rolled out 
we need to situate them in a more complex relationship with each other. 
This thesis responds to this challenge by situating expertise as emergent in a co-
constitutional relational dynamic between epistemic communities and 
programmes of government; specifically, policy programmes. These specific 
social forms are linked in space by circuits of knowledge at moments of 
problematisation and translation. Through these circuits epistemic communities 
and policy programmes are able to influence and shape one another while never 
being entirely in control of the processes of problematisation and translation that 
link them up. The remainder of this section will draw on arguments made in this 
and the previous chapter in order to outline this approach in greater depth. 
To begin with, epistemic communities are constitutive of expertise. They provide 
knowledge in some material form and authority for that knowledge through 
their shared commitment to certain principles of validity, causality and policy 
enterprise (Haas, 1992). An expert will be constituted as such by their 
membership in one or more epistemic communities and the access to knowledge 
that this supplies them with. By situating expertise in epistemic communities we 
can delineate its geographical, institutional and social situation, scope and 
limitations. 
Epistemic communities are not static but in process. While they are constitutive 
of expertise they are also constituted by the people who are the experts. These 
people will be differentiated by their particular histories and the knowledge that 
they each 'have', meaning that the community will be uneven in its distribution 
of know ledge across space and time. It is preferable, then, to extend Haas's 
definition and argue that epistemic communities are unified by shared tendencies 
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to ideas of causality, validity and policy enterprise. This suggests the possibility 
that epistemic communities are multi":dimensional with sub-communities 
forming around differing degrees of acceptance of the core ideas. Going further, 
Halfon argues that epistemic communities can usefully be thought of as 
'constrained space(s) of contestation: new rhetorics emerge and stabilize, but are 
disciplined by the community's knowledge practices' (2006: 795). By focusing on 
processes of contestation we can see how a community can maintain its integrity 
while certain dominant conceptions and ideas change over time. Alternatively, it 
can also alert us to how epistemic communities might fragment. By recognising 
how epistemic communities change over time and space we can get a sense of the 
multiplicity of the knowledge that is spoken in expert discourses. 
Epistemic communities form in relation to dynamics of knowledge circulation. 
On the one hand epistemic communities rely on certain circulating knowledges 
that enable members to speak with one another in the same language and appear 
to be working within a shared project, even if oftentimes this disguises divergent 
goals across the community that could soon come to the surface (Sharif, 2006; 
Halfon, 2006). Secondly, it is the circulation of knowledge that can create new 
adherents to the message of the community, allowing it to extend its size and 
make-up. On the other hand the circulation of alternative or new knowledge 
from inside or outside the community can also change it, causing it to change its 
ideas of validity, causality and policy enterprise or to fragment. The integrity of 
an epistemic community is constituted, and threatened, by circuits of knowledge. 
'Circuits of knowledge' describes the specific paths on which codified and 
embodied knowledge - all the documents, papers, reports, visual material, books 
and people - travel and circulate. The particular circuit a knowledge form travels 
on may be entirely unintentional: for example, a research report produced for a 
government department may end up on the desk of an academic in a university 
on the other side of the world who then hands it on to local community activists. 
Or it may be deliberately put together: for example a management book that is 
distributed to attendees at the kinds of organised business seminars Thrift (2005) 
describes as the cultural circuit of capital. Reflecting to a certain extent the 
distinction between tacit/embodied and codified knowledge (see Maskell and 
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Malmberg, 1999; Gertler, 2003), different knowledge forms will have different 
properties and travel by different means when they circulate (Bathelt et al., 2004). 
Hence while codified knowledge can travel further, faster and through more 
channels than embodied knowledge, the latter provides for a more intense 
engagement with the actors and situations it encounters (e.g. Grabher, 2002; 
2004). The important point is that these circuits are material: knowledge can only 
travel because there are appropriate channels for different forms to move down: 
knowledge does not diffuse through space in an agentless process (see the work 
reviewed in Hughes, 2007). 
As well as epistemic communities, circuits of knowledge are implicated in 
moments of problematisation and translation. This means that the kind of 
expertise and knowledge constitutive of and available to these moments depends 
on the circuits of knowledge that have found their way into the 'particular 
locales ... , institutions or organisations' (Dean, 1999: 27) where these have 
occurred. What may have happened, for example, is that a document produced 
by an expert, or even that expert themselves, has managed to engage 
governmental programmers and policy-makers to such an extent that they have 
been presented with an unmistakable problem situation (problematisation) 
and/ or come to think of an external situation as equivalent to their own 
(translation). Out of these moments programmes of government, including 
policy formation and translation, emerge. Hence, material circuits of knowledge 
I connect' epistemic communities with policy programmes. 
As the circuit is material, any connection that occurs between an epistemic 
community and a policy programme through processes of problematisation and 
translation could range from deliberately engineered, through contingently 
lashed together, to entirely accidental. At one end of the scale, ensuring the 
circulation of a particular knowledge form produced within a particular 
epistemic community to a site where it would produce an unmistakable problem 
situation may have been strategically achieved through actors associated with 
that community organising themselves through lobby groups, advocacy 
networks or policy think-tanks to be able to access policy-makers, or even to 
become policy-makers themselves (e.g. Stone, 2004; Peck, 2008). At the other end, 
74 
a paper written by an academic for an academic audience may find its way onto 
a policy-makers desk through a university intern working in their government 
department and foment new ways of thinking about certain problem situations. 
Indeed, a knowledge form produced in one epistemic community-context may be 
used in contexts and ways quite divergent from the intentions of the original 
author. It is not necessarily the case that a knowledge form will be associated 
with the epistemic community 'in which' it was produced, or even with just one 
epistemic community. 
But knowledge forms are not produced only ill the context of an epistemic 
community - processes of problematisation and translation can result in 
knowledge forms, particularly in the form of policy documents. Programming 
and policy-making sites are not singular states but coalitions of different actors 
and interests with links to different epistemic communities as well as other kinds 
of political actors. Often it will be a variety of knowledge forms coming together 
in a particular site that induce problematisation and translation. The' friction' of 
this coming together is a productive moment in which new knowledge, and new 
knowledge forms, can be generated (Tsing, 2005). These forms will then 'circulate 
out'; if they are policy documents they will be mobilised in projects of governing 
that' conduct conduct' and produce new subjects and spaces. But they will also 
be engaged, absorbed and critiqued by actors in epistemic communities. This 
returns us to that notion of epistemic communities as in process: these 
knowledge forms could challenge or supplement an epistemic community's 
notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise, resulting in new alliances and 
associations being forged and/ or old ones broken as epistemic communities 
realign themselves to contend with the new situation presenting itself. 
As a result epistemic communities and processes of policy formation/ transfer are 
co-constitutive. Epistemic communities do not so much drive processes of 
problematisation and translation as form and reform through them. But without 
the expertise that epistemic communities provide, policy programmes will lack 
authority in conditions of modernity. This means that we should not treat the 
production of knowledge and the production of policy as if they are happening 
in separate spheres (Jasanoff, 1996; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002; Knorr-Cetina, 
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2007). By focusing on the circulation of knowledge forms - including policy 
documents - and how they are involved in moments of problematisation and 
translation which produce new policy knowledges and reshape epistemic 
communities it becomes possible to discern, in a geographically sensitive fashion, 
how particular forms of expertise come to influence the formation of policy 
programmes and governmental regimes. 
3.6: Conclusion 
Epistemic communities are a powerful political actor with an important role in 
the transnationalisation of policy regimes. However, that role has been under-
theorised and, as a result, the nature of their relationship with the policy process 
has been misunderstood. This chapter has theorised their role by thinking 
through the processes of policy formation and transfer from a post-structural 
perspective and showing how these implicate the knowledge that epistemic 
communities possess. By understanding both knowledge and policy formation as 
occurring in the same sphere and across sites linked up by circuits of knowledge, 
there is no need to see epistemic communities as only on one side of a causative 
equation driving along processes of policy diffusion or transfer. By using this 
approach to trace the dynamic between policy formation and particular epistemic 
communities we will be able to see how the latter have been able to shape policy 
and how they have been shaped by it. 
Drawing on the post-structural perspective links epistemic communities to other 
work in this tradition that has been concerned to understand how knowledge 
shapes subjects and spaces. By bringing in this processual conception of 
epistemic communities we are able to link the production of particular spaces, 
subjects and policy objects, like the economy, to the particular actors producing 
the necessary knowledge. The geography and sociality of these epistemic 
communities gives an insight into the geography and sociality of the expert 
policy knowledge that is constitutive of social relations. This avoids linking that 
knowledge to monolithic entities like particular disciplines or 'The West' by 
providing a more nuanced perspective on where it comes from (compare Callon, 
1998; Mitchell, 2002; 1991; Fine, 2003). It also gives a sense of how knowledge is 
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always already socialised and spatialised and not simply ascribed to particular 
I centres of calculation' where the authority of knowledge is mobilised from 
(Rose, 1999a; see Allen, 2003). 
In conclusion, if we are going to think about the transnationalisation of policy 
regimes there are two elements of the policy process we must consider. One, at a 
general level, we need to think about the material circuits of policy knowledge. It 
is through these circuits that epistemic communities are reproduced and find 
spaces in which they can assert themselves. They are the I infrastructure' of a 
transnationalising policy regime. And two, we need to look closely at the 
processes of policy formation and transfer, how they involve problematisation 
and translation, and how experts and their associated epistemic communities 
play a role in this. What these elements look like and how they play out is an 
empirical question. The remainder of the thesis is concerned with this. 
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4: Researching creative industries policy transfer 
4.1: Introduction 
The methodological approach taken in this thesis stemmed directly from the 
initial observation that the concept of creativity was increasingly being used in 
governmental economic policies and strategies. It was clear that one particular 
policy concept, the creative industries, had been especially prominent in this area 
and the decision was taken to track the transfer of this concept across space in 
order to theorise how 'creativity' has gained prominence in economic policy 
discourse. Thus policy transfer became the 'way in' to understanding this more 
generalised trend. The chapter argues that this requires the use of particular 
intensive, multi-site methods that are informed by a poststructural ethic capable 
of recognising and dealing with the materiality of policy knowledge without 
substituting the particular representations and abstractions of this knowledge 
form for different, but similarly ordered, representations and abstractions. 
The approach draws on Foucauldian genealogy to build a theory of creative 
industries policy transfer. It argues that producing a spatialised genealogy of the 
different instances of the creative industries policy concept emerging in policy 
form or any other policy discourse allows for a consideration of the way these 
instances are linked to each other but does not subsume them within a broader 
logic. A genealogical ethic requires that the materiality of these linkages is given 
full attention as it is from these that tendencies and trends emerge. Guided by 
this ethic, data was collected and analysed for these material links. Out of this a 
process of theory building was initiated that drew in a number of concepts from 
existing literatures to explain in theoretical terms what was being observed. This 
has produced theoretically and empirically rich narratives of creative industries 
policy formation and transfer. 
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The chapter begins with a discussion of why the creative industries policy 
concept was selected for this research. It also discusses the rationale for the 
methodological approach taken and for the selection of the main research sites of 
the UK and New Zealand. The remainder of the chapter is divided into two 
parts: methodology and method. Section 4.3 discusses the Foucauldian 
genealogical approach in greater depth as the methodological approach 
informing this research. It argues that it is possible to spatialise this approach to 
get a poststructural geographical perspective on policy transfer. Sections 4.4 and 
4.5 discuss method. Section 4.4 describes the three data sets used in the research 
and how they were collected. These were: policy and policy-related documents; 
secondary documents that engaged with the creative industries policy concept; 
and semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 38 participants who were involved 
in different ways with creative industries policy. Section 4.5 discusses the 'theory 
building' approach used to analyse these data sets. The chapter concludes with a 
brief summary and an introduction to the narratives that follow. 
4.2: Approaching creative industries policy transfer 
Creative industries policy constitutes the focus for this study. This needs to be 
qualified with the recognition that often the creative industries' policy' that I will 
be looking at is not yet policy as we might traditionally define it insofar as it does 
not make any suggestions or directives for action by particular governmental 
agencies and actors. The original 'creative industries policy document', the 
Creative Industries Mapping Document (CIMD) produced by DCMS in the UK, is 
just such an example because all it does is define what the industries are, then list 
and measure them, arguing that they constitute a rapidly growing proportion of 
the UK economy. It contains no policy directives as such. In this study these 
documents are treated as transferable policy because, one, they are produced in 
designated policy-making sites with an eye to policy being developed in the 
future, and two, more significantly, they establish the creative industries as a 
policy concept that might be used by actors and agencies in other administrative 
sites. 
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There are a number of reasons why this policy concept is a good research object 
for this study. For one, although it was first conceived as recently as 1998, it has 
travelled rapidly around the globe and been utilised in a variety of 
administrative sites at a variety of scales (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). This 
means they are an excellent example of policy transfer and their distinctive 
formulation makes them easily identifiable as such. Second, as they have 
travelled they have overtaken a variety of other policy models, most notably 
those developed around the concept of the cultural industries, suggesting that 
there is something attractive about them to policy-makers (Garnham, 2005). 
Third, as observers have noted, there is a lot of variety in these programmes, but 
explanations for that variety have been limited. And fourth, the development of 
creative industries policy seems to be occurring in places where conceptions of 
the economy and how it needs to be governed and developed are changing, 
suggesting the study of creative industries policy transfer is a productive way 
into understanding these broader shifts. 
It is tempting, therefore, to situate creative industries policy transfer in a 
narrative of global economic and policy change that carries the explanation for 
the transfer within itself. To suggest, for example, that the transfer of creative 
industries policy reflects the growth of these industries as the practices they 
involve become increasingly important in the changing global environment. An 
alternative critical perspective may argue that the creative industries are a chaotic 
concept (Sayer, 2000) that fails to systematically engage with these changes and 
are held together in policy form by a combination of ideology and political will. 
It is not the aim of this thesis to suggest that this is not the case; rather it suggests 
that such an account would move too quickly to explanations and criticisms 
reliant on abstract conceptions of the political and economic environment that 
creative industries policy is responding to and, as a result, possibly missing the 
significance of the transfer itself. Instead this research will respond to Peck's 
(2001: 449) call to analyse state systems as 'process in motion' by focusing in on 
how policy transfer processes shape, and are shaped by, how the world is known 
and acted on in policy. This keeps the focus on how representation is a 
constitutive feature of the 'real' for as long as possible (Barnes, 1996; Bingham, 
1996). 
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This requires a methodological approach able to treat knowledge as a 
constitutive feature of the landscape rather than a reflection of it (Gibson-
Graham, 1996; 2000; Rose, 1999a). It requires seeing knowledge as a materiality 
that orders space rather than an abstraction that represents or corresponds to it. It 
needs to be able to analyse the existence of seemingly abstract knowledge, like 
the creative industries policy concept, by attending to its material forms and 
material effects without resorting to similar abstractions. Fortunately, human 
geography's adoption of poststructural methodologies in the last two decades 
provides the kind of approach needed for this task (Murdoch, 2006; Barnes et al., 
2007). Although these methodologies are diverse, they are united in their 
rejection of the separation of knowledge from the world, seeing instead 
continuity, and asking how the apparent separation is effected and with what 
effects. These effects come about through knowledge imposing order through the 
reconstitution of relations between objects. Poststructural methods, then, focus on 
the relational constitution of their objects of study and how these are changing 
(Murdoch, 2006). 
I will go into more detail on the particular poststructural methodology in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. The remainder of this section discusses site 
selection. Although the decision to use creative industries policy was based on an 
extensive survey that established that this was a rapidly and widely transferring 
policy, and the fact that it is this very characteristic of the policy that interests me, 
the approach I am taking demands an intensive study with a particular focus. It 
needs to find how a particular policy transfer occurred between two 
administrative sites. Because it is focused on the network that joins them, the 
selection of the two sites is to perform a transnational, rather than comparative, 
analysis that is concerned with how the two sites are linked (Kelly and Olds, 
2007). The two sites are the national policy-making centres of the UK and New 
Zealand. 
The first site, the UK, was an obvious choice for the study of creative industries 
policy as it is where the term originated from in the CIMD (DCMS, 1998). 
Examining what has happened to creative industries policy in the UK since this 
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time it is clear there have been a number of changes in how they have been 
conceived and what constitutes appropriate governmental action on them. The 
goal of this analysis, then, was to track the actors, agencies and institutions 
involved in forming and acting on creative industries policy. This can reveal the 
kind of knowledge that the policy programme has been working with. 
The second site is about as far away from the UK as it is possible to get. New 
Zealand was selected in part because of my own familiarity with the country and 
the situation regarding creative industries policy there due to a previous research 
project which had encountered them. Further to this, the New Zealand case 
provides an example of creative industries policy being transferred from the UK 
to occupy a position of some importance on the New Zealand policy landscape. 
More important than both of these, however, and demonstrating why it is 
inappropriate to think of this as a comparative methodology, is New Zealand's 
assumed position at the periphery as a place easily constructed as a I receiver' 
when it comes to policy transfer. Analyses of neoliberalism, for example, often 
assume that the policy experiences of the US and UK were of greater significance 
in terms of international tractability than the experiences of places like New 
Zealand (Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2002; cf. Larner, 2003). There is no 
doubt that the idea of creative industries policy was conceived first in the UK 
before travelling to New Zealand, but does that mean it makes sense only to 
analyse what happened in the UK as the moment of creation and elsewhere as 
the moment of conformity (Larner et al., 2007)7 The aim of this part of the study, 
then, was to find how a policy transfer occurred across transnational space, how 
this reshaped policy in both sites, and the kinds of practices and processes that 
were necessary for this to happen. 
Performing this transnational study meant focusing on those sites and moments 
where transnational connections were made (Tsing, 2005) and local, national and 
global processes, actors and knowledges were weaved together (Amin, 2002; 
Latham, 2002; Massey, 2005) to produce some necessary aspect of a policy 
transfer event. Analysing this with the theoretical framework discussed in the 
previous chapter highlights how these events are linked to the emergence and 
reproduction of epistemic communities. Before this can be done, however, it is 
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necessary to discuss the methodology and methods that will be used to find the 
links. This is the task of the remainder of this chapter. 
4.3: Methodology: towards a spatialised genealogy 
To begin with, this research presupposed a link between the creative industries 
policy programmes being developed in the UK and New Zealand. This is 
confirmed by looking at the key creative industries policy documents of each 
country - the CIMD in the UK (DCMS, 1998; 2001b) and the Growth and 
Innovation Framework (GIF) in New Zealand (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002) 
- where the latter (and later) document draws directly upon the claims made 
about the nature and potential of the creative industries by the UK Creative 
Industries Taskforce that produced the CIMD. However, two things are clear. For 
one, despite this shared central concept these are two very different policy 
documents. The latter document situates the creative industries as a sector 
targeted for government support and intervention in a government programme 
of economic development while the former defines and measures the 
contribution of the creative industries to the UK economy and does not offer any 
real policy directives at all beyond an assertion that these industries are 
increasingly important. And two, even a relatively simple examination of the 
story of creative industries policy in New Zealand reveals that this seemingly 
straightforward imitation masks a complex history of attempts to make the 
creative industries policy concept usable in the New Zealand context. 
The methodological approach of this thesis focuses on the links that join these 
observations up. It needs to track the moments where the creative industries 
concept travelled, and what happened when it got to where it was going. In this 
case, the immediate research question becomes: when did the creative industries 
concept get used in the UK and New Zealand and how did it get assembled with 
other concepts to form policy documents? By locating concepts that are common 
to two or more documents links between them can be revealed - often by looking 
at footnotes, bibliographies and reference lists - or inferred with coincidences of 
language to be triangulated or corroborated. But the key challenge at this stage of 
the research is not to move 'up' to a higher level of abstraction too quickly and 
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suggest that policy concepts like the creative industries are filler for policy 
directions already taken. Drawing this conclusion now blocks out the possibility 
that these policy concepts shaped policy thought in some small, but potentially 
significant, way. It is necessary at this point to keep the concepts, quite literally, 
in their material form as written down on paper and let the policy documents 
speak for themselves. 
This draws on the Foucauldian genealogical method. Foucault described this as 
writing 'the history of the present' (1977: 32) because the goal was not just to 
reverse the standard historical orientation which seeks the present in the past but 
to dispense with the idea of a linear history that in any way, whether it is 
understood as metaphysically inevitable or consequent of revolutionary change 
and the efforts of 'great men', 'progresses' towards the present. These latter 
histories include those that commit the twin fallacies of presentism, in which the 
past is interpreted in terms of the present - for example by analysing rational 
individualism as a driving force in medieval villages, and finalism, in which the 
state of the present is understood as resulting from some point in the past and 
the time that elapsed between is represented as containing the necessary 
unfolding of events towards today - such as in teleological Marxist histories 
which follow a path from feudalism to capitalism (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 
118). Other conventional histories which reject these tendencies work with the 
idea that present concerns, such as the environment or globalisation, offer up a 
chance to interpret history in new ways but do not eliminate the possibility of a 
meta-history - at best they have an auto-critique that recognises these histories 
are interpretations that may be, for example, ethnocentric, elitist or inaccurate. 
What all these types of histories do is unify time into a continuous flow, 
producing a sense of history as unfolding in a linear fashion which, with the use 
of the correct historical methods, can be observed, recorded and spoken of. 
Genealogy in effect rejects this enlightenment inspired idea that the historian can 
adopt a position external to time and base his or her judgements on an 
'apocalyptic objectivity' (Foucault, 1991b: 87). It rejects the possibility of a 
totalising history. 
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But genealogy is not the kind of cultural critique that has been put forward by 
the Frankfurt School or more latterly in 'postmodern' accounts of fragmentation, 
nihilism, despair and the decline of meta-narratives after the enlightenment 
(Dean, 1999). The latter portray a new world order marked by the growth of 
consumer capitalism, the breakdown of traditional social forms, the massification 
of consumption, the acceleration of life, the explosion of spectacle, and various 
other tendencies often said to increasingly characterise society over the twentieth 
century. Despite their aversion to the effects of (usually) the growth of capitalism, 
and perhaps the enlightenment itself, these accounts in fact share a basic 
assumption about the possibility of understanding the world as made up of 
describable epochs marking fundamental shifts in the nature of the world - as 
Dean points out, 'the period from the late 1960s has never been short of prophets 
of a new doom as well as a new dawn' (1999: 43). Genealogy refuses the 
'blackmail' of the enlightenment which wants you to be for or against it 
(Foucault, 1991c: 42-43). What is produced instead is a different type of history, 
an effective history which 'will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless 
obstinacy toward a millennial ending' (Foucault, 1991b: 88). 
Dean (1999: 44) has described this orientation to the past as 'anti-anachronistic' 
insofar as history that is stripped of its progressive and developmental aspects 
which unify it within the ceaseless unfolding of time cannot, by definition, 
contain anachronisms. And yet a consequence of this orientation is that it is often 
concerned with those historical moments and events that don't seem to fit the 
patterns of history as they are often been presented to us - what might be 
described as the 'disreputable origins and unpalatable functions' (Rose, cited in 
Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 29) of particular orders (of knowledge and of other 
types, such as professions) which are held to be transcendent, the kinds of 
'origins' that disrupt implicit appeals to enlightenment reason made in both 
standard and hagiographic histories. Genealogies, concerned with the 
constitution of an object at disparate moments of time, must reject the types of 
origins that feature in these other histories because they assume constancy in the 
object under investigation. They are not interested in the possibility of an essence 
to a historical object that holds it together over time, proposing instead a messy 
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and unstable story of political (or politicised) invention that can be captured by 
the genealogical method. 
Genealogy is a reference to J stock' or J descent' but is not intended in the 
biological understanding of these terms where the past is still present. In other 
words, it is not concerned to show how the past has led up to the present but 
where in the past particular present forms have been produced from. By stating that J as 
it is wrong to search for descent in an uninterrupted continuity, we should avoid 
thinking of emergence as the final term of a historical development', Foucault 
(1991b: 83) is emphasising the singularity of the emergence of any distinctive 
form of discourse or practice, and indeed the singularity of any event, of any 
moment of practice, of any utterance of a statement. These novel forms do not lie 
on a determinative path to some later eventuality or naturally follow on from 
something earlier. Any moment or event which contains within it a particular 
form of punishment say, made up as it is of certain practices, certain materials, 
certain attitudes, certain subjected bodies and certain intentions, is actively 
produced from the traces left by events before. The ritualisation of practice and 
the repetition of discourse allow these productions to bear a resemblance to each 
other over time, but the disparity between moments remains. It is when a 
different trace is introduced, a different form of knowledge about criminals or a 
new technique of punishment for example, that we see mutations occur. 
In relation to the genealogical method we can understand the Foucauldian view 
of power. Foucault's vision of power rejects the societal equivalent of the 
totalising idea of history: the totalising view of power. Rather than descending 
J down' from a position of authority, like the monarch or the state, through the 
echelons of society, power is J diffused' in the micro-relations which taken 
together constitute society. This is not that there is an absolute amount of power 
which is evenly distributed, it is to argue that power appears as relations are put 
into effect by one or both of the parties involved. Nor is it to say that there are no 
actors with seemingly more power than others, it is just to reject the idea that the 
power comes from something other than the institutionalised and spontaneous 
relations that they are situated in. It is the qualitative micro-physics of those 
relations that are of analytical interest. Genealogy is not a history of powerful 
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classes or institutions but may offer insights into how such apparently powerful 
actors emerged. 
This position has led to criticisms regarding the possibility for resistance or 
emancipation in work derived from this methodology (e.g. Fraser, 1981; 
Habermas, 1987; Pickett, 1996). Without a sense of the locus of power, of where 
the root of repressive structures can ultimately be placed, how, these critics ask, 
can forces of resistance mobilise effectively? For Foucault, the answer to this lies 
in the productiveness of power: 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative 
terms: it 'excludes', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth (1977: 
194). 
The mobilisation of practices of resistance are in themselves utilising power, it is 
not a 'capacity' held by the' powerful' but a slippery and multi-faceted resource 
accessible via very particular strategies and technologies. There are no singular 
actors who move 'history' along but potentially resonant changes and shifts are 
always occurring. 
One of the key shortcomings of Foucault's work, however, lies in his engagement 
with space. This may seem surprising as Foucault's work is replete with 
considerations of space, particularly regarding the strategic use of space in games 
of power. This has meant that for geographers Foucault's work has been a source 
of inspiration (Philo 2000a; 2000b; Elden, 2001; Allen, 2003; Crampton and Elden, 
2007), particularly in the analysis of space as a governmental resource - such as 
in the arrangement of spaces in the manner of the panoptic an for disciplinary 
reasons (e.g. Wood, 2007), its use as, or as part of, governmental rationalities (e.g. 
Hindess, 1998; Lamer, 1998; Huxley, 2007), and the way that particular spaces, 
such as the confessional or the clinic, are constituted or changed with shifting 
power-knowledge configurations (e.g. Philo, 2000a; Elden, 2001; Kearns, 2007). 
Despite this, there remains a concern over the degree of absolutism in Foucault's 
conception of space. For Harvey (2007), this remains mired in a Kantian schema 
which separates space from time and, despite Foucault's own concerns regarding 
this, understands space as about difference, as in difference across space, but 
otherwise as fixed and immobile. As a result, Foucauldian work has been 
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concerned with the production of spatial metaphors, such as the panoptic an, and 
the linked production of spaces, such as prisons, that are concerned with the 
manipulation of absolute space. They are the outcome of processes occurring in 
time and uncovered by the genealogical method. The effectivity of space itself is 
obscured. 
Brown's evocation of the genealogical sensibility to history suggests a way 
forward here: 
History is figured less as a stream linking past and future than as a cluttered 
and dynamic field of eruptions, forces, emergences, and partial formations. 
As the discontinuities and lack of directional laws in history are pushed to 
the foreground, history is spatialised - conceptually wrenched from 
temporal ordering (2001: 116-117). 
The use of a spatial metaphor is intended to evoke a vision of time that is 
unevenly distributed, eschewing a narrative of progress. But genealogy also 
happens in space; there is disparity between moments in space as well as time. 
Thus reconstituted spaces, in metaphorical and material form, are integral to the 
shifts in power-knowledge configurations as well as an outcome of them. This 
spatialises genealogy through the lens of the relationally-constituted site. This 
seems a reasonable thing to do; no utterance or statement echoes around the 
world the moment it is made. A genealogy is therefore always located in space -
always spatial - the work of transmitting the statement or utterance that has 
created what Foucault refers to as 'mutations' in the discourse must be 
considered if we are to understand the way discourse works with space. A 
spatialised genealogy (d. Peck, 2008) requires thinking in terms of spaces of 
dispersion in a substantive register which considers the sites where particular 
'eruptions, forces, emergences, and partial formations' (Brown, 2001: 116) 
happen, and the way that they are separated from and/ or connected to other 
sites (Philo, 2000b). 
The use of the Foucauldian genealogical method has implications for how we 
conceive of the key orienting concepts of policy transfer and the creative 
industries: these provide a way into thinking about how particular policy objects 
emerge, change and are stabilised across time and space. By emphasising how 
particular mutations, emergences, eruptions and shifts in meaning occur in 
disparate sites as well as disparate times, this particular genealogy will highlight 
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this distinctive aspect of the role of space in the formation of policy objects. 
Furthermore, it provides an approach that resonates with the theoretical 
arguments made in Chapter 3. The focus it places on the spatial constitution of 
constellations of power-knowledge chimes with the focus of the thesis on the 
experts that shape policy. Thus, this is a spatialised genealogy not only of the 
creative industries policy concept, but of the very expertise that reproduces it. 
4.4: Method: data collection 
This research involved the analysis of three data sets collected from a variety of 
sites in two countries: the UK and New Zealand. The first data set was policy and 
policy-related documents that refer to the creative industries. It is the production 
of these documents that this research is focused on. The second data set was of 
documents that referred to the creative industries and creative industries policy 
in the UK, New Zealand and around the world. The third set was interview data 
collected from semi-structured interviews with 38 participants conducted in the 
UK and New Zealand. These data sets are interlinked in ways that will become 
clear below. In what follows I will discuss some of the issues around how and 
why I accessed and collected this data. 
4.4.1: Policy and policy-related documents 
These documents were collected primarily from New Zealand and the UK but 
included policy documents that could be found from any administration or 
policy actor around the world. The advantage of researching policy in liberal-
democratic countries like New Zealand and the UK in the internet age is that 
most, if not all, policy documents produced in the last ten years are available 
online through Ministry and Government websites and electronic archives. As a 
result access was unproblematic, free, and could be achieved from my desk at the 
University of Bristol. There were some exceptions to this. Occasionally policy 
documents that were older than ten years were not available online but, again, 
access was for the most part unproblematic as the UK documents that I sought 
were available in the University of Bristol Library and the New Zealand 
documents at the University of Auckland Library. The one exception to this was 
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a pre-election policy statement put out by the New Zealand Labour Party before 
the 1999 general election in that country. I was unable to locate a copy of this 
document and was forced to piece it together out of press reports, speeches and 
statements. I triangulated my understanding of it with participants interviewed 
in New Zealand. 
My strategy for locating and identifying important and relevant documents was 
both systematic and organic. Initially, the focus was on those policy documents 
in the UK and New Zealand that referred to the creative industries. This was 
achieved through searches of relevant Ministry web sites - in the UK DCMS and 
in New Zealand the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and the Ministry for 
Economic Development - and those of local and regional authorities and policy 
agencies. Occasionally documents were found on other Ministry sites, such as the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families. When searching for policy 
documents from outside of these two countries I relied on the internet search 
engine Google which indicated where else policy for the creative industries was 
being developed around the world. The location of some creative industries 
policy documents and, importantly, policy documents that were relevant to the 
creative industries documents - insofar as without them creative industries 
policy documents would not exist in the form they do, and vice versa - was 
derived from information collected in the second and third data sets described 
below. 
The result of this data collection was a large amount of paper on my desk. 
Arranging these so that the more important and influential documents could be 
identified was achieved by examining their chronological order, the scale of 
referencing by the documents to each other and, importantly, the testimonies of 
individuals and documents in the other two data sets. The situation of each 
policy document in specific geographical sites meant these methods could also be 
used to identify which documents were being used in the transfer of policy. This 
simple mapping exercise showed where the creative industries have taken shape 
in textual form and which particular documents have been influential across a 
wide range of sites. The testimonies of actors involved and contained in the 
documents themselves is crucial to understanding how and why links between 
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documents were made. By 'following the actors' (Latour, 2005: 12) and their 
reasoning in making these links as they produce or analyse these documents the 
means by which policy transfer actor-networks are built, and hence the reason 
policy transfer occurred, can be revealed. This is why the other two data sets 
discussed below were collected. 
4.4.2: Engaging creative industries policy engagement 
This data set is drawn from a relatively heterogeneous mix of secondary sources 
identified and united by their efforts to engage with the creative industries as a 
policy concept and/ or an economic sector. Again, many of these could be located 
on the internet, and at the libraries at the Universities of Bristol and Auckland. 
They were identified through 'snowballing'. A policy document, newspaper 
article or book would reference other sources on the creative industries concept, 
which I would then seek out, only to be led towards more texts and documents. I 
would code these on their site and time of production (if this was available) and 
look for links they have or make with other documents. The number of texts that 
refer to the creative industries is growing every day so it was imperative on me 
to ensure I used this information to pinpoint the really significant textual events 
that were relevant to creative industries policy in the UK and New Zealand. As 
above, this was achieved through a combination of chronology, inter-referencing 
and the testimonies of interviewees. 
One of the key sources for this data set were the ministerial statements, speeches 
and arguments that were put out in favour of instituting a focus on the creative 
industries. Added to this were statements put out. by the two governments on 
themes that intersected with the creative industries concept, or which were 
suggestive of the approach to government and policy being taken at the time 
creative industries policy was being developed. These were especially useful for 
figuring the rationale for formulating creative industries policy in the words of 
the key politicians themselves. A particularly apposite example is a book 
published by Chris Smith (1998), the British Secretary of State for Culture when 
the creative industries were first identified in policy, entitled Creative Britain. This 
collected together a series of his speeches, bookended with a comprehensive 
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introduction and conclusion, that detailed the New Labour Government's 
approach to the relationship between culture and economy. 
A second key source was newspaper and magazine coverage of the creative 
industries. These were accessed through Lexis-Nexis database in the UK and the 
Newztext database and New Zealand Herald website in New Zealand. These 
proved useful in two ways. One, they helped to establish a timeline for events 
and policy announcements with regard to the creative industries and creative 
industries policy. This allowed me to fill in gaps and, to a certain extent, gauge 
the significance of certain moments. And two, they were useful for showing the 
diverse ways the creative industries were being perceived and engaged with 
beyond government. The extent to which government claims about the creative 
industries in both the UK and New Zealand were contested and/ or absorbed by 
the print media is an important proxy measure of the extent to which they had 
been naturalised as a policy object. The role of the media in encouraging or 
confirming policy transfer needs to be heeded (McCann, 2004; Bale, 2005). 
The other important source for this data set came from explicit research 
engagements with the creative industries policy concept by actors situated in 
research and advocacy institutions including public sector researchers, think-
tanks, consultancies and academia. The nature of these engagements ranged 
from policy-oriented position papers to scholarly academic research 
incorporating the creative industries concept. Some of these embrace the creative 
industries as a useful category for a range of reasons, some reject it outright, and 
others synthesise it with other concepts. The result is a developing body of 
knowledge on the creative industries that has a complex and multi-faceted 
relationship to the development and transfer of creative industries policy. How 
these research engagements, and their authors, impact on creative industries 
policy can be teased out by tracing the links between research and policy 
production through finding authors-in-common, tracking instances of cross-
referencing between research and policy documents, and the question of who 
commissioned certain research, why, and whether it is intended to have a direct 
impact on policy. 
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As I gathered this information two things were apparent. One was the extent to 
which policy-making relied on actors formally external to the state. It was 
becoming increasingly apparent to me that I had to find a way to show how they 
were integrated into the policy-making apparatus. The other was that there was a 
developing, if fragmented, epistemic community interested in the creative 
industries and cognate issues. Both of these realisations were important to the 
direction my research finally took (Crang, 2002). 
I attempted to immerse myself in this community in three ways. One was by 
interviewing certain key actors, which I discuss in the next section. The second 
was through joining a JISCMAIL mailing list on the cultural industries. This is 
primarily an academic mail-out but is also received by an assortment of 
researchers from outside academia. The fact that it is the cultural rather than the 
creative industries is indicative of the attitude of those who set up the list to the 
creative industries concept. Despite these limitations the list was used by 
participants to share resources and information collected on creative industries 
and cultural policy (which, this list showed, were linked in the minds of many of 
these actors). The academic Dr Andy Pratt of the London School of Economics 
was particularly active on this list. It provided two types of information useful to 
this project. It made me aware of policies being developed all around the world 
for the creative industries and of events, forums and symposiums that straddled 
the research and policy-making worlds. And it indicated the way that these 
issues about creative industries policy were being discussed, where, and who by. 
In a similar vein I kept a close eye on similar internet forums on the creative 
industries, such as one run by DCMS through their website during 2005 on what 
kinds of policies should now be developed for the creative industries with regard 
to intellectual property. 
The third way I tried to immerse myself in the community was by participant 
observation at a number of events that brought together different kinds of actors 
involved in studying and policy-making for the creative industries and cognate 
areas. I have included these in Table 4.1, including events I was unable to attend 
but have been able to obtain transcripts for (Please refer to Appendix A for a 
93 
Table 4.1: Events attended or for which transcripts were obtained 
Event Date Organisers Location 
'Cool Aotearoa' Forum 16/03/2000 Creative New Beehive Theatrette, 
(Transcript) Zealand Wellington, New 
Zealand 
Creative Industries 08/09/2000 Creative New Maidment Theatre, 
Forum (Transcript) Zealand and the Auckland University, 
British Council New Zealand 
'Cultural Planning for 18/05/2005 Bristol Cultural The Watershed, Bristol 
the Twenty-First Development 
Century', part of the Partnership 
Bristol 'Festival of Ideas' 
Ideopolis: Knowledge 20/10/2005 The Work The Work Foundation, 
Cities: Understanding Foundation London 
German and UK 
Experiences 
City Salon: 'Do-It- 21/11/2005 Demos The Tobacco Factory, 
Yourself' Cities Bristol 
'Economies of 01/09/2006 Dr Tim Vorley, Royal Geographical 
Enterprise, Innovation Leicester Society 
and Creativity', part of University, and Dr 
the Royal Geographical Helen Lawton 
Society - Institute of Smith, Birkbeck 
British Geographers University of 
Annual Conference London 
'Seminar 9: New 11- Dr Andy Pratt, Royal Society of 
Directions in Research: 12/1/2007 LSE, and Dr Paul Edinburgh 
Substance, Method and Jeffcut, Queens 
Critique', part of the University Belfast 
'Cultural Industries 
Seminar Network' 
(called elsewhere the 
'Cultural and Creative 
Industries Seminar 
Network') 
'Spaces of Vernacular 19/04/2007 Dr Steve San Francisco Hilton 
Creativity', part of the Millington, 
Association of American Manchester 
Geographers Annual Metropolitan 




'Creative Work' 18/10/2007 Cultural and School of Performance 
Symposium Media Industries and Cultural Industries, 




complete verSIOn of this table). These events ranged from think-tank-
organised events to sessions at academic conferences. Their engagement with 
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the creative industries concept ranged from peripheral to central. Of more 
consequence was that these events all involved either thinking the relationship 
between culture and economy or thinking through possibilities for economies in 
the post-industrial, knowledge-driven era. I don't wish to claim that this was 
particularly ethnographic (Dunn, 2007), but it was certainly experiential learning 
for both how policy ideas are debated in certain contexts and for understanding 
the kinds of policy and research debates that were utilising the creative 
industries concept. 
Two kinds of information were obtained from this data set. One regarded how 
the creative industries policy concept was being engaged with and developed 
into discourses by particular actors at particular sites. The knowledge about the 
creative industries being produced at these sites had the potential to shape policy 
if appropriately deployed. The second was the kinds of actors, agencies and 
institutions involved in acting on and through the creative industries and 
creative industries policy. This allows the movement of the concept to be traced 
and indicated the kind of people who would make appropriate and useful 
interview subjects. 
4.4.3: Interview subjects 
The third data set I have used in this project was drawn from semi-structured 
interviews with 38 participants. This was made up of policy-makers, council 
workers, consultants, academics and private-sector workers and entrepreneurs. 
A full list of interviewees is supplied in Appendix B. The purpose of this part of 
the research was to find out how actors have interpreted, been involved in, and 
responded to the emergence of the creative industries policy concept in the UK 
and New Zealand. This provides empirical richness and detail but, more 
importantly, through giving voice to the actors involved in policy-making and 
knowledge production, it can provide insights into the moments that links are 
made across space and the means by which the relationships that situate them in 
policy formation and transfer processes are formed, changed, maintained and 
broken. 
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The selection of possible interviewees was based on, first, information collected 
in the first two data sets, and, second, the recommendations of other 
interviewees. An effort was made to contact potential candidates from as wide a 
field as possible initially and then narrowed as the nature of what the research 
project could achieve became clearer. During my search I contacted individuals 
in Government Ministries, Non-Departmental Government Bodies, Quangos, 
non-governmental organisations, think-tanks, research institutes, consultancies 
and academia in both the UK and New Zealand. This provided a broad 
representation of actors from agencies and institutes that had some degree of 
involvement in creative industries policy development and transfer and in the 
production of the knowledge that informed each of these processes. 
The interviews were conducted over four periods. First, two pilot interviews 
were conducted in Manchester on December 15th, 2005. During January and 
February of 2006 twelve interviews were conducted in Sheffield, Manchester, 
London, Bristol and Bournes Green in the Cotswald Mountains. In May and June 
of 2006 nine more were conducted in London and Leeds, including two 
telephone interviews. During June and July of that year I was in New Zealand 
and conducted 15 interviews in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. Two of 
the interviews I conducted in London were about the New Zealand situation 
meaning that I finished with 21 interviews for the UK and 17 for New Zealand. 
This part of the research came to an end once I had reached saturation with 
diminishing returns coming from interviews in both countries and once my main 
findings had been triangulated. 
For the most part I entered this research field' cold' with little in the way of prior 
contacts in the area. Two of my initial interviews in the English north were set up 
through one of my supervisors' contacts but apart from these I had to find a way 
to access potential respondents. The way I dealt with this was through a formal 
approach. I wrote each potential respondent a letter with a University of Bristol 
letterhead explaining who I was, the nature of the research project, and why I felt 
they could contribute to the study. I included on the letter a link to a website I set 
up on the School of Geographical Science's website which gave more details 
about who I was and what ~y research project involved. About a week after the 
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letter was sent I would contact the potential respondent by telephone to set up an 
interview. This was a time-consuming process as each letter had to be 
individually drafted to fit in with the person's particular concerns but it proved 
to be a very successful strategy. The vast majority of people I contacted 
responded positively even when an interview turned out to be unattainable. It 
was also clear to me that the letter and the website address were appreciated as a 
number of the interviewees brought copies of both along to the interview having 
just read them again beforehand. 
An advantage of conducting research in this area was that, although it was cut 
across by political, technical and academic disputes and issues, it is not highly 
controversial on the national stage like issues around, for example, asylum-
seekers or the invasion of Iraq. This did not prevent some I requested interviews 
with from denying access because of concerns about having to criticise people 
still in their positions or whether they could comment on certain issues. Others 
initially displayed enthusiasm but then began ignoring or avoiding my requests 
for interviews. Such attitudes inevitably shaped my research as it meant I could 
not get the personal insight into certain issues I would have liked. But these were 
exceptions as for the most part this aspect of the research process was pleasant 
with most willing to talk about their work and supply me with materials I may 
not have otherwise been able to access. 
In the end my status as an outsider trying to make their way in the policy 
community may have been beneficial (Crang, 2003). As Herod (1999) has 
demonstrated, in some contexts outsider status provides myriad advantages, 
such as the possibility of a foreign researcher being perceived as less threatening 
than a domestic I investigator', or the opportunity provided for I ice-breaking' by 
access to small-talk concerning country-to-country differences. This certainly 
proved the case in the present research because in the UK my status as a New 
Zealander interested in local development projects seemed to be a source of some 
surprise and concomitantly some enthusiasm for speaking with me about them. 
Even on returning to New Zealand to conduct fieldwork there I received 
invitations from respondents I had not contacted, but who had learned of my 
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research from others I had, to speak to them under the impression I was a British 
researcher interested in what was going on 'downunder'. 
The interviews themselves were semi-structured with the intention of letting the 
respondents tell the story of their involvement in creative industries policy in 
their own way. On the one hand this was about finding out how creative 
industries policy has formed, changed and been transferred. But the more 
general aim was to find out their rationales for making and breaking certain 
linkages and developing certain relationships and the way they went about this. I 
wanted to find out how they adjusted their own practices and their own way of 
knowing so that they were able to work with other people and ideas, and to find 
out their justifications for it. The interview strategy I used to achieve this was to 
get them telling the story of their life as regard to how they ended up where they 
were and how this resulted in the creative industries entering their 
consciousness. This included an exploration of their personal networks, both 
formal and informal, and how these shaped their way of thinking. Finally, how 
and why they engaged the creative industries policy concept was explored, with 
a focus on what they had achieved or otherwise. By letting the actors speak for 
themselves the means by which the relational geographies in which policy forms 
and transfers are held together can be revealed and the move to abstract 
explanation will not be made too quickly (Olds, 2001; Law, 1994). 
In asking people about their work histories, engaging with what they produce, 
and learning about their networks while attending many of the same events and 
being part of their forums, these data collection activities have effectively 
involved the creation of my own network. My situation in this position, and the 
need for reciprocity, remains something I am conscious of. Every so often I 
receive an e-mail from a respondent asking about what has become of my 
research. As I have conducted my data collection it has also conducted me in 
terms of the kinds of questions I am able, and want, to answer. I have shaped my 
research field as it has shaped me (Rose, 1997; Crang, 2002; Gibson-Graham, 
1996). For example, a policy document I was aware of but would have otherwise 
ignored, the DCMS Evidence Toolkit (DET) (DCMS, 2004), to be discussed in 
Chapter 5, became far more interesting to me after a discussion with its author 
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who made it clear it was intended to shape the policy discourse begun by the 
release of the CIMD. From here my interest in the kind of epistemic community 
making these interventions grew and I realised that understanding their 
dynamics would be important for understanding policy transfer. In the end what 
constitutes the research field is being ordered and historicised in a variety of 
ways by a variety of actors, including the researcher, and it is the negotiation of 
these myriad orderings that is both generative of tensions and conflicts and 
productive of new knowledge. Producing a genealogy is not a case of observing 
and writing about the research field, it is literally a case of inserting oneself into 
it, producing a particular type of ordering that has a particular type of critical 
edge, and making a contribution, however minor, to the production of the field 
itself. 
4.5: Method: analysis 
The strategy that best describes the analytical approach taken, given the above 
considerations, is of theory-building (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Bailey et al., 1999; 
James, 2006). This is an approach that aims to create theories which explain 
aspects of the world rather than testing and embellishing existing theories. 
Therefore, it can be distinguished from more positivist approaches through its 
emphasis on induction rather than deduction. They are theories grounded in the 
empirical world being researched but that are informed by theories and concepts 
already developed. Therefore the aim of this approach is to produce work that 
provides insights into a particular aspect of the world, that speaks to other 
research which draws on the same or similar theoretical concepts, and which 
contributes to the development of meso-level theory. 
The movement from a mass of raw data to a more analytical realm from which 
theories can be built involves a series of steps (James, 2006). First the data was 
read and analysed through a genealogical lens for particular important moments, 
incidents, observations and so on that were referred to by informants and in 
secondary material. This involved coding through the construction of timelines, 
the mapping of links between individuals, texts and events, and the 
representation of individual networks and circuits. This work helped to make 
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sense of the data and allowed particular themes, trends, tendencies and moments 
to stand out as significant. It also provided the opportunity for triangulation so 
that the significance of particular moments, individuals or documents could be 
checked against what the rest of the data indicated. As I mentioned above, this 
made particular moments or documents, like the DET, stand out as significant in 
sometimes unexpected ways. 
From here initial ideas and theories were developed which were then checked 
against the data as a whole for validity and further refined in an iterative process. 
This also directed further data collection to develop, embellish and triangulate 
these ideas (Bailey et al., 1999). At this point the analysis began to incorporate 
concepts and theories from different literatures that could contribute to the 
theories being developed. As these were cycled through the data different 
concepts were deployed with some being kept, notably, the concept of epistemic 
communities, and others dropped: Mitchell's (2002) concept of techno-politics -
the politics inherent in the techniques through which the world is understood 
and acted upon - was discarded when it became apparent that the politics of 
policy formation and transfer were about more than just technical knowledge. 
Through the combination of analytical concepts drawn directly from the 
empirical work and those drawn from the secondary literature the theories 
developed and explored in this thesis were built. 
It is also clear, given the theoretical and methodological claims I have made, that 
a certain idea of ontological distance needs to be sacrificed. This is not a new 
insight; the problem of being an 'outsider' and the need for reflexivity has long 
been accepted in human geography and the social sciences in general (Lynch, 
2000; Rose, 1997; Crang, 2005). The researcher becomes implicated in the very 
world they are studying. To conduct an interview or to analyse a text is not to 
take a 'sample' from the research field that continues to exist as a coherent 
'whole' in the hands of the academic in the ivory tower. It is a moment where the 
co-production of knowledge is occurring rather than the empty-vessel researcher 
is filled with information and insight by the informant (Herod, 1999). This is 
particularly so in the case of this research where the interview effectively 
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requires, and provides the opportunity for, the interviewee to 'step back' and 
consider how they order their world and the orders that they are beholden to. 
Therefore this theory provides a partial perspective on the world and the people, 
agencies, institutions and events it describes. The theory that has been 'built' here 
is out of a research process that has been 'complex and messy ... infused with 
personal subjectivities, practical constraints, and opportunities; a process unable 
to claim the title of 'objective" (Olds, 2001: 260). This is reflected in the writing 
style which, in the next three chapters, takes a narrative form in an attempt to 
convey something of the complexity of what has occurred over time and space. 
Writing is a moment of extraction, a verbalisation of a diverse set of knowledges 
with the possible (and intended) effect of producing knowledge of its own. The 
text that is produced is not a definitive account of the field, it is now a part of it -
even if it is a relatively minor one. Writing does not occur after method, it is 
inevitably a part of it. 
4.6: Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methodological strategy used in this research. 
Given the diversity of ways that policy transfer can be thought about, there is no 
prescribed way of conducting research on it. For this thesis I have developed an 
approach that draws on and extends Foucauldian genealogy to think about the 
material links that can be drawn between spatially disparate instances of what 
appears to be the same policy. A genealogical ethic demands that the nature of 
that link is prioritised rather than subsumed to a wider logic and reduced to 
trivial or anachronistic detail. This has been used to guide a process of theory 
building where the data sets that had been collected were analysed using a 
variety of concepts to produce a theory of creative industries policy transfer. 
These have been arranged as three narratives which constitute the content of the 
next three chapters. 
Each narrative offers an account of different moments and different processes. 
They have been arranged to highlight key moments and key issues. Chapter 5 
explores the original development of the creative industries policy concept in the 
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UK out of particular problematisations of the country's economy and culture. It 
traces the emergence of the concept and the way it has been engaged by a variety 
of actors in the UK, including one group who have made a particular effort to 
recast themselves as creative industries experts. Chapter 6 describes the 
formation of creative industries policy in New Zealand, a story that is different to 
that of Chapter 5 for more reasons than its being set in another country. By 
tracing the translation of the creative industries policy concept into New Zealand 
policy discourses, the chapter demonstrates how policy transfer is not simple 
homogenisation but, in this case, the transnationalisation of the policy formation 
process. Chapter 7 argues that the combination of these two processes is resulting 
in the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries 
policy experts supported by a transnational infrastructure of conferences, 
forums, research institutes, think-tanks, consultancies and policy networks. 
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Chapter 5: Constituting a space for expertise: the making of a 
creative industries sector in the UK 
5.1: Introduction 
The empirical component of this thesis begins not with an epistemic community 
but with a policy document. In 1998, amid the clamour of 'Cool Britannia' and 
the political tum down the 'Third Way', the recently elected New Labour 
Government of the United Kingdom produced the Creative Industries Mapping 
Document which showed that non-manufacturing based industries like music, 
theatre and advertising were five percent of the economy and growing twice as 
fast as any other sector. While Cool Britannia and the Third Way have since 
fallen by the wayside, this latter policy concept has continued to evolve. When it 
first emerged it was conceived at the national scale and focused on revenue-
generation, exports and growth with a sideline in social inclusion. By the time 
this is being written there is a stronger regional policy presence focusing on local 
and urban cultural systems and the role of intellectual property has gone from 
being definitional criteria to a key agenda for central government. Over this 
period the creative industries have routinely been dismissed as little more than 
rhetoric and New Labour boosterism; at best a faddish and poorly conceived 
attempt to sell the idea of the knowledge-driven economy and at worst a new 
apogee in the 'instrumentalisation' of culture for economic purposes (see 
Greenhalgh, 1998; Littler, 2000; Hughson and Inglis, 2001; Belfiore, 2004; Oakley, 
2004; Miller, 2004; Garnham, 2005; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007). But despite 
these criticisms and concerns, the creative industries have endured as a concept 
due in part to that very sense that there is something out there being captured, 
that there is a real economic sector being represented, however poorly or 
partially. As a result a community of experts has rapidly developed providing 
information, advice, criticism and commentary on this new policy object. 
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The CIMD itself was first produced by DCMS in 1998. A second version was 
published in 2001 and since this time regular updates on the performance of the 
creative industries have been produced (DCMS, 2002; 2006) but not in as 
complete a form as realised in the original mapping document and its successor. 
The significance of the CIMD does not stem just from the coining of the phrase 
'creative industries'. It realises a set of discourses circulating around the spaces of 
New Labour which attempt to reimagine economy, culture and the policy-
making process6 and redeploys them in a conceptual and calculative form that 
was politically palatable and useful for the incoming government. Moreover, the 
CIMD rendered these as indicative of a previously unacknowledged sector of the 
UK economy, and in doing so made the sector visible in particular ways and 
available for political intervention by governmental and non-governmental 
actors (Christophers, 2007). This was achieved, firstly, through the sectoral 
definition: 
Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and 
talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through the 
generation and exploitation of intellectual property (DCMS, 2001b: 5). 
Secondly, the sector was populated with a particular set of industries: 
Advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, 
designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the 
performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and 
radio (DCMS, 2001b: 5). 
And thirdly through the act of 'mapping' the sector, which involved the 
measurement of the contributions of each creative industry sector in terms of 
revenue, exports, employment and contribution to Gross Domestic Product. 
This chapter makes two arguments. First, that the creative industries have been 
constituted through their representation in the CIMD initially, and later by their 
enframement through the emergence of a constellation of agencies and experts 
that act on this representation. And second, that the circulation of the CIMD has 
resulted in a variety of actors who have recast themselves as creative industries 
experts but in the process who have engaged, challenged and changed the 
representation and the enframement. To summarise, it is argued that the creative 
industries concept emerged at the confluence of governmental reimaginings of 
6 For examples of these kinds of reimaginings see Leadbeater (1999), Smith (1998), Gould 
(1998), Blair (1998) and Giddens (1998b). 
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economy, culture and their relationship to each other. Their policy form was 
shaped by the way these reimaginings were realised through a matrix of 
calculative evidence. This was the 'mapping' method of the CIMD which used 
numerical measures to demarcate the extent of the sector, its constituent 
industries, and their particular growth patterns in relation to the rest of the 
economy. Drawing on insights on the technicality of politics from the 
governmentality literature, it is argued that this act of calculation provided an 
empirical object that tried, however imperfectly, to mirror the relationship 
between culture and economy that was being imagined in governmental 
discourse. It also rendered the creative industries as a describable and governable 
sector available to political intervention. The CIMD, then, provided a platform 
for the development of new kinds of policy directed at newly imagined spaces 
and subjects. But it also provided an opportunity for new types of political 
intervention and pressure to be brought to bear on and by the government, and 
opened up an unpopulated space of policy knowledge for different actors to 
recast themselves in as a certain type of policy expert. In the end, this technically 
rendered reimagination of the relationship between culture and economy has 
resulted in a rearranged, and still evolving, policy landscape populated with new 
kinds of policies, agencies and expertise existing in constitutive relationships to 
each other. 
The chapter will begin with a discussion of the reimagined and retooled 
conceptions of the economy, culture and policy development which came 
together on circuits of knowledge associated with New Labour and resulted in 
the production of the CIMD. Although these reimaginings were underway before 
1997, after the election of New Labour that year they were given a new impetus. 
Section 5.3 focuses on the CIMD itself, arguing, following Christophers (2007), 
that the technical and especially calculative nature of the CIMD was a key factor 
in making creative industries policy sensible and therefore possible. The result, 
as discussed in Section 5.4, is the availability of the creative industries as a policy 
object towards which policy actors, including but not limited to DCMS and the 
rest of the government, can act. The CIMD, in a small way, enframed the 
reimagined economy to include this sector and its distinctive dynamics. Finally, 
Section 5.5 argues that the emergence of the CIMD opened a space for an existing 
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epistemic community calling itself the Forum on Creative Industries, who until 
that point had little if any influence on central government policy, to cast 
themselves as experts in, specifically, the link between culture and economy that 
had been a part of governmental reimagining and insert their concerns into the 
policy development process. The result is a distributed array of policy 
documents, agencies, actors and experts that comprise the body of creative 
industries policy knowledge in the UK. 
5.2: Cool Britannia: New Labour and the creative industries 
The Creative Industries Mapping Document (DCMS, 1998; 2001b) was first 
conceived in a period of what Rose has termed 'political inventiveness' (1999b). 
The newly elected 'New Labour' Government was keen to show it had shed the 
connotations of 'old Labour' and demonstrate its capacity for a new kind of 
political thinking which reconciles 
themes which in the past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic -
patriotism and internationalism; rights and responsibilities; the promotion of 
enterprise and the attack on poverty and discrimination (Blair, 1998: 1, 
emphasis in original). 
As such it has connected itself into knowledge circuits it perceived could provide 
it with ideas for this purpose. Most famously this circuit connected it with Bill 
Clinton's Democrats in the United States (Peck and Theodore, 2001), with the self 
defined new left think-tanks Demos and Comedia and their associated thinkers, 
including Geoff Mulgan (who became one of Blair's chief policy advisors) and 
Charles Leadbeater (who wrote the original knowledge-driven economy strategy 
in 1998) (Griffiths et al., 2002), and with 'Third Way' guru and head of the 
London School of Economics Anthony Giddens (McLennan et al., 2005). The 
rapid circulation of knowledge forms, both texts and people, between spaces like 
these in the late 1990s resulted in political reimaginings linked to emergent 
problematisations that in turn resulted in new programmes of government. One of 
these was the CIMD. This section will discuss the political imaginings associated 
with the knowledge forms circulating around the policy-making spaces of New 
Labour and how these resulted in the production of the CIMD. As such it 
demonstrates how the new policy knowledge realised in the CIMD emerges from 
106 
circuits of knowledge that connect up different kinds of experts through policy-
making spaces. 
5.2.2: Revisioning economy 
One of these reimaginings coalesced around conceptions of the economy in the 
late twentieth century. One aspect of this was the acceptance of particular ideas 
about globalisation. Outlining his initial vision for New Labour, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair concedes that Britain is now part of a global economy: 'In 
macroeconomic policy, medium-sized countries cannot afford to 'go-it-alone': 
they must be continually sensitive to the international economy and its driving 
forces' (1998: 8). This is no idle observation; Labour had long ceased to be in 
favour of the nationalisation of production. In 1994 Blair made the symbolic 
gesture of removing the clause concerning nationalisation from Labour's 
manifesto in an effort to assuage fears that they remained at heart a socialist 
party (see Gould, 1998). This endorsement of what was increasingly regarded as 
'economic orthodoxy' was continued after the election with the establishment of 
operational independence at the Bank of England. This deepening 
institutionalisation of the monetarist notions that had previously been espoused 
by the Conservative Thatcher and Major Governments meant the idea of Britain 
as ensconced in an increasingly determinate global economy was accepted and 
extended by the new government. 
This said, the vision of the global economy is not entirely consistent from the 
preceding government to New Labour. Institutionalist ideas had found their way 
into New Labour thinking through new think-tanks like Demos which argued 
that the market did not function free of social constraints and, in fact, functioned 
better when their embeddedness in the social was recognised (Bevir, 2005). This 
rationalisation extended policies inherited from the previous Major Government 
that inscribed a national competitive in the global by fostering competitiveness 
amongst its business community (on the central role of the private sector, see 
Blair, 1998: 8-11). This became linked to politically fresh ideas regarding the 
knowledge-driven economy - the idea that in a globalised world developed 
economies like Britain's cannot compete on primary or secondary production 
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terms due to a lack of access to cheap resources or cheap labour power. Instead, it 
is in the knowledge of the workers of Britain, in their ability to innovate and 
create, that the future of the country's economy is deemed to rest (see Blair, 1998; 
and Department for Trade and Industry, 1998, for the Government's White Paper 
entitled Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy). Social 
measures like spending on education came to be seen as integral to economic 
policy (Bevir, 2005). Such intervention would not always be about spending, 
however. The supply side could be improved through tackling 'social exclusion', 
a 'New Labour' language replacing 'old Labour' concepts like 'class' and 
'inequality' . 
The growing clamour of these discourses in the late 1990s, and the accompanying 
problematisation of the structure of the British economy, would lend the creative 
industries a certain stature for being at the forefront of economic strategy in the 
face of such macroeconomic shifts (Garnham, 2005; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007). 
Certainly such an understanding was used in the advocacy of them by figures 
such as Chris Smith, who described the creative industries in his forward to the 
second edition of the CIMD as 'a key element in today's knowledge economy' 
and argued that 'in a knowledge economy the importance of these industries to 
national wealth is more commonly recognised' (DCMS, 2001b: 3). In the CIMD, 
the idea of 'individual creativity, skill and talent' as the defining feature of these 
industries aligns the sector with definitions of the knowledge-driven economy's 
'distinctive assets' of 'knowledge, skills and creativity' (Department for Trade 
and Industry, 1998: 14). Both locate the distinctive source of competitiveness in 
the global economy most centrally in the capacity of the individual to produce 
something that cannot be easily replicated with the abundance of raw materials, 
land and cheap labour possessed by competing countries. This continues today 
with the incumbent Prime Minister Gordon Brown bundling the creative 
industries with other knowledge economy industries as key to the future of the 
British economy in his speeches (Brown, 2005; 2006). The creative industries 
provided a useful neologism and vision that fitted well, at a variety of levels, 
with the way the economy was being reimagined under New Labour. 
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5.2.3: Culture and economy in the UK 
The creative industries were not just structured around a new economic 
imperative, however. The cultural activities included in the list of industries _ 
performing arts, music, the arts market, film and video, and television and radio 
- point to New Labour's attempt to differentiate itself in the cultural field. During 
the 1997 election Labour had contrasted itself with the incumbent government by 
claiming they valued culture while their opponents were hostile to it. The 
Conservative Government had made no secret of its funding retrenchment and 
market exposure for the 'great' cultural institutions. But there was no simple 
answer to this problem: for New Labour there couldn't be a return to old funding 
regimes which had successfully been attacked by the Conservatives, as well as 
critics on the left, as elitist and reproductive of certain structures of privilege that 
were anathema to the increasingly individualist ideology of the previous twenty 
years. Instead, the new government weaved together certain governmental, 
economic and societal imperatives through the reimagining of the constitution 
and role of the arts and culture in British society. 
To an extent this was a form of boosterism for a new sense of British identity in 
which New Labour could position itself. Initially this found form in the short-run 
'Cool Britannia' campaign. Originally a media concoction, New Labour deployed 
this term in an attempt to link itself with all that made Britain 'cool' by 
promoting the creative industries, holding publicity-driven exercises like having 
the band Oasis over to a party at 10 Downing Street, and contrasting the Britain 
they would be governing as a young and stylish post-imperial nation with the 
'warm beer and cricket greens' image of John Major's Britain. In response to the 
release of a Demos pamphlet on the idea of rebranding Britain through 'Cool 
Britannia' (Leonard, 1997), the government organised a taskforce on the subject 
led by foreign secretary Robin Cook. However, this particular attempt to create a 
new British identity was short-lived. As early as 1998 Chris Smith was referring 
to it as a 'flawed phrase' (1998: 5) because, he claimed, it failed to engage with 
great swathes of British identity and culture. It is also possible the government 
was reacting to the negative press coverage the concept often received and the 
way the idea was used to make the argument that New Labour was all style over 
109 
substance (Littler, 2000). But, success or failure notwithstanding, the attempt to 
rethink the idea of the nation is of significance here. Britain would no longer be 
defined by ideas about history but by the present and the future, by 
contemporary culture and the knowledge economy - even if this orientation to 
the future was backwards-looking in the identification of what constituted the 
contemporary (Blake, 1998). By renaming the Department for National Heritage 
as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport Chris Smith claimed that: 
important though the conservation of our heritage is, it did not represent all 
that our work should be. I wanted something that was a bit more all-
embracing, and a bit more forward-looking. Our new title reflects much 
more the nature of what we are about (1997: 6). 
DCMS became the institutional site where this new vision would be coordinated. 
The idea of creativity, which was emerging as a key concept for the knowledge-
driven economy, also allowed a reimagining of the cultural and its opposition to 
the economic. The speeches of the incoming Secretary of State for Culture Chris 
Smith, collected along with some other interventions in the volume Creative 
Britain (Smith, 1998; see also Smith, 1997), are indicative of a reimagining of the 
role of culture in society that did not institute a wholesale reorientation but 
served to move the political debate and the politics of culture along to 
(seemingly) fresh ground (Osborne, 2004). The speeches and essays proffer the 
policy approach to arts and culture of New Labour as revolving around their 
four 'key themes' of access, excellence, education and creative economy. This 
juxtaposes a desire to democratise culture and make it accessible to everyone 
with the possibility of a 'cultural democracy' where cultural forms are seen as 
producible by anyone anywhere, not just in certain elite institutions by certain 
types of individual (Hughson and Inglis, 2001). This is weaved together with 
economic and social concerns through the notion of creativity. Key to this is the 
collapsing of ideas of 'high' and 'low' culture. Thus Smith claims to 'loathe the 
distinction that some people try to draw between so-called 'high art' and 'low 
art'. What on earth counts as 'high' and 'low'?' (1998: 144). This is not just an 
opinion, it allows Smith to reference on equal terms ideas about the cultural 
value of both those considered traditional art forms, such as Shakespearean 
theatre, and more contemporary popular forms, particularly 'Britpop' and the 
'y oung British Artists' like Damien Hirst. The democratisation of culture is not 
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simply about exposing the masses to enlightenment via particular cultural and 
artistic forms but encouraging 'access' to 'excellence' in the cultural realm - a 
realm broadly defined in the fashion of cultural democracy. It is in the supposed 
transcendence of what is produced from the subjective force of creativity, in 
whatever form and context, that matters, a point emphasised in the concluding 
chapter of Smith's book, entitled No Wealth But Life: The Importance of Creativity. 
The concept of creativity allows culture to serve particular governmental 
purposes apart from any simple I civilising' function it may once have played 
(Finlayson, 2000). Thus, for the new government: 
In the years ahead, people's creativity will increasingly be the key to a 
country's economic identity, to its economic success, and to individuals' 
well-being and sense of fulfilment (DCMS, 2001a: 5). 
New Labour have not so much instrumentalised culture as identified the root of 
culture in the individual and attempted to harness this to their goals. This 
proposes a capacity in the subject that can be put to work (in a governmental 
sense) for cultural and economic ends. By instituting the creative industries New 
Labour claimed to have identified a conduit through which the cultural and the 
economic come together and positioned this at the forefront of economic strategy. 
5.2.4: Modernising government 
The creative industries were defined in the CIMD as exemplary knowledge-
driven economy industries that sprang from the capacity of individuals to be 
creative. They were the form in which cultural and economic production came 
together. In this sense the document was not entirely original. The industrial 
make-up of the sector overlapped with the concept of the I cultural industries' 
that was forwarded in the London Industrial Strategy by the Greater London 
Council (GLC) in 1985. This document, however, produced by a socialist 
metropolitan council in a time of massive infrastructural collapse and 
unemployment in London following de-industrialisation, aimed to support 
independent cultural producers in the face of the growing dominance of mass 
market (and especially American) cultural forms as part of a strategy to generate 
a thriving and diverse urban economy (see Mulgan and Worpole, 1986). The 
strategy was never put into practice as the GLC was abolished by the Thatcher 
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Government in 1985. The cultural industries were not a simple precursor to the 
creative industries, however, despite links that can be drawn through individuals 
like Geoff Mulgan, who worked on the London Industrial Strategy in the early 
1980s and by the late 1990s was the head of Tony Blair's Number 10 Policy Unit. 
The expanded scope in terms of qualifying industries - advertiSing and 
architecture for example were not included in cultural industry definitions - and 
the 'outward-orientated' focus on the industries as knowledge-driven and 
competitive in the global economy marked these out as conceived quite 
differently from the production focus of the GLC (Gamham, 2005). They 
imagined the economy in quite a different way to the GLC. 
The CIMD draws in a more explicit fashion on a policy document produced by 
the Government of Australia in 1994 (Smith, 1998). Creative Nation, produced by 
the Keating Government, does not use the creative industries term invented by 
the CIMD but conceptualises the cultural industries in a comparable manner as a 
distinctive sector with the potential to have a significant impact on the Australian 
economy: 
This cultural policy is also an economic policy. Culture creates wealth. 
Broadly defined, our cultural industries generate 13 billion dollars a year. 
Culture employs. Around 336,000 Australians are employed in culture-
related industries. Culture adds value, it makes an essential contribution to 
innovation, marketing and design. It is a badge of our industry. The level of 
our creativity substantially determines our ability to adapt to new economic 
imperatives. It is a valuable export in itself and an essential accompaniment 
to the export of other commodities. It attracts tourists and students. It is 
essential to our economic success (Government of Australia, 1994: 
Introduction). 
The focus on the national scale and the emphasis on this sector as aiding the 
'ability to adapt to new economic imperatives' means the document shares with 
the CIMD a concern to use this set of industries to position the country 
competitively in a global economic environment. Although the link between 
culture and economy is not as ingrained as in the CIMD, it still makes an 
analogous effort to link cultural production with economic outcomes. However, 
what distinguishes the CIMD from both the GLC and Australian documents is 
not only conceptual. The practice of 'mapping', or measuring, the contributions 
of each of these industries is a significant point of difference that makes the 
CIMD a particularly noteworthy text (Christophers, 2007). 
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Taking this relatively comprehensive numerical approach reflected the ethic of 
government New Labour was, in principle at least, adopting. The 1999 White 
Paper Modernising Government illustrates this by outlining how the new 
government would be approaching its task in relation to the production of policy 
and delivery of public services (Labour Government, 1999). This was described 
as a pragmatic approach, the 'Third Way' (Giddens, 1998b; Blair, 1998) between 
the ideological 'extremes' of collectivism and state provisioning that previous 
Labour governments subscribed to or the market driven rationality that the 
Conservative Party pushed when they were in power, especially during the 
1980s and 90s. This approach to government foregrounded, in principle, 
evidence-based policy, target-setting, and the monitoring of delivery by those 
working in the service of the government's goals (Labour Government, 1999; see 
Newman, 2001; Bevir, 2005). By measuring the creative industries, then, they 
could be presented to the Government and to the public in a form which 
effectively carried the justification for their recognition, and politicisation, within 
them. As an academic involved in cultural mapping exercises points out: 
Creating the Mapping Document allowed there to be a measure, a marker 
for DCMS to be able to make its case to Treasury for money. The Treasury 
like figures and they looked good and they gave them some (Academic, 
interview with author, 2006). 
The CIMD provided the necessary statistics for the creative industries to be seen 
as significant for the economy and to be taken seriously by the government. In 
this context the CIMD was produced in a calculative fashion because it was 
politically useful to DCMS, and to the government, to do so. 
The creative industries concept was tied up with the reimagined economic and 
cultural spheres in which innovation, knowledge and creativity were 
increasingly important to the British economy and culture was increasingly 
comprised of activities from which a living could be made. These imaginings 
emerged from the knowledge forms circulating through and coalescing in 
governmental sites; forms ranging from knowledge-driven economy strategies, 
think-tank pamphlets, external policy documents and ministerial statements to 
individuals like Mulgan, Leadbeater, Blair, Smith and others. As these entered 
certain policy-making sites, like DCMS, they fed into the production of policy 
documents, like the CIMD, which would themselves circulate out as new 
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knowledge forms. The circulation of the CIMD has in many ways been highly 
effective in enframing a new governable sector dressed up to reflect these 
emerging imaginings and respond to the problematisations they produce: indeed 
this was not simply an engagement with a previously unacknowledged sphere of 
activity - the significance of the CIMD was its role in bringing this sector into 
existence (Christophers, 2007). 
5.3: Mapping the sector: constituting the creative industries 
The role of calculation in rendering social, cultural, political and economic objects 
as available for action from policy-makers and other such actors has been an 
abiding concern in poststructural analysis (e.g. Rose, 1999a; Mitchell, 2002; 
Ferguson, 2006; Li, 2007a) and the rise of statistics and numerical technologies in 
government practice is well documented. Foucauldian govemmentality scholars 
in particular, and Foucault himself, have emphasised the growth and 
deployment of these technologies as a corollary of the rise of the human sciences 
in the last few centuries (see for example the studies collected in Burchell et al., 
1991; Barry et al., 1996). Rose (1999a) has argued that the 'advanced liberalism' 
that has emerged in the last few decades can be described as and attributed to the 
development and diffusion of numerical technologies such as audit (Power, 
1997), new public management (Hood, 1991) and benchmarking (Larner and Le 
Heron, 2002) which govern by providing seemingly neutral measures through 
which individuals are disciplined or form aspirations. Hacking has described the 
rise of the science of statistics as having 
helped determine the form of laws about society and the character of social 
facts. It has engendered concepts and classifications within the human 
sciences ... the collection of statistics has created, at the least, a great 
bureaucratic machinery. It may think of itself as only providing information, 
but it is itself part of the technology of power in a modern state (1991: 181). 
In many ways numbers have made modern government possible. Modernising 
Government and the CIMD both implicitly recognise this fact. 
Despite not being a 'map' in the cartographic sense of the word, the term 
'mapping' was used to describe the activity undertaken in the CIMD because, 
according to Chris Smith, 'it covers territory never systematically charted' by 
government' (1998, cited in Christophers, 2007: 236). Inscription devices like 
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maps, charts, graphs and so on have long been used to rationally reduce the 
complexity of space to a manageable form. They work through their appeal to 
neutrality and objectivity as able to, from a distance, produce a truth about a 
particular defined space in a form that makes action upon them possible (Latour, 
1988; Rose, 1999a). The CIMD, despite being a statistical profile, is no exception. 
The calculative approach of the CIMD demarcates the creative industries as a 
recognisable sector within the wider economy with particular properties in this 
regard, most notably its relative size and rapid growth rate. The novel 
contribution it made, however, which explains why this really was 'new' 
territory, was the establishment of what Christophers (2007: 240) calls 'internal 
equivalence: the industries belong together because they all share the central, 
defining feature of creativity'. The CIMD unified a set of disparate activities, 
rendered them in a (calculative) fashion that was comprehensive and 
comprehensible, and delivered them up as a governable object for policy-makers. 
Of course, the definitions and measurements used in the CIMD have been a bone 
of contention (e.g. Selwood, 2002; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005; Taylor, 2006). 
But, as will be shown below, despite these protestations policy is being produced 
at all administrative levels through the UK that specifically target the creative 
industries. This engagement is not always uncritical and often tries to reshape the 
sector in policy discourses (e.g. Oakley, 2004). This is because the effect the CIMD 
has in constituting the creative industries sector is not about accuracy, 
conceptualisation or even ideology. As Mitchell (2002) has argued, what is 
important is not the statistics, or the knowledge the statistics represent, or the 
particular form that the statistics are in (although these are significant), but the 
new kind of calculating site that developed with these, such as DCMS. These 
sites have the capacity to act on constituted objects, such as the creative 
industries, because they produce a ' distance between reality and its 
representation, between the material and the abstract, between the real world 
and the map' (Mitchell, 2002: 116). The abstract and representational knowledge 
'held' at DCMS in the form of the CIMD may be inaccurate or poorly conceived, 
but it induces the idea of a describable creative industries sector beyond its walls 
in the 'real' economy. The creative industries sector is constituted as a governable 
object through this effect (Mitchell, 2002; Christophers, 2007). 
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Finally, the positioning of the creative industries within 'the economy' is an 
important factor in their constitution. It is not just the intrinsic qualities of 
numbers themselves that has made them such a powerful governmental tool 
(Rose, ~999a). Calculative practices have become powerful because they establish 
a relation between economic concepts and correspondence with the 'real world 
economy'. Changes in one necessarily act in concert with changes in the other 
through the link drawn between them by calculation. Buck-Morss' (1995) 
argument that the predominance of certain economic models in policy 
programmes rests on their ability to 'envision political economy' in diagrammatic 
form suggestively links the collection of statistics to the conceptualisation of them 
- but these conceptualisations do not necessarily have to be diagrammatic. As 
Mitchell (1998; 2002) has argued, 'the economy' (definite article) emerged as an 
object after World War Two, largely through the work of John Maynard Keynes, 
as an organising concept for all the calculative representations of certain 
productive activities within the territory of the nation-state - in turn calculation 
allowed this representation to seem to correspond to 'reality'. The CIMD worked 
within this pre-existing object but reconstituted it both conceptually and 
calculatively by proffering the existence of the creative industries sector. 
In sum, the ability of the CIMD to constitute a sector does not stem just from its 
calculative nature, although the dominance of numerical technologies makes this 
a necessary condition. It is the marrying of these calculations to a certain 
conceptual framework that positions the CIMD within knowledge of the 
economy as a whole. As discussed above, the creative industries are conceived at 
the forefront of the emerging knowledge-driven economy, as the clearest 
realisations of the economic value of culture, and as the expression of the 
'creative' impulse that drives both economic and cultural activity. Through 
calculation the CIMD makes the vital link between the way the economy is 
imagined and the necessary representative practices that can make this 
correspond with 'reality'. There have been two main effects. For one, 'the 
economy' is understood as a slightly different reality in which 'creativity' and 
'knowledge' play increasing roles (although the extent of this is contested in 
technical debates). And two, an economic sector that is the manifestation of these 
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trends, and named here the creative industries (although this is also contested, as 
will be demonstrated below), comes to be seen as part of it. 
Reflecting on the popularity of the creative industries model with policy makers 
around the world, Michael Volkerling (2001) has concluded that the creative 
industries as realised in the CIMD is a model rather than a policy per se. Insofar 
as the CIMD contains no redistributions of resources, no creation of any new 
agencies and no directives for action, other than an assertion of the need to 
encourage and develop them, this is certainly the case. But I have argued, 
following and extending Christophers (2007), that the achievement of the CIMD 
was not creating a policy but establishing an integral relation between the 
creative industries and the reimagined economy through calculation. By 
enframing certain industries as 'creative' and linking them to emerging 
conceptions of the British economy the CIMD made the creative industries into 
an object available to new kinds of policy intervention. Rather than a policy 
model it makes more sense to conceive of the CIMD as a platform bolted onto 
'the economy' upon which policy could be constructed. 
The result of this has been two-fold. First, policy and other governmental 
programmes, begun both inside and outside the spaces traditionally associated 
with the state, are indeed being built on this platform provided by the CIMD. 
This is enframing the creative industries as an economic sector. And second, the 
circulation of the CIMD has prompted a variety of actors to be recast, and to 
recast themselves, in line with creative industries governmental visions. These 
actors are the creative industries 'experts' engaging and implementing these 
programmes. But these actors are not 'blank' - they have each engaged with the 
creative industries concept with a reason and for a purpose. The circulation of the 
CIMD has caused changes in their epistemic communities, forcing them to 
respond and realign themselves. These two effects will be dealt with in turn over 
the next two sections. 
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5.4: Creative industries policy after the CIMD 
The evidence for the efficacy of the CIMD in constituting a governable object is 
apparent in the action directed towards the creative industries after 1998. Most 
apparently, this has been through the production of policy documents implicitly 
reliant on the work the CIMD had done in establishing the creative industries. In 
subsequent years numerous other documents regarding the creative industries 
were produced by, or in association with, DCMS, including The Creative 
Industries: The Regional Dimension (DCMS, 2000a), Our Hidden Potential: The Report 
of the Creative Industries Export Promotion Advisory Group (DCMS, 1999a) and more 
specific reports on sectors within the ambit of, and directly referential to, the 
creative industries, such as television (DCMS, 1999b) and the internet (DCMS, 
2000b). A second CIMD was also produced (DCMS, 2001b). These documents 
perform the dual purpose of further deepening· the demarcation of the creative 
industries sector as a governable object begun in the original CIMD, and 
developing policy for specific aspects of the sector. This latter element tended to 
come in the form of policy recommendations and the formation of working 
groups within specifically created forums like the Creative Industries Export 
Promotion Advisory Group and attached to pre-existing or recently constituted 
agencies like the Regional Cultural Consortiums (RCCs) established to further 
cultural development at the regional level (see Lutz, 2006). 
Further to this, the creative industries provided a policy platform for more than 
just economic concerns. The problem defined as I social exclusion' became a key 
theme early on in the deployment of the creative industries (Evans and Smith, 
2006; Oakley, 2006), reflecting one of the potential roles conceived for the creative 
industries in the reimagined economy. The work of the Social Exclusion Unit 
explored the possibility of using arts and sports, which I are associated with 
rapidly growing industries' (Policy Action Team 10, 1999: 8), as a way to connect 
individuals with their communities and with society at large (see Levitas, 2004). 
This possibility was developed further in the report on the regional dimension of 
the creative industries sector in which a greater role in community development, 
urban regeneration and the integration of ethnic minorities was advocated 
(DCMS, 2000a: 21-22). The CIMD was not just an economic report, it worked with 
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an idea of the economy straddling social concerns and more conventional 
economic concepts. 
However, the success of policy that builds on the creative industries platform has 
been mixed, in both implementation and effectiveness. This suggests that some 
aspects of the reimagining were far from durable. With regard to social exclusion, 
the creative industries have proven less than successful and are rarely now seen 
as relevant to these concerns (Oakley, 2006). Creative industries policy 
implementation at the regional level has also been difficult, with some 
commentators arguing it is a 'lost cause' (Jayne, 2005), although creative 
industries policy is being produced by the RCCs in some regions (e.g. Culture 
South-West, 2006). On the other hand, at the national level, government agency 
NESTA (National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts) have 
embraced the creative industries concept and produced a report on the 
development of 'world class' creative businesses (NESTA, 2006). Notably, these 
policy interventions focus on the' regional', the 'social' and the 'business' aspects 
of the creative industries. Creative industries policy, then, is being built on the 
platform laid out by the CIMD, although in an uneven and undulating fashion 
and often in league with conceptions of space and sociality other than those 
national-scale and consumptionist conceptions it had used. 
It is important to note, as Christophers (2007) has, that the availability of the 
creative industries to policy intervention in this fashion was not innocent. Their 
constitution has important disciplinary attributes which attempt to direct the 
actions of economic and cultural actors. Christophers refers to the case of the 
formation of the Office of Communications (Of com) in the UK which converged 
all the big regulators of telecommunications media - radio, television and 
telephony. Early on these were linked to the creative industries through a study 
of television exports (DCMS 1999b), but the key moment came when the white 
paper setting out the vision for Of com drew upon the CIMD to argue that the 
media and communications sector was growing 11 % faster than the rest of the 
economy (Department for Trade and Industry/DCMS, 2000, cited in 
Christophers, 2007: 241-2). This is not just about legitimation. Ofcom, while being 
focused on non-intervention, maintains a constant stream of information about 
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the media and communications sector (Hesmondhalgh, 2005). The CIMD and 
Ofcom both work with spatially and temporally continuous representations of 
their respective objects, the former for the purposes of demarcation and naming, 
the latter for the purposes of non-interventionist 'supervision' which, in 
governmentality parlance, conducts conduct. The CIMD and Ofcom work with a 
field of power that relies on the production of seemingly neutral knowledge and 
information· that subjectifies and spatialises. Their linking, as evidence and 
action, extends this field of knowledge in a consistent manner and holds out the 
possibility of extending technologies of discipline developed within Ofcom to all 
the creative industries. 
The CIMD has also made the creative industries sector available for policy action 
by non-state actors. Since 2005 the creative industries have re-emerged as a policy 
issue for the government after they dropped off the agenda since 2001 following 
the removal of Chris Smith from the Secretary of State position. This has involved 
the appointment of the first Minister for the Creative Industries, James Purnell, 
who instituted the 'Creative Economy Programme' (Purnell, 2005: unpaginated). 
This has several strands but a key one is a renewed emphasis on intellectual 
property (IP). This was part of the conception of the industries, but until this 
point it was relatively peripheral. The focus on it came about after an 
intervention by an organised coalition of non-state actors: 
(IP) has always been there but the music industry made a big play to (Prime 
Ministerial residence) Number 10 (Downing Street) about two and a half 
years ago. We realised this isn't just effecting the music industry, they were 
just at the coalface. (Government Official, interview with author, 2006). 
Certainly this had not been considered as an issue to any great extent. For 
example, a DCMS report on the funding problems of the music industry released 
in 2001 makes no reference to the opportunities and threats posed by the advent 
of digital technology (DCMS, 2001c). Following the action by the music industry, 
however, the Creative Industries Forum on Intellectual Property was formed in 
July 2004. This involved a series of meetings between representatives of DCMS, 
the Department of Trade and Industry, the Patent Office, the Consumers 
Association and various creative industries actors. The result is that a significant 
part of the Creative Economy Programme has been about improving Britain's IP 
laws and developing strategies for reducing the threat of IP crime (Creative 
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Industries Forum on Intellectual Property, 2005). This demonstrates how the 
development of policy following on from the CIMD is not just a government 
prerogative. Following the conception of the creative industries sector, any 
number of actors can engage with it. 
This section has demonstrated the way that the CIMD made certain spaces, such 
as the media and enclaves of I social exclusion', available to new types of 
intervention based on the potential of these industries in the emerging 
governmental economic imagination. It has also shown that it can provide a 
conduit for certain actors to put pressure on the government and the policy-
making process. This has two effects. One, as these policies are rolled out they 
further entrench the status of the creative industries as a significant sector and 
policy category. And two, an institutional framework is constructed that 
enframes the reimagined economy (Mitchell, 2002). This is not to suggest that this 
framework somehow produces the economy as it has been reimagined, it is to 
argue that the reimagining is realised in the creation of agencies and institutions 
that act on particular social practices and forms articulated through it. It is not 
always robust, as the fading of social exclusion from the agenda testifies, but it 
has the CIMD and a range of other related research to provide it with a sense of 
what it is acting on. And it is in the very spaces that this framework opens up 
that certain actors can cast themselves as policy experts and try to shape the 
direction of the policy knowledge being produced and the economy being 
imagined. 
5.5: Production vs. consumption: contesting the creative industries 
The circulation of the CIMD did not simply produce a new constellation of 
agencies and experts enframing a new creative industries sector. It engaged a 
variety of actors already lout there' situated in a variety of epistemic 
communities to whom this new policy document had important ramifications for 
their knowledge, practices, and constitution. This section will look at one 
particular epistemic community that responded to the CIMD by changing their 
alignment and recasting themselves as creative industries experts. To this extent 
they contribute to the constitution of the creative industries as a sector by 
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providing authoritative expert knowledge. However, these actors were not a 
'blank slate' upon which the CIMD has been written, they brought with them 
their own knowledge forms which, through their role as creative industries 
experts, they are now circulating into policy-making spaces and changing the 
way the creative industries sector is conceived. 
During 1998 an existing, but relatively loose, network of practitioners, 
consultants and researchers who had an interest in what they would describe as 
cultural industry and cultural development planning at especially the local and 
urban scale formed themselves into an organisation called the Forum on Creative 
Industries, or FOCI. They described themselves as I a network of experienced 
professionals concerned to inform and influence the current debates around the 
creative industries'.7 Initially it was brought together by three individuals: Phil 
Wood, a consultant for the urban-cultural consultancy Comedia and former head 
of the Huddersfield Creative Town initiative of the 1980s; Justin O'Connor, an 
academic from Manchester Metropolitan University and associate of 
Manchester's Cultural Industries Development Service; and Josephine Burns, co-
director of cultural consultancy the Burns-Owens Partnership. In effect, FOCI 
became a vehicle to develop and represent the views of this small epistemic 
community. 
The formation of FOCI represents this epistemic community reshaping itself in 
response to the CIMD. FOCI's significance stems from their desire to engage with 
this new discourse of the creative industries - even bringing the term into the 
title of their network despite many of the members professing some contempt for 
it. They wanted to ensure their ideas and insights would influence the policies 
and programmes produced in the name of the sector. This presupposed an 
overlap and established a link between their work and the discourse of the 
creative industries. This move was made 
because ... people like me who had been working in Sheffield and 
Manchester and so on all those years were thinking, I great, finally somebody 
is speaking our language' but feeling at the same time they weren't actually 
talking to us about it ... FOCI was formed to represent those people who had 
been working with the cultural industries for years and their concerns ... we 
decided to do something about it and so we combined our address books 
7 See www.foci.org.uk 
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and in~ited every~ne to a meeting in Huddersfield to see what they think 
about It, and that s where FOCI was born (FOCI Member, interview with 
author, 2006). 
The formation of FOCI was a spontaneous, but deliberate, act emerging from the 
re-articulation of a pre-existing set of relations. 
There were several motivations for FOCI to form. The possibility of funding from 
central government for cultural industry and cultural sector projects is a central 
concern for members of FOCI as many of the projects they had been involved in 
had survived through occasional injections of council money and European 
funding for special projects or for deprived areas, where many of the projects 
were based. As the nineties drew to a close however, this funding was beginning 
to dry up. Success in this area has been mixed, with most of the funding coming 
through Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), RCCs and occasional injections 
from interested bodies like the Arts Council and the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council. 
However, to focus only on resource distribution is to underplay the complexity 
of the engagement. This has allowed for a thoroughgoing reframing of the sector 
away from what DCMS had produced and towards some of the concerns of FOCI 
members. Like the CIMD, certain elements of FOCI's constitutive knowledge 
could be traced to the work of the GLC. According to one member: 
The GLC had been the incubator of cultural industries thinking ... In the end 
the abolishment saw it disperse to all these Northern Councils ... I went to 
conferences, I read voraciously the documents that they were putting out 
and a lot of the stuff that was coming out of Comedia at the time. People like 
Ken Worpole and Geoff Mulgan for example. (In the mid to late 1980s) I was 
trying to put some of those ideas into practice at the local level (FOCI 
Member, interview with author, 2006). 
Unlike the CIMD, however, FOCI's members remained faithful to the GLC's local 
and regional focus. This meant that, to an extent, they wanted to ensure that 
policy for the creative industries engaged with the local and regional level which 
had been conspicuously absent from the initial DCMS framework: 
We felt that when the government started up with the creative industries in 
1997 a lot of the groundwork had been done at the local level. And part of 
the creative industries agenda had always been a local one, but that DCMS 
document didn't mention place anywhere. We wanted to stress the local 
dimension (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006). 
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But this was not all, there was a desire to challenge the way the sector had been 
enframed: 
Where the word creative came from nobody knows. The specific definition 
was very individualistic. It completely came from left of field for people who 
had b~en talk~ng. abo.ut cultural industries and value chains and complex 
ecologIes of dIstrIbution systems, and suddenly it was just about creative 
entrepreneurs exploiting IP. It was quite a weak understanding (FOCI 
Member, interview with author, 2006). 
The CIMD's constitutive enframing of the economy to include' creative' activity 
as an integral component invited attention on a creative industries sector that 
overlapped with the objects of actors in the FOCI network. This overlap became a 
conduit through which these actors could contest the constitution of the sector as 
it stood in existing policy documents and offer a different way of understanding, 
and a different way of enframing, the economic for policy purposes. FOCI 
became the mechanism through which this could occur. 
FOCI's opportunity came as a result of the CIMD garnering broad political 
support but in itself not being a policy programme, resulting in something of an 
impasse for DCMS. One member described the role the network was able to take 
on: 
The regions were well placed to do something about (the creative industries) 
because in a way this was what they had always been doing. But, and this is 
an important point, that could never be admitted. Part of the reason that 
creative industries and not cultural industries was selected was so that New 
Labour could distance itself from 'Old' Labour. 'Old' Labour had much of its 
support in the old metropolitan counties and much of what it had done was 
local economic development which was against the neoliberal orthodoxy 
which New Labour had taken over. There was a tension there ... So FOCI... 
became a convenient sort of method for DCMS to talk to the regions - it 
inserted itself into the process ... serving as an intermediary between public 
and private and all those interests. It could talk to people between different 
spheres and pass information along (FOCI Member, interview with author, 
2006). 
FOCI became a part of the creative industries policy network. It acted as a proxy 
for drawing in knowledge once linked to the GLC, but at the same time disguised 
the fact such a link existed. The result was the ability of FOCI members to 
influence policy through membership of DCMS taskforces and influence at the 
RDAs and RCCs: 
In the early days we were able to guide policy, particularly at the regional 
level because there was a complete lack of knowledge. The organisations 
had been set up at the regional level with people who didn't really know 
anything about the area. So we saw ourselves as befriending these regional 
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agencies and guiding them in a way that we wanted them to use their 
resources. Ultimately several FOCI members got into jobs as creative 
industry coordinators. I think FOCI members did just about every piece of 
research at the regional level which established policy for the RDAs (FOCI 
Member, interview with author, 2006). 
Hence members of the FOCI epistemic community were producing, and were 
themselves, knowledge forms circulating through policy spaces. The authority 
they now had as creative industries experts meant that, at particular moments, 
they have been influential in the formation of policy programmes. The DCMS 
Evidence Toolkit (DCMS, 2004) was FOCI's most conspicuous success in this 
endeavour. 
The DET was ostensibly a response to 'the urgent need, expressed by all the 
English RCC's, for a more robust and reliable evidence-base on which to develop 
policies for the future' (DCMS, 2004: 1). It serves as a guide for the collection of 
cultural statistics, including the creative industries that are within the DCMS 
remit,8 and is intended to standardise this practice at the regional level and 
become part of the institutional framework described above. Like the CIMD, the 
DET makes the link between a concept, in this case the cultural sector, and the 
need for calculation to constitute it as knowable and actionable: 
It is only relatively recently that this sector has been bought together in the 
same policy framework. There are no shared definitions, systems and 
methodologies... there has been a lack of knowledge and expertise in 
drawing together credible data for policy-making (DCMS, 2004: 1). 
To this extent the DET continues with the approach of using calculation to render 
certain unified spaces and subjects as available to governmental intervention. 
However, the DET differs from the CIMD in certain key respects. This is not just 
that they target the 'cultural' sector which overlaps with the creative industries 
sector - the DET is a deliberate attempt to alter the way that both of these sectors 
are conceived in policy knowledge. 
Apart from a reference to them in a section on definitions, the creative industries 
are not mentioned in the DET. However, it is clear that these two sectors overlap 
one another in terms of some of the 'cultural' industries referred to. But this is 
8 At the time these were visual-arts, performance, publishing and audio-visual. The rest 
of the creative industries were looked after by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI). 
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not a case of shifting the analytical lens and using the same statistical approach as 
the CIMD for measuring the performance of a slightly different set of activities. 
The focus of the DET is on the cultural sector and the economies in which it is 
situated: 
Culture has both a 'material' and a non-material dimension. The definition 
of the Cultural Sector must focus upon material culture, and we understand 
this to be the sum of activities and necessary resources (tools, infrastructure 
and artefacts) involved in the whole I cycle' of creation, dissemination, 
exhibition / reception, archiving / preservation, and education / 
understanding relating to cultural products and services (DCMS, 2004: 10). 
While the CIMD measured output and revenue, the DET uses production chain 
logic to guide the development of the statistical framework. Set against the 
consumption-revenue generating definition of the creative industries that 
describes the 'present approach of DCMS', this productivist definition 
emphasises not just the returns of the industries themselves but the role of all the 
facets of production: 
an analysis of one function within Film, film production, would not simply 
cover film production companies, but would seek to include set design, 
costume hire, post-production, special effects and so on. In addition to the 
introduction of functions that are not presently considered by DCMS (e.g. 
film education), a more rigorously applied concept of the production chain 
works to 'deepen' the cultural domains when compared with the present 
approach of DCMS (DCMS, 2004: 11). 
The result is a challenge to the CIMD. The statistical representations that would 
be produced under the framework, with its emphasis on all the inputs that go 
into cultural production, would suggest the presence of a creative industries 
sector that looks quite different to that suggested by the latter. The implication of 
this is recognised by the authors: 'the concept of the production chain enables 
policymakers to 'see' the totality and interrelations of an industry or domain, 
which improves their ability to properly target interventions' (DCMS, 2004: 11). 
The overlap of the two sectors aside, this language indicates that the DET is a 
deliberate attempt to force a different representational map of the cultural and 
creative industries sectors that would result in a different kind of policy focus for 
both. 
The DET itself was authored by academic Andy Pratt and consultancies the 
Burns-Owens Partnership, Positive Solutions and Experian Business Strategies, 
but FOCI had a strong influence. According to one member: 
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It was the subject of a lot of debate in FOCI. We all inputted into that. We 
had many, many long debates about it. There were several people from the 
FOCI group who were involved in developing it (FOCI Member, interview 
with author, 2006). 
It was Pratt, however, who was most responsible for the production chain 
conceptualisation of the creative industries - it was an approach he had worked 
with before when studying what he called the cultural industries sector (see 
Pratt, 1997). One of the authors is definitive about what they hoped this would 
achieve: 
The failing of the mapping document was its conceptual basis where it was 
concerned with consumption but not with the interconnectivity of cultural 
production. By creating this model about the circuit of production it was like 
inserting a time-bomb into the whole statistical framework. .. they're now 
beginning to realise that their entire framework is based around this 
(production chain concept) and they've actually got statistics on this and 
they have to think about cultural production more generally. It's (our) way 
of figuring policy. (We've) inserted this policy imperative in the centre. 
(Jokingly) It's like a virus (DET Author, interview with author, 2006). 
By creating this alternative framework to the CIMD a different type of evidence 
base is expected to result. FOCI's goal is to change the way the creative 
industries, and the cognate cultural sectors they are also interested in, are 
understood and acted upon in evidence-based policy. Some members claim that 
it has already had some success in changing the terms of the debate so it is 
possible this strategic deployment of knowledge, taken when a political opening 
occurred thanks to the efforts of FOCI, may have shifted the terrain of the 
creative industries in a significant way. 
The CIMD and the reimagined economy it partly represents provide a platform 
for policy action and for policy intervention. The way that this produces an 
institutional framework provides the space, and the deliberate reliance on certain 
kinds of knowledge the opportunity, for actors, like those that constitute FOCI, to 
recast themselves as creative industries policy experts. In the case of FOCI the 
rise of the creative industries gave them a path to get closer to centres of policy-
making and the opportunity to intervene on the way the imagined economy is 
governed. Their's is not the only example of this kind of intervention, but their 
story does illustrate two things: that policy is not only reliant on expertise but 
constitutive of it, and that this expertise is not necessarily interested in 
reproducing the status quo. 
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5.6: Conclusion 
This analysis denaturalises the creative industries as an object of government by 
demonstrating the extent to which they were initially a contingent invention, 
produced in response to specific problematisations emerging in a specific 
moment of political change, reimagination, and inventiveness. This brings to the 
surface the means by which the creative industries were constituted as an 
actionable political object in a reimagined British economy. The use of 
calculative, evidence-based policy in the first iteration of the creative industries -
the CIMD - had the effect of constituting the creative industries as an economic 
sector with certain qualities and dynamics amenable to political intervention. The 
CIMD and its related documents achieved a transformation in the ideas about a 
particular set of economic activities that were unified by the idea of creativity 
into numerically-proven fact - not because these figures were not disputed but 
because they backed up a claim that this sector existed in some form in the 'real' 
economy. The result was an economy with a new institutional framework that 
acts on this sector. The economy imagined in the CIMD became a reality for those 
agencies tasked with acting through or on the creative industries sector. These 
spaces became the real substance of the policy possibilities imagined through the 
CIMD. 
With regard to the broader theoretical arguments of the thesis, this chapter 
shows how knowledge circuits that link different epistemic communities and 
policy-making sites can produce changes in all of them. The creative industries 
initially emerged as a policy concept through the articulation of particular 
problematisations concerning the nature of the British economy, the multi-
faceted desire for a cultural revival and the turn towards evidence-based policy. 
These problematising discourses had been drawn from epistemic communities 
linked into New Labour and were circulating around the newly minted 
government system where, in DCM5, they found expression in the CIMD. This 
articulated a governmental imaginary that could be used to shape discourses 
about the future of the British economy and how those formerly' excluded' could 
be I included' again, as well as of the place and capacity of culture in British 
128 
society. From a governmental point of view it produced a field of intelligibility 
through which programmes which would conduct the conduct of certain 
organisations and individuals could be made manifest. But the circulation of the 
CIMD also invited other epistemic communities, such as that constituting FOCI, 
to intervene on these governing processes through their ability to cast themselves 
as creative industries experts. By adjusting their own knowledge to engage with 
the new creative industries concept, and using this to enter knowledge forms 
onto the knowledge circuits that intersect with policy-making sites, these 
epistemic communities not only reshape themselves in relation to a particular 
policy but contribute to the shaping of problematisations that can reshape policy. 
Hence new and reconstituted epistemic communities form around particular 
problematisations. 
This demonstrates how representations are constitutive of expertise, as well as 
constituted by it, through the circulation of knowledge forms. While the 
representation of the creative industries in the CIMD relied on politically 
mediated expert discourses about the changing nature of the economy and 
culture in the UK, the document has also caused actors situated in other 
epistemic communities to cast themselves as creative industries experts and 
engage with the representation. The CIMD was a I success' whose legacy has 
endured not necessarily because it represented a sector that was of increasing 
importance to the British economy, or because it produced certain subjects and 
spaces constitutive of that sector, but because it resulted in the reconstitution of 
experts, agencies and institutions who were willing to work through the concepts 
that it provided. In the end, this technically rendered reimagination of the 
relationship between culture and economy has resulted in a rearranged, and still 
evolving, policy landscape populated with new kinds of policies, agencies and 
expertise existing in constitutive relationships to each other. 
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Chapter 6: Transnational policy formation: importing creative 
industries policy into New Zealand 
6.1: Introduction 
Since the creative industries were first conceived in the UK, it has reappeared in 
policy form in a number of countries around the world (Hesmondhalgh and 
Pratt, 2005). This chapter focuses on one of these, New Zealand, to demonstrate 
the kinds of processes that can occur when policy transfers. The creative 
industries have been taken up with some enthusiasm by the New Zealand 
Government - most significantly they feature in a major economic strategy, the 
Growth and Innovation Framework (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002), as one of 
three key sectors, alongside biotechnology and information and communication 
technology, that the government wishes to develop.9 But, as the chapter will 
show, this is not a straight-forward case of policy transferring fully-formed from 
one site to another. Indeed the story of creative industries policy development in 
New Zealand follows a quite different path to that of the UK despite a number of 
apparent similarities between the two administrations themselves. The 
differences that will be apparent here are not trivial: they are indicative of the 
complex geographies of circulation associated with policy transfer. 
This chapter suggests that the transfer of creative industries policy from the UK 
to New Zealand is effectively a process of transnational policy formation. What 
the difference between the two UK and New Zealand stories of creative 
industries policy development indicate is that despite moments of 'parallel' or 
'near parallel' policy development when the CIMD is drawn upon in the New 
Zealand context, these are projects that, individually, have developed in quite 
distinctive ways. They are connected by the circulation of knowledge between 
9 They have also been embraced at the level of urban governance (e.g. Auckland City 
Council, 2005) but here the focus will be on the creative industries in national policy. 
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them, but it is a circuit that must pass through complex political, economic and 
social terrain, resulting in the particular knowledge forms often taking on new 
meanings as it is translated and retranslated on its way across the landscape. 
Thus this chapter focuses on the moments when the creative industries policy 
concept 'circulated in' to New Zealand and was translated into a constitutive 
component of policy debates and developments. It shows how creative industries 
policy in New Zealand was shaped by policy developed in the UK, but also that 
its engagement with the concept was determined by political concerns that saw it 
take a novel form. Creative industries policy in New Zealand was assembled from 
a variety of circulating knowledge forms and was more. than the simple 
reproduction of the British experience. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the political situation in New Zealand 
when the political party that would institute policy for the creative industries, the 
New Zealand Labour Party, came to power late in 1999. The self-identification of 
the new government as 'post-neoliberal' and social democratic while still seeking 
policy solutions led them to draw on overseas policy ideas associated with 
similarly constituted governments, including Tony Blair's New Labour. As 
discussed in Section 6.3, part of New Zealand Labour's strategy was to focus on 
reinvigorating the moribund cultural sector in the country. It was during the 
search for a policy solution that would achieve this, a search that involved a 
variety of state, non-state and quasi-state actors from inside and outside New 
Zealand, that different actors began making links between the creative industries 
programme (as far as it existed) in the UK and the potential for such a 
programme in New Zealand. The first significant engagement with the creative 
industries policy concept occurred in this context with the 'Heart of the Nation', 
or HotNation, project intended to develop New Zealand's cultural sector. 
HotNation proved to be a failure as its authors misread the political moment, but 
it seeded the possibility of the creative industries as an important economic 
sector and increased the circulation of the concept. As Section 6.4 shows, the 
creative industries then began to be articulated into economic discourses, resulting 
in the Creative Industries Mapping Document being reproduced again (more 
faithfully than had been conducted under Heart of the Nation) by a new national 
economic development agency. This allowed them to be deployed in the GIF as a 
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sector vital to the 'economic transformation' of New Zealand. The chapter 
concludes by arguing that 'Yhat is called policy transfer in this case is 
transnational policy formation that is spatially and temporally distributed across 
a range of policy-making sites linked up by a variety of knowledge circuits. 
6.2: Policy knowledge networks and the New Zealand policy apparatus 
When New Zealand Labour was elected to power in November 1999 it found 
itself with a number of political problems for which it was still seeking policy 
solutions. Of particular concern was the desire of the party to present itself as 
having moved on from the problematised neoliberal style of government that 
had marked the previous fifteen years. Like the election of New Labour in the 
UK in 1997, the election of New Zealand Labour had heralded the end of a long 
period of conservative (in the New Zealand case, National Party) rule. Although 
the opposition party in this case was in power for half the time - nine years as 
opposed to eighteen - the neoliberal style of government that allows parallels to 
be drawn with Thatcherite Britain extended further back to 1984 when the 
deregulation of the economy and the privatisation of state assets was begun 
under the previous (fourth) Labour Government. National's extension of market 
reforms to social services like health, education and welfare after 1990, combined 
with particularly extreme anti-union legislation, meant the 'New Zealand 
experiment' (Kelsey, 1995; see also Hazledine, 1998; James, 1998; Jesson, 1999) 
became an international example, cast in both negative and positive lights, of 
what could be achieved under neoliberal rationalities of government. This 
presented a complex problem for New Zealand Labour. On the one hand, a mid-
1990s referendum that introduced a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 
representation system was seen as a reflection of widespread public 
dissatisfaction with the pace and scale of reforms that had dramatically changed 
New Zealand's economic and social landscape during this period - MMP was to 
be a check on the parliamentary power that allowed this to happen.1o On the 
other hand, neoliberal discourses of what constituted prudent economic 
10 The first MMP election in New Zealand returned the National Party to power in 1996 in 
coalition with the minor New Zealand First Party. The latter had found itself as a power 
broker and had unexpectedly, for the electorate, gone with National rather than Labour 
(Bale, 2003; Kelsey, 2002). 
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management were seen as by and large accepted by the populace, so there was a 
public (and statutoryll) expectation that the New Zealand economy would be 
managed in line with the principles that had become 'economic orthodoxy'. 
Labour came to power even as it still searched for policy answers to this 
particular problematisation (Lamer et aI., 2007). 
This was not simply a search in a 'marketplace' of policy ideas, New Zealand 
Labour deliberately drew on particular national and international policy 
networks. At the time there was a convergence of self-identified social 
democratic parties around idea of the 'Third Way' (see Giddens, 1998b). This 
famously nebulous political construction's best known proponents were Blair 
and US president Bill Clinton, although it was the former who became most 
associated with it (see Blair, 1998). It offered a political approach claiming to pick 
its way between right and left, dispense with the left's conflict-ridden language 
of class and inequality and suggest that it is possible to have a dynamic economy 
and social cohesion in the newly globalising world. Despite a constant stream of 
criticism that argued it was an entirely insubstantial ideology (see Kelsey, 2002: 
58 for examples of this), during 1998 and 1999 Third Way discourse became a 
defining vision for New Zealand Labour. Following a visit by Robert Reich, 
Clinton's former Secretary for Labour in mid-1998, in which the Third Way 
vision of 'globalisation with a human face' was propounded, the New Zealand 
version of Third Wayism began to develop (Kelsey, 2002). New, though short-
lived, leftish think-tanks were formed by Labour Party members such as the 
Gamma Foundation and the Foundation for Policy Initiatives. The latter had 
links with the British Blairite think-tanks Demos and the Institute of Public Policy 
Research (Kelsey, 2002). One conspicuous outcome was the publication of The 
New Politics: A Third Way for New Zealand (Chatterjee et al., 1999) prefaced by 
Joseph Stiglitz, the former president of the World Bank who had come to speak 
out against the neoliberal'Washington consensus'. 
11 For example, the Fiscal Reponsibility Act (1994) requires the New Zealand Government 
to always run budget surpluses and th~ Reserve Bank AC.t (19~9) granted independence 
to the Reserve Bank to set interest rates ill order to control inflation. 
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New Zealand Labour, committed down the Third Way route, sought to associate 
itself with Tony Blair's New Labour, at one point Clark said that they were so 
close together you 'couldn't even fit a slice of bread' between them (cited in 
Kelsey, 2002: 67). This was reinforced in a 2002 speech by Helen Clark to the 
London School of Economics (LSE). Reflecting on New Zealand Labour's first 
term in office, she stated that her: 
government in New Zealand is following a path parallel to those of other 
modernising centre-left governments. We do seek in Professor Giddens' 
words 'to reconcile social justice with an energetic and competitive 
economy' (2002: unpaginated). 
In line with this, the UK was looked to for policy ideas - in her LSE speech Clark 
(ibid.: unpaginated) confessed to 'borrowing from a British New Labour 
initiative' concerning developing a protocol for managing relationships between 
central government and the non-governmental organisations that deliver 
particular social programmes - and even campaigning techniques - New 
Zealand Labour imitated the New Labour 'Pledge Card' approach in which key 
policy commitments were listed on a wallet-sized card. 
It should be noted that this association was not driven only by New Zealand 
Labour itself: in the late 1990s the media became a key site for shaping policy 
lesson drawing from New Labour in the UK (on the role of the media in policy 
transfer see McCann, 2004). A study by Tim Bale (2005) suggests that the New 
Zealand media was especially involved in bringing interpretations of New 
Labour's policy programme to New Zealand in order to set an international 
policy context for New Zealand Labour to work towards. Highlighting the 
particular role the media can play in policy learning, this coverage was 
particularly media-ted with 'the bulk of the material... (turning) out not to be 
contained within news sections but within editorials/leaders and 
commentary/feature columns' (Bale, 2005: 389). The concern for these generally 
right-wing journalists, such as Fran O'Sullivan of the New Zealand Herald and Jeff 
Gamlin of the National Business Review, was to indicate, editorially rather than 
accurately, the extent to which New Labour did not resemble the socialist' old' 
Labour of Britain, and to point the business-friendly direction New Zealand 
Labour would need to go to make it electable and successful. Of course, this 
media-tion cuts both ways as since New Zealand Labour's election articles 
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favourably highlighting their supposed 'progressive' credentials have appeared 
in left-leaning British newspapers such as The Guardian (Bale, 2003; e.g. 
Freedland,2000). 
But New Zealand Labour built on its own international policy knowledge 
networks as well. From 2000 it began attending meetings of the international 
Progressive Governance Forum. This forum was an extension and rebranding of 
the policy exchange events held under the Third Way umbrella for social 
democratic parties since 1998. It was to one of these events that Helen Clark was 
heading after her 2002 LSE speech, 'to swap ideas on how to meet the economic, 
social and international challenges which face us all' (2002: unpaginated). The 
UK, it is clear, was not the only source of policy ideas. In the same speech Clark 
(ibid.: unpaginated) makes reference to economic development strategies for 
which 'we have looked at models elsewhere, from those of Ireland, Finland, and 
Israel to Singapore, Korea and Silicon Valley. From them we borrow what we 
believe will work for New Zealand'. Initiatives like the Kiwi Expatriate 
Association (KEA) (see Larner, 2007) were the result of ideas 'borrowed' from 
overseas. 
New Zealand Labour's policies were not developed in splendid isolation, but nor 
were they simply plucked from a 'free market' of policy ideas. Through the 
media, through political networks like the Progressive Governance Forum, 
through the organised movement of certain knowledgeable individuals like 
Reich, New Zealand's policy-making apparatus was ensconced in a particular set 
of policy knowledge circuits that were integral to shaping political problematics 
and providing policy solutions. It was, and is, linked to these circuits in myriad 
ways: for example through personal connections, formal associations, organised 
events, and the media. When policy knowledge shifts within these circuits, New 
Zealand's policy programmes will shift with it. As I will show in the remainder 
of this chapter, however, this is not a case of policy homogenisation. The 
circulation of policy knowledge into and out of New Zealand's policy spaces is a 
process of translation which sees policy knowledge interact with 'local' expertise 
to produce novel policy forms, which can, in tum, return to those circuits. This 
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will be examined by looking at the specific conditions whereby the creative 
industries policy concept was translated into policy in New Zealand. 
6.3: Cultural policy and the creative industries 
6.3.1: Cool Aotearoa? 
Policy ideas and possibilities, and sometimes simply policy language (Solli et al., 
2005; Lofgren, 2005), came through the circuits discussed in the previous section, 
including, as we have seen, from the UK. One of these was the concept of the 
creative industries (Kaino, 2007; Larner et al., 2007). Initially, they did not make 
an appearance as any more than a simple rhetorical concept. The first time they 
surfaced was in a November pre-election cultural policy statement entitled 
'Uniquely New Zealand' by the Labour party in which the desire was expressed 
'to back a strong creative industry sector which provides sustainable 
employment and is able to contribute to economic growth and prosperity' 
(Labour Party, cited in Wong, 2000a). At the time this echoed the claims of the 
CIMD but was no more than a superficial engagement. Unlike the CIMD they 
were not being explicitly attached to the knowledge economy despite the 
presence of this latter discourse in New Zealand policy circles (e.g. Information 
Technology Advisory Group, 1999). It was in some ways an act of political 
expediency, like the 'pledge card' approach one of many intended to ride the 
popular wave of the UK's recently elected New Labour Party. But the language 
of the creative industries, and the possibilities it offered, could be usefully 
integrated into New Zealand Labour's political positioning. This was borne out 
in the year following the election as the term came to be established in New 
Zealand policy discourses. 
The new government sought to position itself as a 'progressive' administration. 
Clark (2002) deliberately described the previous fifteen years as a period of 
'neoliberal' government they had moved on from, but they also wanted to mark 
themselves as different from the pre-1984 governments. Its interpretation of this 
period echoed those made during the neoliberal period which described New 
Zealand as an over-regulated, centrally controlled economic basket-case - the 
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Poland of the South Pacific (Goldfinch and Malpass, 2007). Neoliberalism, then, 
was not a clear villain. Drawing on Third Way discourse, Clark conceded that 'no 
doubt many of these changes had to happen' (2002: unpaginated) so that New 
Zealand could become an open and modem economy - especially now u~der 
conditions of globalisation. But the changes had been too rapid, too radical and 
too ideologically tainted. Clark concludes that the reason her party had been 
voted in, and the mandate under which they had to govern, was because: 
many New Zealanders agreed that the country was on the wrong track and 
that fifteen years of radical change had failed to deliver either prosperity, or 
a fair society. Nor was there an appetite for any more radical change (ibid.: 
unpaginated). 
Clark's government needed to differentiate itself from the neoliberal approaches 
of the previous decade and a half but retain certain aspects that could be thought 
of as essential to a modern globalised economy - trade and fiscal policy 
especially - without doing anything that might be conceived of as overly radical 
or ideological. It would take a comparatively pragmatic approach (Bale, 2003). 
Reemphasising arts and cultural policy was one tactic for achieving this. Helen 
Clark herself became the Minister for the Arts, Culture and Heritage as well as 
Prime Minister, an unprecedented move that symbolically placed the sector at 
the heart of power. The cultural sector was constructed as having suffered under 
an austere neoliberal regime - Clark at one point even referred to the 'philistines' 
that wanted to narrow the collections and functions of the National Library and 
National Archive (Clark, 2000a: unpaginated). This was not difficult to do. 
During the neoliberal period, the Trade Development Board had in 1989 released 
a document on the export potential for the arts, working with the rationality that 
the artist had to learn to pay their way by developing their business skills (New 
Zealand Trade Development Board, 1989). In 1994 the Queen Elizabeth II Arts 
Council of New Zealand that had been set up in 1963 to manage the subsidy the 
government provided for the sector was restructured into its present form as 
Creative New Zealand (CNZ) and populated with generic managers who 
imposed a commercial model (Easton, 1997). Perhaps most significant was the 
gradual reduction in central government funding for the Arts Council/ CNZ after 
1990 despite some partial offsets via lottery money (Skilling, 2005). Opposition to 
these managerialist, business-oriented and parsimonious policies contributed to 
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the new government's self image as an administration with an interest in the 
cultural sector absent under neoliberal rationales. But Labour also differentiated 
itself from the old subsidy regime by emphasising the role that the arts and 
culture could play in constructing national identity and generating economic 
returns. 
In this context the creative industries were picked up as a term that could 
partially organise Labour's approach to cultural government. As pointed out 
above, this was not at this stage an in depth engagement with the CIMD. It was 
what Ward (2006) would refer to as I shallow' rather than I deep' policy transfer. 
Nor were the creative industries the only term that travelled in this shallow 
fashion from the UK for these purposes. In March of 2000 an event entitled I Cool 
Aotearoa 7' ,12 organised by CNZ and chaired by its chief executive Peter Biggs, 13 
was held in the Beehive14 in an attempt to apply the I Cool Britannia' concept to 
the New Zealand context as a way of fostering a new identity. Biggs' inaccurate 
characterisation of Cool Britannia as a I series of policy initiatives introduced by 
the Labour Government over there in 1997 to foster creativity in the United 
Kingdom' (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 3) rather than the marketing slogan it really was 
shows just how I shallow' the engagement was at the time. The British guests on 
the panel, brought in to discuss the concept, very quickly disabused Biggs and 
the audience of the possibility that it still had credibility in the UK. One panellist, 
Michael Billington, theatre correspondent for The Guardian newspaper, stated: 
I don't want to sound too provocative, but I think with the benefit of 
hindsight it seems to have done Labour quite a bit of damage actually ... it 
came to be taken to mean that they were actively hostile to the traditional 
arts, because they were so busy inviting people like (Britpop band Oasis 
guitarist Noel) Gallagher to 10 Downing Street. So I think it's a phrase that 
needs to be handled with a good deal of caution (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 3-4). 
12 Aotearoa is the Maori name for New Zealand. 
13 It is interesting to note that before the 1999 election Biggs, a successful advertising 
executive, had been appointed to chair at CNZ by the previous government. At the time 
Clark declared that this was an end of term game being played by the departing 
executive by make life difficult for the incoming government (Small, 1999), but fairly 
soon into the term it became clear Biggs had gained Clark's trust, becoming one of her 
closer allies (Biggs was made a member of Clark's 'kitchen cabinet', the trusted advisors 
who populated her Growth and Innovation Advisory Board (Prince, 2003». 
14 The Beehive is the executive wing of the New Zealand Parliament Buildings ill 
Wellington. 
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The panel's other British representative, Paul Smith of the British Council, 
concurred: 'I do (share that view) to a great extent, I think the label is now rightly 
neglected in Britain' (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 4). 'Cool Aotearoa' proved to be a false 
start and has not been heard of since. 
The term 'creative industries' remained peripheral at this stage despite the 
government's signalling of it. At the' Cool Aotearoa?' event they were mentioned 
only once by Paul Smith who described it as a 'ham-fisted' phrase but suggested 
it was 'maybe most constructively useful as an example to New Zealand ... (After 
some statistical work was carried out) we were looking in the Arts and Creative 
Industries at the second largest sector in the. British economy' (cited in CNZ, 
2000a: 5). But the focus at this stage was on New Zealand arts and culture and the 
possibilities of the 'creative sector', the 'creative society' and the' creative nation'. 
Associate Minister for the Arts Judith Tizard reflected on the emerging debate 
about the place of arts and culture in New Zealand that the 'Cool Aotearoa?' 
event was a part of: 
I think it is a sign that this government is as passionate as it is about doing 
something real about New Zealand being a creative nation that we are having 
audiences like this talking about the sort of issues we are ... I hope that this 
debate will be part of the ongoing debate which I hope that this government 
will be able to put real resources and real energy behind (cited in CNZ, 
2000a: 1, emphasis added). 
Peter Biggs also made it clear that his organisation shared the government's goals 
on this matter: 
Why has Creative New Zealand organised this event? Simply one reason, 
we don't see ourselves as just funders of the arts, we want to see ourselves 
as a catalyst in making the creative society happen (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 2, 
emphasis added). 
Late 1999 and early 2000 was a period when policy ideas were used largely as a 
result of the new government' feeling around' for possible policy solutions and 
ideas. The actors and agencies that linked to UK creative industries discourse at 
this time, like CNZ, predominantly identified themselves as part of the cultural 
sphere. This meant they looked to the UK through the networks they were linked 
into, meaning actors and agencies who similarly saw themselves as part of the 
cultural sphere in the UK. As a result the interpretations of the 'creative 
industries' and 'Cool Britannia' initially entering New Zealand were seen as 
possible solutions to what were considered cultural policy concerns. 
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These events, policy statements and positioning speeches reflect attempts to 
translate policy concepts into a New Zealand context. This is not necessarily a 
difficult task: just the introduction of the creative industries concept suggests that 
there is an equivalent sector in New Zealand and therefore it will be possible to 
learn from what the UK is doing. But if it is to have any momentum and become 
a policy solution then it needs actors with the means and the motivation to 
champion the translation. Hence, certain agencies, such as CNZ, used this 
moment to try to position themselves as vital centres in this process of translation 
and therefore as indispensable components - 'a catalyst' (Biggs, cited in CNZ, 
2000a: 2) - of the emerging policy solution. Like the actors from FOCI, the arrival 
of the creative industries concept as a possible solution to problems in the 
cultural sector allowed them to be cast as policy 'experts'. For CNZ this was 
rewarded with a generous funding boost, part of what was known as the 
Cultural Recovery Package, in May 2000 (Clark, 2000b). After promising in their 
pre-election campaign to provide an injection of funding into arts and culture of 
NZ$25m, the announcement of the Cultural Recovery Package in May saw this 
amount increased markedly to over NZ$86m plus NZ$18.5m extra funding per 
year distributed across several organisations. Table 6.1 summarises this 
spending. This increased the proportion of Crown expenditure on arts and 
culture from 1.2% to 1.7% between 1998/99 and 1999/2000 (Statistics New 
Table 6.1: Summary of the Cultural Recovery Package (source: Clark, 
2000b) 
Organisation Additional Funding provided (NZ$) 
Creative New Zealand 20m 
Film Production Fund 22m establishment costs 
New Zealand Music Industry Commission 2m establishment costs 
New Zealand On Air 27.9mplus Sm extra pi a 
New Zealand S_y?lphon~ Orchestra 3m plus 1.4m extra pia 
Te Papa National Museum 11m extra...EI a 
New Zealand Historic Places Trust 3m plus O.5m extra pia 
New Zealand Film Archive O.94m 
Royal New Zealand Ballet O.76m 
Christchurch Art Gallery 6.74m development costs 
Ministry of Culture and Heritage 1m plus O.6m extra pia 
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Zealand, 2005: 6). The NZ$20m that CNZ received enabled the agency to increase 
its funding to 31 regularly funded cultural organisations by an average of 30% 
and provide funding for an additional seven organisations over the following 
three years (CNZ, 2001). 
Clark justified the increase in spending by pointing out that New Zealand's 
established arts organisations were in a precarious financial position and needed 
serious monetary assistance if they were to continue being viable. But she also 
further emphasised the government's commitment to establishing a unique New 
Zealand identity which had the arts and culture at its centre and repeating the 
pre-election policy statement on the role that a 'creative industry sector' would 
have in the future of the New Zealand economy (see Clark, 2000a; 2000b). 
6.3.2: 'HotNation' 
Of more portent, however, was the commissioning of the Heart of the Nation 
(HotNation) project at the end of March 2000. The purpose of this project was to 
develop a strategic plan for the cultural sector within the context of the 
Government's 'vision'. The Terms of Reference for the project outlined this by 
repeating pre-election campaign lines: 
• Vibrant arts and cultural activities which all New Zealanders can enjoy 
and through which a strong and confident cultural identity can emerge; 
and 
• A strong and vibrant creative industry sector which provides sustainable 
employment and economic growth within an innovative environment 
(New Zealand Government, in Heart of the Nation Project Team, 2000: 
Annex A ii, refer Appendix C) 
The creative industries, here still no more than a vague concept in a vague 
discourse, were about to undergo a deeper engagement. 
The intention was for the panel to 'embark on a consultative process with key 
stakeholders and interest groups in the cultural sector' which would not rely on 
'significant increases in government funding for its effectiveness' (ibid.: Annex A 
ii, refer Appendix C). Its strategic working group was led by arts consultant 
Hamish Keith although the quantitative and analytical research conducted in the 
report was by the consultancy McDermott Miller and especially the Wellington 
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academic, and former director of the Arts Council, Michael Volker ling. 
Volkerling is generally credited with writing the bulk of the report. The project 
was given two months to report back to the Minister. The process of producing 
the report involved the panel talking to arts organisations, collecting 
submissions, meeting with local community representatives across the country, 
researching the cultural sector, and drawing up a strategic plan. What was 
produced ran to over 60,000 words as The Heart of the Nation: A Cultural Strategy 
for Aotearoa New Zealand (HotNation Project Team, 2000). The report offered a 
conceptualisation and analysis of the cultural sector and proposed a fairly 
thoroughgoing restructuring of its existing governance arrangements. To this 
extent it was a relatively strong techno-political statement about the nature of the 
sector and an attempt to bind together the cultural sector ideologically, 
materially and institutionally. The plan was defended as a coherent architecture 
that was emerging from within the cultural sector (Keith, 2000). One individual 
involved with writing the report argued that it represented a distillation of the 
cultural policy discourses that had been fermenting in and around the Arts 
Council since the 1980s (interview with author, 2006). 
The report drew on the Government's vision outlined in the terms of reference by 
conceiving of the cultural sector as comprised of cultural enterprises in which 
'creativity embraces expressive and communicative purposes and where profit 
and commercial gain is not a primary motivator', and creative industries 'whose 
primary resources are creativity and intellectual property and which are 
sustained through generating profits' (HotNation Project Team, 2000: 5). On top 
of this, the sector was conceived as necessarily including the recognition that 
Maori culture is distinctive from non-Maori culture and needs to be maintained 
as such under the obligations of the Treaty of Waitangi. It was expected that the 
cultural sector would provide both cultural and economic returns. Drawing 
directly on the CIMD, this possibility is fleshed out in the bulk of the report 
which analyses the size of the sector in terms of its cultural and economic returns, 
the possibilities for the growth of the sector given growing domestic and 
international audiences and the prospect of increased investment by private and 
public organisations. It concludes that the sector has great potential for enhanced 
economic and cultural returns if necessary strategic steps are taken. 
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The report proposed a significant programme of restructuring to acheive this end 
- in the words of the report, what was needed was not a 'tune up', but an 
'overhaul' of the existing system (HotNation Project Team, 2000: 76). The most 
important elements of this were a new Ministry for Maori Arts, Culture and 
Heritage to sit alongside the existing Ministry for Culture and Heritage and the 
abolishment of CNZ to be replaced with an assortment of bodies concerned with 
training and support for cultural and creative workers, local government 
partnerships, sector specific arrangements, and the creative industries. The last of 
these would get its own Creative Industries Development Agency intended to 
work with existing practitioners in developing careers, markets and products for 
the sector. This was the first substantive engagement with the creative industries 
in a policy related document in New Zealand, a document primarily intended for 
the broader cultural sector. 
6.3.3: HotNation and the eIMD 
Texts like the HotNation report are forged from the articulation and translation 
of a variety of intersecting actor-networks (Barnes, 2001a). The report's primary 
author, Michael Volkerling, has an international reputation as a cultural policy 
scholar resulting from his constitutive actor-network that includes roles 
organising the biannual International Conference on Cultural Policy Research 
and on the editorial board of the International Journal of Cultural Policy. The 
HotNation report illustrates this in referencing cultural policy examples from 
Australia, Ireland, Canada and the United States. What is also clear however, 
despite these other examples, is the influence of the CIMD and other creative 
industry policy documents from the UK. The first CIMD (DCMS, 1998) is 
included in the bibliography along with the Creative Industry Task Force reports 
on exports (DCMS, 1999a), the internet (DCMS, 2000a) and the 'regional 
dimension' (DCMS,2000b). 
The report provides a definition for the cultural sector, of which the creative 
industries are a part, that adopts the same key components as that provided in 
the CIMD. Compare: 
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with: 
Those in.dustries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent 
and w~lch have the potential for wealth and job creation through the 
generation and exploitation of intellectual property (DCMS, 2001b: 5), 
a range of commercially-driven businesses whose primary resources are 
creativity and intellectual property ... a range of activities which have their 
origin in individual creativity, skill and talent (HotNation Project Team, 2000: 5, 
refer Appendix D). 
The method of listing the range of activities that make up the sector is also 
utilised. Although some different activities are included, it is notable that, like the 
CIMD, it groups together activities that may have once been seen as disparate, 
like design, the performing arts, advertising, film and the recording industry (see 
HotNation Project Team, 2000: 5, refer Appendix D). 
This process is indicative of how the policy transfer is a matter of translation 
(Czarniawska and Sevon, 2005; Lofgren, 2005; Olds, 2005). After a possible 
equivalence was recognised between the New Zealand and UK cases it had 
become conceivable that a policy transfer could be effected between the two 
countries. The HotNation report did this directly by drawing on the CIMD and 
related documents. But despite its obvious influence it was not parachuted in 
fully-formed, it was translated through the knowledges that intersected at the 
site of production and a new knowledge form was created. The way the 
definition was taken apart and put back together in a different way - resulting in 
a definition for which arts and culture are not understood only in terms of the 
creative industries as they are in the UK (refer Appendix D) - is an allegory of 
this process. The ideas of the CIMD combine with ideas about culture as not just 
about profit and the need to make special provision for conceptions of Maori 
culture, along with myriad other knowledges brought into the site through other 
actor-networks, resulting in the alloy of the final report. Other constraints played 
their part as well (Routledge, 2008): the project team was only given two months 
to produce their report, meaning the statistical analysis was a pragmatic 
articulation of the CIMD approach and the approach taken by Statistics New 
Zealand several years earlier when they produced the New Zealand Framework for 
Cultural Statistics (Statistics New Zealand, 1995) using a set of similar categories. 
This provided the researchers with a ready-made proxy for measuring the 
cultural sector and its creative industries as it was argued that most of the 
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activities that make up the cultural and creative industry sector fit under these 
headings. Hence, the CIMD had a definite influence on what was produced, but 
the end result came out of the active translation of the CIMD and its articulation 
with other knowledges. 
6.3.4: Heart failure? 
To a considerable extent the process of translation is an exercise in negotiation 
between different knowledge claims. It is also a techno-political exercise as actors 
try to produce knowledge forms calculated to cause favourable shifts in policy. It 
was hoped that the HotNation report would be a central text, a circulating 
immutable mobile in ANT parlance, for producing an institutionalised actor-
network that would govern the New Zealand cultural sector. It was not to be. 
After reviewing the report, Helen Clark responded in no uncertain terms that it 
did not fit in with what the government wanted. In their response, the 
government argued that the review did not address the terms of reference 
because the project was intended to I facilitate the development by the sector of a 
strategic plan' in the context that: 
the Government wants to playa supportive role in relation to the sector, but 
to do this most effectively, we believe the sector must have a clear sense of 
its own vision and strategies to achieve it (Matthews and Clark, 2000: 
unpaginated, emphasis added, refer Appendix E; see HotNation Project 
Team, 2000: Annex A ii, refer Appendix C). 
This VISIOn conflicted with the strategy outlined in the report which the 
government saw as I substantially a plan to implement structural changes to 
Government' (Matthews and Clark, 2000: unpaginated, refer Appendix E).IS 
The primary justification for the rejection was cost - the proposed reforms would 
cost millions to implement and be difficult to justify given the government's 
15 This reflects the main thrust of the rejection, although there are some additional 
concerns expressed over the fact that the submissions received are not reviewed, giving 
the government no sense of what interests outside the project team were thinking, and 
some dispute over the figures used concerning the proportion of built capital against 
non-capital cultural expenditure (refer Appendix C). This latter conflict resulted in a 
longstanding bitterness as some of the researchers were left angry over the loss of 
reputation they may have suffered, reflecting the sour conclusion to the HotNation 
project as a whole and possibly to the new cultural sector that had been hoped for (Wong, 
2000b). 
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limited fiscal base (Clark, 2000a) - and a related concern over the meaning of a 
restructuring programme of that magnitude: it was argued that, for one, there is 
already an established infrastructure in place, and two, that the cultural sector, 
and the country in general after almost two decades of reform, was 'all 
reorganised out' (Tizard, in CNZ, 2000b: 9). The most telling aspect of the 
rejection concerned how the government wanted to playa' supportive' role and 
that the sector had to have 'its own vision and strategies to achieve it'. The 
government had an idea of the cultural sector as a definable entity that had for 
years relied on state funding but with the potential in a post-industrial age to 
become self-regulating and, at least partially, self-sustaining. Although funding 
had been injected to revive flagging cultural institutions, it was hoped the 
national debate and the Heart of the Nation project would then catalyse a self-
aware and independently operated sector. What the HotNation report proposed 
was at odds with this rationale - it implied a continued heavy government 
presence in the cultural sphere and a wide range of institutions that would be 
costly to set up and into which government money would continue to be 
funnelled. According to Associate Minister for the Arts Judith Tizard: 'We asked 
for fish and chips and they (gave) us a fishing trawler and a flour mill' (cited by 
Harcourt, in CNZ, 2000b: 8). 
In contrast, Volkerling, described in an interview with one of his work 
acquaintances as a 'structuralist' type thinker, was proposing thoroughgoing 
institutional changes that could not be easily reconciled with government 
thinking. For Volkerling, the problem was that 'the Heart of the Nation report 
overlapped but did not couple neatly with the government's readymade 
solutions' (2001: 449). The extent to which the government did indeed have 
'readymade solutions' at this time is uncertain, but after signalling early in her 
premiership that 'mediative' ideas which provide for incremental rather than 
dramatic change, the Third Way for example, appealed to the kind of politics she 
wanted to conduct (see McLennan and Osborne, 2003), the restructuring 
programme of the HotNation report proved unpalatable. The articulation of the 
CIMD with knowledge produced through the particular actor-networks that 
informed the production of the HotNation report could not be reconciled with 
those that informed the conduct of the new government. 
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For all intents and purposes, HotNation was a failure. It did not have any of its 
recommendations acted upon and its rejection was clear and public. As a 
knowledge form, this meant it was destined to not travel through the circuits 
intended or in the form intended - as such very few hard copies of the report are 
still in existence. The cultural sector never recovered the optimism that had 
marked the early part of 2000 despite Clark announcing that supporting the arts 
and culture would continue to be a priority for her government (Oark, 2000a). 
However, although it did not result in the formation of policy for the creative 
industries, the report proved to be pivotal in increasing the circulation of the 
concept around more than just cultural policy circles: indeed parts of HotNation 
remained instrumental as the creative industries came to be resituated in a 
different policy context, and substantive creative industries policy formation 
occurred. 
6.4: The emergence of the creative industries 
The arrival of the creative industries concept in New Zealand, combined with the 
more sustained engagement with the CIMD in the HotNation report, began to 
consolidate the concept in policy discourses. This was not simply I free-floating' 
discourse: the term I creative industries' was proving useful to policy, media and 
industry actors for understanding particular industries in New Zealand whose 
recent developments had received widespread media and government attention. 
Framing them in this fashion also fed into the image of New Zealand as a 
particularly I creative' place. Three industries were especially prominent: popular 
music, designer fashion and film. 
In July 2000 the New Zealand Music Industry Commission (NZMIC) was set up 
to cater for the national music industry which was seen to have an increasingly 
distinctive sound and an untapped potential for export earnings (see Music 
Industry Export Development Group, 2004). This resulted from the lobbying of 
government by musician representatives to get them to recognise the potential of 
a sustainable music industry that sat somewhere between the pure creative focus 
of CNZ and the commercial I airtime' focus of the Government's broadcasting 
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funding agency New Zealand On Air. At the time of writing the Government 
had granted the NZMIC two packets of NZ$2m in 2000 and 2005. 
Designer fashion in New Zealand was also achieving a degree of exposure that it 
had not experienced previously. 2000 was the year of the inaugural New Zealand 
Fashion Week which built on the acclaim and commercial success that New 
Zealand fashion designers had enjoyed the year before at London Fashion Week 
and since 1997 at Australian Fashion Week (Goodrum et al., 2004). Government 
support and extended media coverage of the event and the industry itself 
confirmed its perceived status as a pre-eminent post-industrial industry and 
purveyor of New Zealand's desired identity as an edgy and innovative place 
(Lewis et al., 2008). 
Finally film-making in New Zealand was receiving a disproportionate amount of 
attention at the time due largely to the filming of The Lord of the Rings in New 
Zealand by local director Peter Jackson which utilised New Zealand designed 
special effects technology widely perceived as cutting-edge. The presence of 
Hollywood actors and the amount of investment from the American movie 
producers New Line Cinema, as well as the innovative business model of making 
all three films of the trilogy at once, saw media attention lavished on the 
production. As with designer fashion, film was perceived as representative of the 
creativity inherent in the people of New Zealand and an opportunity to leverage 
off the country's scenery (Jones and Smith, 2005). 
By September 2000 the idea that these were all 'creative industries' was 
increasingly accepted. The creative industries concept served to arrange them 
alongside each other and in relation to the rest of the New Zealand economy. 
This was illustrated at an event similar in nature to 'Cool Aotearoa 7' entitled 
simply the 'Creative Industries Forum' (CNZ, 2000b). Organised again by CNZ, 
this time in conjunction with the British Council, the forum's participants were a 
reflection of how these industries were being understood together as creative 
industries and in parallel with a similar sector being developed in the UK. The 
main speaker was the British Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
Chris Smith alongside Judith Tizard and a panel of New Zealand speakers 
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representing music, designer fashion and film: 'three of the key creative 
industries' (Harcourt, cited in CNZ, 2000b: 1). The presence of Smith and the 
industry representatives on the stage with Tizard was in marked contrast to the 
'cultural' experts from the UK and New Zealand who spoke with her about 'Cool 
Aotearoa'. The focus now was on the creative industries - a fact quite explicitly 
laid out by chair Gordon Harcourt who linked Smith to the Creative Industries 
Taskforce in the UK and introduced the creative industries themselves through 
reference to the CIMD. While the event was a discussion of how New Zealand 
might learn from the UK example, its significance lay in the way it ordered these 
New Zealand industries as conceivable together through this British policy 
example. 
To sum up, over the course of 2000 the creative industries concept made a 
substantial incursion into New Zealand policy discourses. During this period a 
knowledge circuit had developed between New Zealand and the UK on which 
different kinds of experts travelled, ideas moved, and documents transferred. 
This particular circuit was the result of multiple attempts to translate the creative 
industries idea into the New Zealand context by multiple overlapping policy 
networks. As these attempts at transfer began to run together, gradually a certain 
conception of the creative industries formed across a number of agencies and 
networks and the creative industries concept began to develop in the New 
Zealand context. One government official described this process of the creative 
industries becoming a potential policy object thus: 
The focus on creative industries as developed in New Zealand did result to a 
significant degree from the work on Heart of the Nation. This was more as a 
result from the process involved in developing the report and work on next 
steps after the report than necessarily from the content of the final 
HotNation report itself. This focus on creative industries was further 
reinforced by the mapping work going on in the UK, which the visit of Chris 
Smith further crystallized (Government Official, interview with author, 
2006). 
The movement of ideas, documents and experts had been driven by more than 
just one actor or agency: CNZ, the HotNation project team, the new Labour 
government and creative industry practitioners all had a hand. Each of them had 
different motivations and deployed the language for different purposes - not 
always successfully as the failure of HotNation made clear. But out of it the 
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creative industries emerged as a useful concept for policy development in the 
New Zealand context. 
The creative industries concept is not the only way that the sectors the term 
describes might have been conceived for governmental purposes. In fact it was 
not the only attempt to do so: in an effort to gain more recognition and funding 
the New Zealand Film Commission commissioned a report that explored the 
concept of 'cultural capital' and whether the government should get involved in 
encouraging its production (see Barker, 2000). This was not as successful as the 
concept of the creative industries, not only in terms of its circulation in policy 
discourse but in the use of the term by actors in these sectors. This can be 
explained by the stronger actor-network that had formed around the idea of the 
creative industries, a characteristic of its translatability as a useful idea for a wide 
variety of actors. 
The creative industries idea offered a variety of actors in New Zealand the 
opportunity to operationalise the idea that' creativity' unified all these industries 
and their interests, and suggested that their parallel rise was not coincidence but 
the result of the growing importance of this capacity to the economy. As the 
cultural critic Stuart Cunningham has observed: 'for the first time (the creative 
industries concept) brings those industry sectors, those enterprises and those 
people who are creative in this broad sense, right into that mainstream of 
economic calculation and activity' (2003: 2). It was a policy with the potential to 
push aside existing tensions and problems by unifying the sector within itself 
and with the Government and, in a mediative fashion, act as a 'problem-solving 
device ... that will simply 'move things along" (McLennan and Osborne, 2003: 
53). When the HotNation report 'landed uninvited at the door of Jim Anderton's 
newly created Ministry of Economic Development' (Smythe, 2005: unpaginated) 
later in 2000, it was in the context of this emerging conception that this piece of 
codified knowledge was now being deployed. It had gone from' cultural plan' to 
economic 'mapping document'. 
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6.5: From culture to creativity? 
6.5.2: Creative industries as economic policy 
The transition of the creative industries from an amalgamation of cultural and 
economic imperatives to an economic sector was confirmed when responsibility 
for developing them passed from the cultural agencies like CNZ and the Ministry 
of Culture and Heritage to the newly formed economic development agency 
Industry New Zealand. The appeal of the creative industries had been such that 
Clark had remained true to her word in the HotNation response that the report 
would be a 'useful input' to policy development (Matthews and Clark, 2000, refer 
Appendix E). Judith Tizard had also referred to the document as 'a fantastic piece 
of work which has produced a creative and cultural map of New Zealand' (cited 
in CNZ, 2000b: 9). The use of the term 'map' here to describe the HotNation 
report despite it, like the CIMD, not being a map in the conventional sense at all, 
reflected the influence the CIMD approach now had on the thinking of these key 
government actors. The HotNation report served as an input to policy by tracing 
the contours of a creative industries sector in New Zealand, much like the CIMD 
had done in the British context. But its situation in a cultural policy document, 
and the perceived lack of rigour that was a consequence of the short time frame 
for the project, meant it was soon displaced as a key policy document and the 
CIMD was once again re-engaged by a different set of agencies and actors. 
Following the British example of the Creative Industries Taskforce, a cross-
departmental Creative Industries Working Group was set up with officials from 
the Ministry for Economic Development, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage 
and Industry New Zealand. The last of these had been set up as a new agency 
intended to develop New Zealand enterprises within a new paradigm of 
governmental intervention in the economy. This paradigm, located between the 
'extremes' of laissez-faire marketisation and state economic management, would 
be based upon 'intelligent interventions' that combine indirect and direct support 
for industries (see Rodrik, 2004). Initially in November 2000, five creative 
industry sectors were identified as having the potential for significant returns -
music, screen production, design, digital media and publishing. In 2001, under 
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the direction of the Creative Industries Working Group, it fell to Industry New 
Zealand to go further than what had been achieved with the HotNation report 
and explore the shape and potential of these sectors for the New Zealand 
economy. This would amount to a more sophisticated rendering of the creative 
industries sector, and of the industries within it. 
The first such study was contracted out to the New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research (NZIER) which produced an overview of the creative 
industries in New Zealand (Walton and Duncan, 2002). The brief given to NZIER 
by Industry New Zealand required that they model their approach on that used 
in the CIMD (ibid.: 1) and they did this through the adoption of the definition 
and the reproduction of the greater part of their methodology combining 
statistical data with estimation. Although they endeavoured to use the same 
categories, they had to reduce the number from thirteen to ten due to a lack of 
available data in the arts, crafts and antiques sector (ibid.: 3-4). The significant 
findings of the report were that the whole creative industries sector was 3.1 % of 
the economy in 2001; comparable to sectors such as education and finance, and 
that it had grown faster than the economy as a whole since 1997. Like the CIMD 
and HotNation, this study was constitutive of the creative industries as a sector 
in New Zealand rather than a description of a pre-existing object. Because it was 
modelled on the CIMD, its effect was to produce a comparable sector to that which 
existed in the UK and understood in much the same terms as containing certain 
industries and collectively growing at a certain rate (Larner and Le Heron, 2002; 
McCann, 2008). 
But in addition to this initial study, Industry New Zealand also commissioned a 
number of more specific I scoping reports' of opportunities and impediments for 
growth on the creative industries of designer fashion (Blomfield, 2002), design 
(Haythornthwaite, 2002), music (Douche, 2001), film16 (Yeabsley and Duncan, 
2002) and interactive gaming (O'Leary, 2002). These studies delimited which 
activities carried out in which fashion at which sites and by which kinds of 
workers fall within each particular sector. This is more than just boundary 
16 This report was commissioned by the New Zealand Film Commission but utilised by 
Industry New Zealand with special reference to the impact of The Lord of the Rings. 
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drawing: the creative industries are also activities defined by certain aspirational 
associations with creativity. Hence designer fashion was separated out from the 
production of textiles and other clothing due to the possibility it could' gain an 
international profile for New Zealand' (Blomfield, 2002: 51). These studies work 
to make the creative industries, in particular and in general, exist as definable 
and describable entities with a degree of coherence that means they can be acted 
upon as a whole (Mitchell, 1991; 2002; Buck-Morrs, 1995; Christophers, 2007). 
During 2001 the New Zealand creative industries went from a vague object 
understood to be 'out there' to a solid and actionable space of industrious and 
creative activity. 
The mapping study and the scoping reports constituted a platform on which 
policy could now be built. It is here that they began to be articulated with other 
policy knowledges circulating through Industry New Zealand. The nature of the 
economy, and the role that government could play in it, was being reimagined by 
and through a variety of commissioned studies, forums and agencies. Work 
conducted by Industry New Zealand, Trade New Zealand (formerly the New 
Zealand Trade Development Board) and the Treasury, supplemented by research 
on the 'kiwi diaspora' and foreign direct investment by private consultancies, 
produced an array of reports specifying the challenges the New Zealand 
economy faced (e.g. Boston Consulting Group, 2001; L.E.K. Consulting, 2001). 
Imported discourses of the 'knowledge economy' and 'knowledge society' were 
standard motifs for these reports. Similarly influential and with greater media 
exposure was the 2001 'Knowledge Wave' Conference co-organised by the 
University of Auckland and the Government. This event focused on how New 
Zealand might become a 'knowledge society' and organised its recommendations 
around themes of innovation, creativity, human capability, entrepreneurship, 
sustainability and social cohesion (Prince, 2003). Much like in the UK, 
government directed research on the creative industries was conducted at the 
same time that a relatively wide-ranging reimagining of New Zealand's economy 
and society was occurring. The idea of the creative industries had emerged in the 
UK from the reimagining of the economy that produced ideas like the 
'knowledge economy' which were now also circulating into New Zealand 
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(Larner et al., 2007). But as these were re-articulated together by agencies in New 
Zealand they produced a different policy regime. 
The main policy form that emerged was the Growth and Innovation Framework 
(GIF) (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002) released in 2002. The GIF serves as the 
centrepiece of the Government's attempt to intervene on New Zealand's 
economy and society: 'the framework government is following to create the 
innovative New Zealand we need to achieve our social and economic goals' 
(ibid.: 6). The stated intention is to reinvent the economy as a haven of high 
value-added production, leading to higher growth outcomes. To this end the GIF 
focuses on three sectors of the economy which are considered to have high 
growth prospects and the potential for significant impact across the economy. 
These are biotechnology, information and communication technology, and the 
creative industries. After the failure of HotNation to make them part of a cultural 
strategy, the creative industries had been translated into economic strategy. As an 
element of the knowledge economy they are seen as either industries where New 
Zealand is considered to have a competitive competency, like film, or as 
industries with an enabling quality providing innovative design and unique 
identity that cannot be replicated elsewhere. The creative industries are less the 
economically viable outcome of cultural production, as they were under 
HotNation, and more a realisation of an economic ideology that 'creativity is at 
the heart of innovation' (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002: 56). 
More pertinently, the inclusion of the creative industries in the GIF strategy was 
made possible through the use of the calculative 'mapping' approach first 
developed in the UK. In one sense, this approach had supplied the necessary 
numbers to justify their inclusion in the Government's master strategy,17 But in 
the end it was not the figures produced that were important, or even the 
evidence they provided that the sector was growing rapidly: already for one 
government official, the scoping studies are little more than a 'piece of history', 
meaning their role was to provide a foundation to get the creative industries into 
17 Although several of the studies are dated after the release of the GIF, t~e fa~t of th:ir 
existence was influential in justifying the inclusion of the creative mdustnes 
(Government Official, interview with author, 2006). 
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the GIF (interview with author, 2006). Of more significance is the possibility of 
the sector as a policy object. It was not important that the calculation of the 
contribution of the creative industries was accurate but that the sector was 
calculable, measurable, and therefore real (Mitchell, 1991; 2002; Christophers, 
2007). It was this effect, rather than accuracy, that the mapping and scoping 
studies achieved, and the reason the creative industries could be translated into 
the reconstituted economic strategy. 
6.5.2: After the Growth and Innovation Framework 
With their existence recognised through the studies, and their place in policy 
established through the GIF, the creative industries remain a contested presence, 
resulting in novel policy forms and interventions as they are re-translated and re-
articulated in new policy roles. The rollout of the GIF, for example, involved the 
creation of four private sector taskforces for each of the three priority sectors. The 
biotechnology and information and communications technology sectors had a 
single taskforce each but the creative industries ended up with two, one each for 
screen production and design. The decision to focus on these two creative sectors 
within the creative industries spectrum reflects the influence the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Industry New Zealand now had on the direction of 
creative industries policy. Design was selected under the GIF rationale that it was 
the most likely to have a broad impact across the economy as a whole; in other 
words it was perceived to have potential as an enabler for other industries to 
increase the value-added contribution to their part of the value chain. The focus 
on screen production on the other hand is described as a case of I strategic 
opportunism' borne out of the success of The Lord of the Rings in attracting 
investment and providing the opportunity for other industries, notably tourism 
and special effects technology (Jones and Smith, 2005), to leverage off the films 
(Government Official, interview with author, 2006). 
While the policy for these programmes is managed by the Ministry of Economic 
Development, they are delivered through the agency New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise (NZTE) which had been formed in June of 2003 out of the 
amalgamation of Industry New Zealand and Trade New Zealand. At the time of 
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writing NZTE remains the primary central government agency for the creative 
industries in New Zealand. The sector engagement strategy for 2006-07 (NZTE, 
2006) lists the key initiatives as the Better By Design project,1S a project to build a 
sustainable entertainment sector which focuses entirely on the screen production 
industry, and projects on developing exportable new generation textiles and 
'designer' /' sustainable' lifestyles. By far the most significant of these is Better By 
Design which resulted from the design taskforce's recommendations for a 
'design reference group' and focuses on linking New Zealand companies with 
the design industry. The screen production strategy focuses on bringing 
investment into New Zealand by attracting foreign film-makers, as occurred for 
The Lord of the Rings, and improving the sustainability of the New Zealand 
industry. DeSigner fashion had featured in the previous sector engagement 
strategy (see NZTE, 2005) and still has an official overseeing it, but has since been 
absorbed into the 'designer' lifestyles project. Music still rates a mention on the 
website but no strategy for engaging the sector exists with the agency. Two 
government officials interviewed made it clear that these industries are not 
considered economically significant enough to the agency to warrant sustained 
engagement (Government Officials, interviews with author, 2006). 
On the other hand, the relative size, centrality and success of the Better By Design 
project is indicative of ideas about the value-chain in governmental discourses. It 
is also clear that the creative industries are regarded as central to producing a 
New Zealand identity as they had been during the commissioning of HotNation, 
but here they are now linked with the possibility of further developing the New 
Zealand 'brand' from which New Zealand enterprises might be able to gain 
leverage (see NZTE, 2004-5). This is connected to discourses of 'economic 
transformation' which conceive New Zealand as competing in a global 
environment and linked into this via value-chains (see Mallard, 2006; Cullen, 
2006; Ministry of Economic Development, 2007). In explaining this, a government 
official directed me towards a paper by the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik 
(2004) which has been highly influential in thinking about the economy in New 
Zealand. The paper makes an argument for 'intelligent intervention' in the 
economy in which public and private actors work together to identify the most 
18 See www.betterbydesign.org.nz 
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widely beneficial way to act in the economy. Within this context the creative 
industries are regarded as enablers in the value-chain in that they enable New 
Zealand producers to extract more value from their particular node whether this 
is through improved design capability or through the reference of 'Brand New 
Zealand' and its many positive cultural associations which the creative industries 
are expected to provide. The Better By Design project represents the translation 
of the creative industries into the service of 'economic transformation' and, 
conversely, provides an important constitutive element of this process. 
Meanwhile the place of culture in relation to the creative industries continues to 
be rethought. Officials from the Ministry of Culture and Heritage who feel 
marginalised from policy formation are currently seeking a fuller strategic 
engagement with the creative industries, through a renewed focus on the concept 
of the cultural industries and their role in the production of national identity, that 
they feel is currently lacking due to NZTE's dominant position and unrelenting 
commercial focus (see Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, 2005; 
Maharey, 2007). Notably, CNZ has washed its hands of the creative industries 
after being so actively involved during 2000 around HotNation and the national 
debate on culture - when I requested an interview with the chief executive of 
CNZ in June of 2006 I received a response pointing out that they were primarily 
an arts agency and therefore did not have a creative industries focus. This is in 
marked contrast to a statement made by Peter Biggs in 2000 after HotNation 
called for the abolishment of the agency in which he argued that CNZ had 
moved 'beyond the pure arts and into the creative industries' (Cardy, 2000: 10). 
What is clear is that through these reshuffles, re-orientations, re-translations and 
re-articulations the substance of the creative industries discourse has shifted from 
cultural renewal and economic potential to national branding and value addition 
and the sites where that substance is produced have shifted from agencies 




Since 2000 the creative industries have been established as a policy object in New 
Zealand, but as a policy process this has followed a quite different path to that of 
the UK. Policies that explicitly target them have been developed within the 
context of broader economic policy after initial attempts to use them for cultural 
policy failed. When we consider the trajectory of these developments with those 
outlined in Chapter 5, it is clear that despite similarities in terms of definition, 
industrial constitution and mapping that resulted from New Zealand policy 
actors learning from the UK experience, the story of creative industries policy 
development and eventual policy outcomes is quite different to that of the UK. 
This underlines the theoretical point that policy transfer should not be thought of 
as diffusion or convergence where policies homogenise across space. The 
emphasis this chapter has placed on the complexities of translation reveal why 
simple policy reproduction as transfer tends not to happen. By focusing on the 
moments of transfer, and attempted moments of transfer, and how these are 
conducted politically, who by, and for what purpose, shows how policies drawn 
from across borders are established and assembled together with other policy 
concepts and tools into broader policy programmes. 
The existence of transnational knowledge circuits can explain why policy transfer 
occurs and why transferred policies often end up looking different in different 
places. To begin with, as the chapter demonstrates, knowledge circuits playa role 
in policy transfer processes. New Zealand's policy-making and policy-shaping 
sites had various knowledge forms, including policy documents (like the CIMD), 
policy interpretations and analyses (like media reports), and policy and other 
actors (like Chris Smith, Paul Smith and Michael Billington), circulating through 
them, bringing the creative industries policy concept into the country via a 
variety of routes. But the chapter also shows how these circulating knowledge 
forms are central to the production of new policy knowledge. The need to 
translate these circulating knowledge forms and articulate them with other 
knowledge residing in a particular site resulted in new policy knowledges being 
created and entering circulation (Williams, 2006). As a result, the failure of 'Cool 
Aotearoa' and HotNation to produce policy directly did not mean they were not 
158 
instrumental when creative industries policy was eventually assembled. They 
put into circulation knowledge forms that found their way to the eventual policy-
making site and played a vital role in the production of creative industries policy. 
The creative industries policy concept should not be thought of as a 'British' 
policy idea that has been transferred to other countries. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, in New Zealand it has been combined with notions of 'economic 
transformation' to assemble a creative industries policy programme quite 
distinctive from that of the UK. The CIMD itself, while at first a British initiative, 
has now been reproduced in New Zealand and (as we will see in the following 
chapter) elsewhere, producing myriad comparable representations of creative 
industries sectors across transnational space. The circulation of knowledge forms 
across transnational space, and their often contingent translation into other sites 
to produce new creative industries policy forms, means creative industries policy 
is developing unevenly but largely contemporaneously in sites dispersed across 
transnational space. It has been this circulation of knowledge, rather than the 
organisation of particular policy transfer networks or channels, that explains this 
particular policy transnationalisation (d. Stone, 2004; Ward, 2006). This highly 
uneven and dynamic production of policy knowledge across transnational space 
has provided an opportunity for myriad actors to engage in a fashion analogous 
to that described in Chapter 5. Thus transnational policy formation can be linked 
to the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries 
experts. This is discussed in the following chapter. 
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7: Global policy knowledge? A transnational epistemic 
community for the creative industries 
7.1: Introduction 
The transnationalisation of creative industries policy has been spatially extensive. 
The concept has emerged in administrative sites around the world, including in 
Australia, South Africa, New York and the EU. It has not been limited to 
Anglophone places with Tanzania, Columbia, China and Taiwan all adopting 
policy for the creative industries in some form. This chapter argues that this 
transnationalisation has been accompanied by the emergence of a transnational 
epistemic community of creative industries policy experts. This has resulted from 
the processes described in Chapters 5 and 6. As national and local 
administrations have adopted creative industries policy they have co-constituted 
locally or nationally focused creative industries experts. Hence, the development 
and transfer of the creative industries policy concept around the world is 
resulting in more and more creative industries experts emerging. Meanwhile the 
translation of the concept into different sites, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, is 
producing a variegated policy geography cut across by circulating policy 
knowledge. These two trends, one producing the same policy concept and 
associated expertise in different sites across space, and the other resulting in 
often quite different and locally determined policy outcomes, has resulted in new 
circuits of creative industries policy knowledge through which issues of policy 
difference and similarity are grappled with. Although many of the members of 
what is being referred to here as an epistemic community disagree about these 
issues, indeed some reject the 'creative industries' label outright, their 
engagement and/ or association with the CIMD and the creative industries policy 
concept means they are collectively recognised as having 'expertise ... , 
competence ... and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge' (Haas, 
1992: 3). 
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This chapter will trace the contours of the emerging epistemic community by 
examining the actors involved, the texts that circulate within it, and the emerging 
supporting infrastructure of agencies and sites developing and disseminating the 
knowledge produced (compare Haas, 1992; Chilvers, 2007). The 
transnationalisation of creative industries policy IS linked to the 
transnationalisation of the experts associated with it. They are embodied 
knowledge forms travelling on circuits of policy knowledge, a capacity requiring 
new skills and competencies. As more and more experts begin to circulate like 
this the epistemic community takes shape as a distinctively transnational entity. 
Second, it is argued that the epistemic community is reproduced through the 
emergence of particular sites that intervene on the circulation of knowledge by 
either facilitating increased circulation or actively contributing more to the 
knowledge forms of the circuit. This emerging infrastructure promotes and 
maintains the integrity of the community while supplying more knowledge 
forms to circulate to policy-making sites where they may be implicated in 
processes of problematisation or translation. 
As with the experts described in Chapter 5, the status of the CIMD as the first 
description of the creative industries in policy or scholarly discourses provides 
the clear' starting point' for building this epistemic community. A sense of the 
international circulation of the CIMD since its inception in the late 1990s is 
provided in the Section 7.2. This circulation almost immediately resulted in the 
emergence of a cabal of experts from the UK who became involved in policy 
development in distant places as well as within the UK itself through the CIMD. 
Section 7.3 shows how this has become increasingly professionalised with many 
of these experts becoming creative industries development officers for local and 
regional councils or getting involved with consultancies focused on creative 
industries policy. As the idea has become increasingly popular around the world 
more and more individuals are moving into this area, resulting in a rapidly 
expanding creative industries policy community. But this expansion has also 
meant that the community has become increasingly diffuse. 
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Nonetheless the organised circulation of policy knowledge around the world 
continues to hold this group together. Section 7.4 explores the infrastructures and 
processes that enable this to happen. Sites of knowledge exchange are where 
creative industries policy-makers, academics, researchers and so on come 
together to share their policy ideas and experiences and engage in a process of 
policy learning. Sites of knowledge production are sites in universities, research 
institutes, think-tanks and consultancies which are grappling with conceptual 
and research issues regarding the creative industries in order to produce 
authoritative policy knowledge. Both of these site categories are implicated in 
processes of articulation which make the creative industries cognate with other 
policy knowledges, particularly those that refer to creativity as an economic 
capacity, making it a constitutive part of larger, and potentially more durable, 
global policy circuits. The development of the epistemic community and the 
circulation of the policy concept are shown to be driving the I globalisation' of the 
creative industries policy concept (compare Sheppard, 2005). 
7.2: The CIMD as travelling policy 
New Zealand is not the only place where the CIMD has influenced policy. Policy-
makers from around the world have borrowed from it. According to one 
government official: 
There are a whole raft of countries looking to the UK and DCMS to learn 
about how the UK government is developing creative industries policy here. 
The mapping documents seem to be used world-wide as a model of best 
practice or as a reference. (There have been recent) approaches from South 
Africa, Holland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, New York (Government 
Official, interview with author, 2006, emphasis added). 
The key elements drawn from the CIMD are the I creative industries' moniker, the 
definition, the list of industries making up the sector, and the technique of 
measuring their impact on the economy. It has been cited in documents 
produced in and for a variety of administrative sites. These include, for example, 
Singapore (Economic Review Committee, 2002; see Yue, 2006), Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong Trade Development Council; 2002; see Wang, 2004), Columbia,19 the 
European Union (EU) (Marcus, 2005), South Australia (Doust, 2005), Zurich 
(Held et al., 2005) and Vienna (Ratzenbock et al., 2004). Table 7.1 lists a selection 
19 See http://tinyurl.comJ5u4fhl 
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of policy documents from outside the UK that refer to the CIMD or the creative 
industries concept in some way (Please refer to Appendix F for a complete 
version of this table). 
As in New Zealand, these have not been straightforward engagements. The way 
that the CIMD has been articulated with other knowledges as it has been 
translated into these sites has created considerable variety. For example, the 
Singapore (see Economic Review Committee, 2002: iii-iv) and Hong Kong (see 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council; 2002: unpaginated) cases adopt the 
moniker20 and definition up front and perform an equivalent mapping exercise, 
although they designate a different set of industries as constitutive of the sector. 
This was the same translation strategy taken by the New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research (Walton and Duncan, 2001). The EU (Marcus, 2005: 28, 30), 
South Australian and Viennese cases on the other hand adopt the moniker and 
reference the definition in their discussions of the conceptions of the creative 
industries, but set it alongside a range of other conceptions which makes the 
specificity of its influence more difficult to judge. The Vienna study offers an in-
depth account of the history of the concept from Adorno and Horkheimer's 
formulation of the' culture industry' through to the idea of creativity as a factor 
in production (Ratzenbock et al., 2004: 9-12). The South Australian document 
argues in its discussion that the CIMD version 'is a very broad definition and 
there are inconsistencies between the criterion and the inclusion of industries' 
(Doust, 2005: 21) before going on to compare definitional approaches taken in 
other policy documents.21 
Other strategies have the creative industries term articulated into them but do 
not refer to the CIMD at all. For example, an independent think-tank in New 
York City, the Center for an Urban Future, produced a report on Creative New York 
(Keegan et al., 2005: 25-26) which argued for supporting the city's creative 
20 The Singapore case slips between referring to the 'creative industries' and the 'creative 
cluster'. 
21 A follow-up document to the original strategy produced in Singapore in 2003 also 
compares the creative industries conception with cultural and copyright industry 
conceptions (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore; 2003: 52; see also Heng et aI., 
2003). 
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Table 7.1: Creative industries policy documents 
Document Author Year Space of Action 
Heart of the Nation Heart of the Nation Project 2000 New Zealand 
Team (for New Zealand 
Government) 
Creative Industries in Hong Hong Kong Trade 2002 Hong Kong 
Kong Development Council 
Creative Industries in New New Zealand Institute of 2002 New Zealand 
Zealand: Economic Economic Research (for 
Contribution Industry New Zealand) 
Creative Industries Economic Review 2002 Singapore 
Development Strategy: Committee, Government of 
Propelling Singapore's Singapore 
Creative Economy 
Cultural Policy White Paper Council for Cultural 2004 Taiwan 
Affairs 
An Analysis of the Ratzenbock et al. on behalf 2004 Vienna 
Economic Potential of the of the City of Vienna 
Creative Industries in 
Vienna: English Summary 
Creative New York Keegan et al. for the Centre 2005 New York, USA 
for and Urban Future and 
Mt Auburn Associates 
Future of the creative Marcus, for the European 2005 EU 
industries: implications for Commission 
research policy: Working 
Document 
The creative industries in Doust, for Arts South 2005 South Australia 
South Australia: a report Australia: Cross-
prepared for the Cross- Government Steering 
Government Steering Committee 
Committee: Arts SA 
Snapshot: Auckland's Auckland City Council 2005 Auckland, New 
Creative Industries Zealand 
Zurich's creative industries: Held et al., on behalf of the 2005 Zurich, Switzerland 
synthesis report Economic Development 
Departments of the Canton 
and City of Zurich 
Creative Industries Department of Sport, Arts, 2005 Gauteng, South Africa 
Development Framework of Culture and Recreation: 
the Gauteng Provincial South Africa 
Government 
Our Creative Potential: Brinkhorst et al., 2005 Netherlands 
Paper on Culture and Ministry of Economic 
Economy Affairs and Ministry of 
Education, Culture and 
Science 
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Table 7.1 cont. 
Document Author Year Space of Action 
The Economy of Culture in Kearn European Affairs 2006 European Union 
Europe (KEA), for the European 
Commission 
Understanding Creative The Global Alliance for 2006 Global 
Industries: Cultural Cultural Diversity and 
Statistics for Public Policy UNESCO 
Making 
industries and drew on research carried out on Creative London, the Creative 
Industries Development Service in Manchester, and the Round Foundry Media 
Centre in Leeds, all of which had previously articulated the CIMD into their own 
concerns in particular ways. In South Africa the Department of Sport, Arts, 
Culture and Recreation produced a report on Creative Industries Development 
Framework of the Gauteng Provincial Government (2005: 7) which used the creative 
industries moniker but adopted a definition produced by the Government's 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology originally developed 
explicitly for the cultural industries (see Department of Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology Cultural Strategy Group, 1998). 
This shows that these sites are linked into circuits of knowledge in a similar way 
to New Zealand, and that processes of translation are occurring in these sites as 
well to produce novel policy knowfedge forms: it is indicative of the spatial 
extensiveness of this process of transnational policy formation. Notably, many of 
the more recent documents that refer to the CIMD do so only in passing, if at all. 
Of those documents cited above, those that attempted to reproduce the method 
of the CIMD most faithfully were published in 2001, 2002 and 2003, and those 
that marginalised it were published in 2005. To an extent this reflects the way 
that the CIMD has been overtaken by other knowledges which conceptualise 
these industries in slightly different ways. These result from projects that, 
consciously or not, are trying to shift the terms of debate to those contained in 
new forms of policy knowledge. The DET (DCMS, 2004), discussed in Chapter 5, 
is a particularly deliberate example of this. One of the authors is cognisant of the 
possibilities of deploying an effective piece of codified knowledge: 
Just at the moment I'm redoing the cultural framework for UNESCO (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) with the hope 
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that the world will fall in line. A lot of countries have brought into similar 
models now so there's a chance (DET Author, interview with author, 2006). 
So even as the circulation of the CIMD peaks its influence begins to wane. It has 
dissipated into other new knowledge forms and policy documents and 
increasingly become a historical policy example which has been developed 
beyond its original formulation. As Chapter 6 has demonstrated, this can be 
explained by the processes of translation that drive policy transfer and 
transnational policy formation. These produce new policy knowledge forms that 
are then put into circulation and occasionally supersede older forms. As the 
CIMD has had to compete with policy knowledge forms seen as 'fresher' and 
more developed its authority as a policy model has diminished. This chapter 
suggests that this is linked to the emergence of an epistemic community around 
the creative industries policy concept. This community was largely seeded by the 
CIMD but as it has grown and changed so policy actors and researchers 
associated with it have sought out and produced new and different ways of 
understanding its central object. The remainder of this chapter will consider how 
this has happened. 
7.3: Negotiating expertise 
As argued in Chapter 5, the formation of creative industries policy resulted in a 
number of actors being recast, voluntarily or by circumstance, as creative 
industries policy experts. These actors are now taking on an increasingly 
transnational character. As different administrative sites, initially within the UK, 
took an interest in the CIMD different kinds of actors stepped into roles that 
engaged directly with the creative industries policy concept. These actors, 
reconstituted as creative industries policy experts, became targets for actors from 
outside of the UK when they began looking for expertise to guide their own 
creative industries policy development. Their involvement in these policy 
transfer actor-networks shaped the policy as it travelled, but it also shaped them 
as they adopted subject positions within a fomenting transnational epistemic 
community of creative industries policy knowledge. 
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As discussed above, these experts include policy actors from DCMS (and as 
demonstrated in Chapter 6 Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Chris 
Smith) whose authorship of the CIMD makes them an obvious candidate for 
anyone seeking to learn about the CIMD and policy-making for the creative 
industries. But policies developed by the Greater London Council and in places 
like Sheffield and Manchester are also now linked to the CIMD by foreign policy-
makers seeking expert advice. This has provided an opportunity for actors an 
arms length from DCMS, such as the members of FOCI, to be part of this cabal of 
experts. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, FOCI initially formed to formalise a network of 
academics, practitioners, council officers, researchers and cultural entrepreneurs 
who had an interest in issues relating to, especially, cultural development 
strategies at the urban and regional scale in response to New Labour's much 
publicised focus on the creative industries. These actors continued to push the 
creative industries line within the UK when central government commitment 
faltered following the demotion of Chris Smith in 2002 although, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, this involved an attempt to manipulate creative 
industries policy knowledge in a direction this group favoured. But since the 
CIMD was first produced in 1998 this has not been the only activity that actors in 
FOCI have been involved in with regard to creative industries policy knowledge. 
Through their respective institutions and agencies these actors have helped to 
transfer, develop and spread creative industries policy across international space. 
The aptly named FOCI network has become a focal point for these efforts and a 
forum through which this knowledge can be exchanged. 
One member of FOCI is in no doubt about why British expertise is being called 
upon overseas: 
It's purely that document (the CIMD). Absolutely that document. It's 
amazing the story of a document. It gives a nice definition and some 
statistics and it's had a big effect (FOCI Member, interview with author, 
2006). 
The CIMD has opened a space for FOCI members to participate in conferences 
and similar events for the creative industries being held by local, regional and 
national governments around the world. For example, in 2005 O'Connor 
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participated in 'From Made in China to Created in China: An International 
Creative Industries Conference'22 held in Beijing, China where, the organisers 
claimed: 'the concept of the creative industries - almost unheard of in China in 
the lead-up to the forum - has taken root in policy, academic and entrepreneurial 
circles and is now a buzzword in many of the big cities' (Hartley and Keane, 
2006: 261). This was not just an academic forum with the organisers deliberately 
inviting policy-makers and creative and cultural entrepreneurs. 
International conference events are not the only way that these British experts 
have been engaged overseas. Through the Manchester Creative Industries 
Development Service (CIDS) that he helped set up and run, O'Connor became 
involved in a project developing the creative industries in St Petersburg, Russia. 
The partnership between the cities that produced this project was funded under 
the EU's Tacis programme which was designed in 1991 to transfer knowledge 
from Europe to the 'transition economies' of the former Soviet Union through 
grant-financed technical assistance (see Swain, 2006). The project's intention was 
to use the expertise of CIDS to help St. Petersburg develop its creative and 
cultural industries (O'Connor, 2005; Creative Industries Development 
Partnership: St. Petersburg and Manchester, 2004). In practice this involved two 
'study visits' to Manchester from St Petersburg in 2003 and 2004, with a return 
visit from Manchester between these intended to be an opportunity to 
demonstrate in St. Petersburg the potential of the networking approach to sector 
development used by CIDS in Manchester. The most tangible end-result was the 
development of a Creative Industries Development Centre in St. Petersburg 
despite the fact' four years ago the concept' creative industries' was little known 
or understood in St. Petersburg' (Barbour and Brien, 2004: 91). 
A number of agencies playa role in connecting overseas policy-makers with 
British expertise. The British Council has in recent years embraced the concept of 
the' creative economy' in its work developing cultural links between the UK and 
overseas, especially its former colonies. Their Creative Economy Unit closely 
associates itself with DCMS, using the CIMD definition and list of the creative 
22 See http://tinyurl.comJ4cjov2 
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industries to argue that it is these activities that constitute the creative economy. 
They define their work as involved in spreading this vision: 
DCMS helps the creative industries thrive by raising their profile and 
supporting their development. It believes that the most successful economies 
and societies in the twenty first century will be creative ones. The British 
Council works with the DCMS to promote the vision of the UK as the 
world's creative hub; and to share expertise and experience with other 
countries worldwide.23 
The British Council have conducted creative economy 'study visits' to New 
Zealand and were involved in bringing Chris Smith to that country in 2000. They 
have also worked closely with several members of FOCI: the academic Calvin 
Taylor of the University of Leeds, for example, a Senior Lecturer in Creative 
Industries in the School of Performance and Cultural Industries, acted as the 
academic advisor to the British Council's CIMD-style mapping research and pilot 
creative industries development scheme in Columbia. 
Private agencies casting themselves as creative industries experts have also 
emerged. Soon after New Labour came to power and began promoting the 
creative industries a number of private consultancies began specialising in 
researching and working with the cultural and creative industries. A number of 
these are listed in Table 7.2. They are headed up and staffed by individuals who 
have worked for public cultural and creative organisations such as the Creative 
Industries Development Service in Manchester and other regional and national 
arts organisations in the 1980s and 1990s. There are also a number of freelance 
researchers and consultants such as former Merseyside Arts Council head Peter 
Booth and author David Parrish (see Parrish, 2007). The websites of these 
agencies and individuals make it clear they have adopted the DCMS language of 
the creative industries by referring to the CIMD definition, industry list and the 
practice of 'mapping' - now seemingly accepted as the word of choice describing 
the calculative measurement of cultural and creative activity. Whereas most are 
nationally and locally-focused, the Burns Owens Partnership (BOP), by far the 
largest and most successful consultancy in this stratum, has a wide range of 
clients in the private and public sector and across all administrative scales in the 
UK and Europe and some international clients for policy and mapping work in 
23 See http://tinyurl.comJ4jb7tm 
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Table 7.2: British creative industries development organisations 
Title Type Description (in their own words) 
Burns-Owens Consultancy 
'BOP is a leading consultancy on culture and the 
Partnership creative industries. Using our skills in research, strategy 
development and action-planning we bring 
government and industry together to develop the 
creative sectors and to achieve social and economic 
change.' (see bop.co.uk) 
Comedia Consultancy 'Since the mid-1980's our focus has been on how cities 
can revitalize their public, social and economic life and 
how cultural activity might help this process. We have 
drawn up urban strategies, quality of life studies and 
industry development projects for city and regions .... 
Creative Local 
in over 35 countries.' (see comedia.org.uk) 
'CIDS works to help new and established creative 
Industries QuaNGO businesses in Greater Manchester, whilst also taking a 
Development strategic overview of the sector - developing projects in 
Service (CIDS) response to industry needs.' (see cids.co.uk) 
Cultural Local 'The CIQA has contributed to the development of high 
Industries QuaNGO profile successes in Sheffield ... (and) a host of smaller 
Quarter projects have also being supported, putting in place a 
Agency growing infrastructure for the development of creative 
and digital industries in South Yorkshire and beyond' 
(see c!ga.org.uk) 
David Clark Consultancy 'DCA is a Birmingham based culture, creativity and 
Associates regeneration consultancy and project development 
(DCA) company working on arts, creative industries, media, 
heritage, regeneration and broader economic 
develo-.£ment projects.' (see dca-consultants. com) 
David Parrish Author and 'David is a business adviser, trainer and management 
Consultant consultant working with creative businesses and the 
agencies that support them. He helps his clients by 
drawing on his own experience as a creative 
entrepreneur combined with his knowledge as a 
2rofessional advisor.' (see davidparrish.com) 
Forum on Expert 'FOCI is a network of experienced professionals 
Creative Forumj concerned to inform and influence the current debates 
Industries Network around the creative industries - now given momentum 
(FOCI) by the high profile accorded the sector by the 
Kovernment.' (see foci.org.uk) 
New Media Consultancy 'NMP is a research, analysis and strategic consultancy 
Partners specialising in the technology, digital media and 
creative industries. Based in Glasgow, London and 
Manchester our three offices work collaboratively on 
-.Erojects across the UK and beyond.' (see nmp.biz) 
Peter Booth Freelance 'Freelance Arts & Creative Industries Consultant & 
Consultant Researcher' (see http:! jtinyurl.comj522cu9) 
Tom Fleming Consultancy 'In-depth knowledge of models for creative economy 
Creative and cultural sector development (from Chicago to 
Consultancy Cologne); regional policy; national policy; and 
European Policy. This includes consultancy services for 
creative industries strategies, feasibility work, specialist 
support services and investment initiatives.' (see 
tfconsultancy.co.uk) 
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South Africa and China. They have also been working with UNESCO (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) on 'updating' their 
framework for cultural statistics. BOP formed in London in 1997 when Paul 
Owens and Josephine Burns (who also co-founded FOCI) detected a convergence 
under New Labour between an interest in regional government and region-led 
development, and the creative and cultural industries. Initially the bulk of their 
projects were in this area but over time the client base has shifted from local 
government towards larger scale and nationally based agencies like DCMS and 
the Arts Council. This shift has occurred as more than just local government 
agencies have taken an interest in developing creative industries policy. The BOP 
has been a key actor in mapping and policy development work carried out in the 
UK since the late 1990s. It has close, personal associations with FOCI and the 
British Council, and has worked on a number of projects with academics like 
Andy Pratt of LSE, including on the development of the DCMS Evidence Toolkit 
(DCMS, 2004). It is a key agency for connecting expertise with policy-making 
capacity in the creative industries. 
The activities of these British-based actors have created a focus on Britain in the 
international search for policy leaders in the area. Sheffield is a case in point. 
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s Sheffield developed a Cultural Industries 
Quarter as part of a Greater London Council-inspired strategy to use cultural 
enterprises to ameliorate job losses in the steel industry and provide facilities for 
youth activity and training. Although it was not until the late 1990s and the rise 
of New Labour (and the release of the CIMD) that the strategy was fully 
embraced by the Sheffield City Council (see Sheffield City Council, 1998), since 
this time it has rivalled DCMS as a site for foreign policy-makers to visit in search 
of policy ideas. It has become so popular that one local cultural development 
agency uses it as a revenue stream: 
We have Prague next week - the Czech equivalent of the Department of 
Trade and Industry. We've had several visits from Taiwan, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Sweden, a lot of other cities from the UK. We charge for it now, 
we're not going to give it away (Agency Official, interview with author, 
2006). 
The way that these policy experts have developed in response to the need for 
policy expertise shows how this emerging epistemic community needs to be seen 
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as integral and interrelated with processes of policy transfer rather than 
causative. Because the circulation of the CIMD has been a key factor in processes 
of creative industries policy transfer to be seen as an expert it is necessary to 
situate one's knowledge in relation to it, whatever a potential expert's opinion on 
it may be. This requires a resubjectification that engages the CIMD, whether this 
is motivated by a desire to reproduce or contest (like FOCI has) the vision 
outlined in the CIMD. The epistemic community finds its shape through the 
actors that undergo this subjectification in order to become creative industries 
experts. 
This is not just about developing one's knowledge to engage with the knowledge 
contained in the CIMD. It means taking on new roles within and between old, 
new and reconstituted agencies as the creative industries institutional framework 
is erected. The boundaries between different sites of creative industries 
knowledge - consultancies, think-tanks, academia, local cultural and creative 
development projects - are increasingly blurry as actors and knowledge forms 
circulate between them (Oakley, 2004). FOCI Founder Phil Wood, for example, 
works primarily for the consultancy Comedia but is on the Board of Directors of 
the Huddersfield Media Centre and the business incubator Huddersfield 
Business Generator. Until recently he served as vice-chairman for the Yorkshire 
Regional Cultural Consortium. Andy Pratt is an academic at the London School 
of Economics Geography Department but works closely with BOP, UNESCO and 
parts of DCMS and the Council of Europe. One of Justin O'Connor's 
postgraduate students Kate Oakley, while not a FOCI member, has had a career 
moving between think-tanks like Demos and the Policy Studies Institute and 
academia and is currently freelance but associated with the consultancy BOP. She 
is also an adjunct professor at the Queensland University of Technology Creative 
Industries Faculty. There is a succession of embodied knowledge forms moving 
between different types of spaces in academia, consultancy, policy formation and 
so on, linking them together ever more tightly in both their policy research 
concerns and the types of knowledges they call upon. These actors did not 
necessarily set out to be creative industries policy experts or to work in creative 
industries focused agencies, but they have been placed in this position, and in the 
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epistemic community, by the demand for expertise associated with these policies 
forming and transferring. 
Furthermore, the transnational growth of the community has meant that these 
actors need new skills, especially those individuals there from the beginning. For 
example, the CIDS - St. Petersburg project is not just a case of Manchester experts 
filling empty policy vessels in St. Petersburg. O'Connor noted the difficulty in 
this ,particular project of convincing officials in St. Petersburg of the usefulness of 
the cultural industries when the term was considered by them to be anathema to 
their history. Considering the lesson of this for his own work, he observes that: 
It is quite likely that, if the expertise is to be in any way effective, it must 
engage on this local cultural terrain, which at once puts limits on the role of 
'expert' and opens up a new role of transnational cultural intermediary, who 
has to have an explicit cultural politics (O'Connor, 2005: 255). 
The need to articulate and translate competing knowledges can produce new(ly) 
reflexively constituted expert subjects. This highlights the fact that these 
particular experts are multiply-constituted and working in transnational spaces 
between different layers of the state, academia and the private sector (Bockman, 
2007). The development and expansion of a transnational epistemic community 
will not mean 'business-as-usual' for its members. The need to develop the skills 
which allow them to negotiate cross-border knowledge transactions will become 
imperative if actors wish to remain influential in a growing transnational 
epistemic community that has growing policy influence. 
It is quite likely that this epistemic community will continue to grow and 
influence policy given certain observable trends.' In recent years as the creative 
industries have grown globally as a policy object there has been a consequent 
growth in official positions dedicated to them in public organisations. Reflecting 
on the small network of individuals who made up FOCI when it began in the late 
1990s, One FOCI member points out that' five years on and you'd look at The 
Guardian and every week there would be an advert for a creative industries 
development officer in small towns around the country' (FOCI Member, 
interview with author, 2006). Another has observed the same phenomenon: 
It's become bureaucratised the creative industries now. In the public sector 
now there's an infrastructure, a network of creative industries officers, both 
in the RDAs, in local authorities, in business links, in chambers of commerce, 
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they're ~ll doing it, every town in Britain is sticking the word creative in 
front of Its name (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006). 
In the UK, this reaches even central government: since the May 2005 election 
there has been a dedicated Minister for the Creative Industries running the new 
'Creative Economy Programme'. 
While some of these jobs have gone to FOCI members in roles that follow on 
from the work they were involved in before 1998 (hence their membership of 
FOCI), the availability of work in the area has brought in people from other 
backgrounds. The first Creative Industries Officer of Bristol City Council, whose 
job works between economic regeneration and arts sector development, had 
previously worked with the BBC, in graphic design and for a corporate branding 
company in London. The present director of the Sheffield Cultural Industries 
Quarter Agency had previously worked in regeneration around business 
development, housing and the built environment. He confesses to being 
unfamiliar with the Quarter before he arrived while the creative industries side 
of the job had to be learned quickly. FOCI has deliberately remained a small 
organisation and expanded very little from its initial group. It is now at a point 
where its members no longer dominate the creative and cultural industry policy 
landscape in the UK. 
It is not just in the UK that these positions are becoming available. In New 
Zealand Auckland City Council, Wellington City Council and, until recently, the 
public sector Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) all have creative 
industry development officers working for them. These policy actors are forming 
networks of their own. Each of the three officers in these cities are known to each 
other and with cultural and creative industry actors in organisations like the 
New Zealand Music Commission and the British Council of New Zealand. Their 
networks are also international. The British Council has been especially active in 
the New Zealand case in connecting policy actors in New Zealand with their 
counterparts in the UK and elsewhere. A study visit to New Zealand in 2005 by 
the British Council listed as one of its objectives to find 'to what extent (the 
creative sector in New Zealand) were interested in engaging with the UK and 
East Asia on issues about the creative industries and creative economy to share 
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experience, ideas and practice' (Gortan, 2005: 2). The visit included meetings with 
the Auckland and Wellington City Council creative industry officers, HotNation 
author Michael Volkerling, and a Creative New Zealand representative. Since 
this time the Auckland Officer has been to the UK on a fact-finding mission that 
included a meeting with her Bristol counterpart and the former CDC officer now 
works for the British Government's Creative Sector Skills Council in London. 
This transnational policy community forms an increasingly large part of the 
growing epistemic community. It is, for the most part, made up of actors who 
need to learn and embody the knowledges and skills that their posts are 
associated with - they need to be subjectified into the epistemic community. The 
next two sections will discuss the increasingly transnational institutional 
framework that supports this growth and maintains the integrity of the 
community. 
7.4: The making of a transnational epistemic community 
The emergence of the epistemic community is being facilitated through the 
parallel emergence of a number of new and reconstituted sites that produce, 
exchange and mobilise knowledge and expertise in the creative industries. These 
sites facilitate further creative industries policy transfer and the requisite 
expansion of the epistemic community. In addition they provide a means for 
different knowledge forms produced through these expansions to be recirculated 
back into the community for absorption and translation. Thus the epistemic 
community is developing a transnational infrastructure that serves to reproduce 
the community by facilitating the development and transfer of creative industries 
policy. 
This infrastructure is comprised of sites of knowledge exchange and sites of 
knowledge production. Respectively, these facilitate the circulation of creative 
industries policy knowledge, thus contributing to the expansion of the 
knowledge circuits which carry creative industries policy knowledge, and 
contribute to the production of creative industries policy knowledge for 
circulation. They contribute to the development and influence of the epistemic 
175 
community in a number of ways. One, they provide means for the community to 
expand while also protecting its integrity through extending, enriching and 
reproducing interpersonal networks and knowledge production associations 
between existing and new members. Thus by providing forums in which notes 
can be compared and different ideas shared and tested, these sites maintain the 
collective authority of the community while ensuring any useful new ideas and 
innovations can be absorbed. Second, they increase the available knowledge for 
members of the community for use in whatever creative industries-related 
activity they are involved in. And third, they articulate with other knowledges 
and create zones of overlap with other epistemic communities, providing more 
opportunities for expansion. 
7.4.1: Sites of knowledge exchange 
The subjectification of the growing numbers of creative industries policy actors is 
achieved by the proliferation of sites of knowledge exchange (Ward, 2007a). These 
event-spaces, which are usually set up by policy entrepreneurs in coalition with 
policy-makers and interested academics, facilitate the circulation of knowledge 
forms and the policy knowledge and ideas contained within them. As a result, 
they are a key driver for reproducing the epistemic community. The annual 
'Creative Clusters' conference is the longest running of these events to deal 
specifically with the concept of the creative industries. This was started by 
Sheffield-based cultural entrepreneur and FOCI member Simon Evans. Evans 
had been involved in the Sheffield Cultural Industries Quarter since its early 
days and set up the first 'Creative Clusters' event in 2002 in response to the 
number of people who had begun coming to Sheffield to learn from the city's 
experiences. 
Creative Clusters is described on the website as 'an independent policy 
conference examining the growth of the creative economy'. The rationale for the 
event is made clear: 
Creative Clusters believes that creativity is the key factor driving 
development. Across the world, enterprises based on individual creativity 
are booming. Furthermore, knowledge and culture-based activities now play 
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a central role in the activities of all businesses. This is the era of the creative 
economy.24 
The CIMD is a central influence on how this era is described. The creative 
industries are listed as a 'key concept' constituting creative clusters (clusters and 
agglomerations of creative industries) and the creative economy in general. The 
website quotes the CIMD directly in defining and listing the industries: 
Creative Industries .... are based on individuals with creative arts skills .... in 
alliance with managers and technologists .... making marketable products .... 
whose economic value lies in their cultural, or 'intellectual', properties. 
Defined by the UK's Department of Culture, Media and Sport as " ... those 
activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and 
which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation 
and exploitation of intellectual property", the Creative Industries include: 
Advertising; Architecture; Crafts and designer furniture; Fashion clothing; 
Film, video and other audiovisual production; Graphic design; Educational 
and leisure software; Live and recorded music; Performing arts and 
entertainments; Television, radio and internet broadcasting; Visual arts and 
antiques; Writing and publishing25 
Although there are slight shifts in what are named as constituting the creative 
industries, including sectors like architecture, advertising and antiques shows the 
distinctive mix first described by the CIMD continues to be reproduced through 
this event. 
In so far as attendance can be used as a proxy to indicate the contribution these 
events make to the reproduction of the creative industries policy concept and 
associated discourses and knowledges across transnational space, Creative 
Clusters is an important site. It is attended by policy-makers, consultants, 
politicians and academics' engaged in the development of the creative economy 
to communicate and share resources with one another' .26 The conference 
regularly attracts around 300 delegates, although the Brighton event in 2004 and 
the London event in 2007 attracted over 500. According to the website, 
approximately 75 % of the delegates come from the UK, 15 % from the rest of 
Europe and the remainder from elsewhere. The 2007 conference in London had 
delegates from 41 countries. The delegates bring case studies of their particular 
programme or region and attend themed sessions developing different policy 
approaches to the development of creativity. It allows for the exchange of policy 
24 See www.creativeclusters.com/ 
25 See http://tinyurl.com/67scz5 
26 See www.creativeclusters.com/ 
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ideas, the opportunity for policy learning, and the development of transnational 
policy networks as the various delegates see each others presentations and 
socialise on field trips and at organised networking events. 
It was through Creative Clusters that the creative industries became topical for 
the CDC in Canterbury when council workers from Christchurch, along with 
NZTE Creative Sector Head Cheryll Sotheran, attended the 2004 event after 
receiving advertising through the Creative Clusters strategy of contacting via 
email economic development agencies around the world. After making this trip 
Evans' expertise was used to set up a similar event in New Zealand called 
Converge which ran in 2004. Initially this was to be a Creative Clusters franchise 
operation but in the end the connection with the UK was severed for nebulous 
local political reasons and Evans and his company had no involvement with the 
final event. This highlights how these events are able to create transnational 
policy networks, but also how they can create a threat for themselves as they 
expand, and increase the density of, the epistemic community they are 
dependent on. 
Although in the UK Creative Clusters is generally recognised as the key meeting 
for the sector and the means by which creative industry and other comparable 
policy is exchanged between different actors, as the community has grown and 
more intemationallinks are made more overlapping events with a similar policy 
. 
development and exchange purpose are emerging. One interviewee involved 
with these conferences recognises this: 
There's definitely more competition. There was a big event in Singapore last 
year. There's an event called creative places and spaces that's now done 
annually somewhere in Canada, big government money in that. The British 
Council is talking about doing something on it. And there's one in the States 
that's in Philadelphia University ... and one in an Australian university ... 
These people have a lot of money behind them (Agency Official, interview 
with author, 2006). 
Creative Clusters has been an important point of passage (CalIon, 1986): a key 
site for developing and maintaining the integrity of the growing epistemic 
community of creative industry policy actors but there are now emerging more 
and more events that overlap with its purpose in different ways. Table 7.3 lists a 
selection of the policy events that have emerged in the last few years that draw 
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on the creative industries concept and overlap with the remit of Creative Ousters 
(Please refer to Appendix G for a complete version of this table). 
The spatial distribution of these events gives the epistemic community a 
distinctive geography as policy networks form through them. With Creative 
Clusters this has, for the most part, remained centred on the UK, but the arrival 
of other events in other places is changing this situation. As the epistemic 
community becomes increasingly transnational policy expertise will be less and 
less associated with the UK. Somewhat ironically, events like Creative Clusters 
which have sought to utilise the status of the UK on these matters to attract 
foreign delegates have played a part in this emerging transnational geography. 
7.4.2: Sites o/knowledge production 
The CIMD continues to be the founding document for creative industries policy 
knowledge. The ambivalent attitude of some knowledgeable actors, such as Pratt 
and O'Connor, towards it has not prevented those same actors from recognising 
the key role it has played in establishing creative industries policy as a viable 
policy option and therefore in opening up a space for them to engage with and 
intervene on the policy-making process as policy experts. However, the approach 
the CIMD took to policy-making and the strong link it drew with research 
through the I mapping' process has provided a research category for the social 
and economic sciences to develop further which potentially could feed back to 
the policy-making process. While the experiences of O'Connor and Pratt show 
that this is not completely separate from the policy knowledge production efforts 
of the actors and agencies referred to above, these spaces and sites have stronger 
interests in academic research and have adopted the creative industries as a 
useful organising term. The circulation of knowledge forms produced in these 
sites integrates them into the epistemic community, to which they are perceived 
to offer deeper, and more scientific, conceptualisations of the creative industries, 
providing the authority to further entrench their categorical existence within the 
economy. 
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Table 7.3: Conferences on the creative industries 
Event Organisers Date Location 
Creative Clusters Creative Clusters Inc. Annually since Locations around 
2002 the UK 
From 'Made in Chinese Academy of 7-9/7/2005 Beijing, China 
China' to 'Created in Sciences, Humanistic 
China': International Olympic Studies Centre 
Creative Industries at Renmin University 
Conference of China, and the 
Queensland University 
of Technology Creative 
Industries Faculty 
CARICOM-WIPO Caribbean Community 8-9/2/2006 Georgetown, 
Experts Meeting on (CARICOM and the Guyana 
Creative Industries World Intellectual 
and Intellectual Property Organisation 
Property (WIPO) 
Creative and European and 20/3/2006 Tate Modern, 
Cultural Industries International London 
in Europe Information, Research 
and Consultancy 
Services (EUCLID) 
MyCreativity: Institute of Network 16-18/11/2006 Amsterdam 
Convention on Cultures, Hv A 
International Interactive Media, and 
Creative Industries Centre for Media 
Research Research, University of 
Ulster 
Culture-Creative Office for Cultural 3-4/5/2007 Berlin 
Industries in Europe Policy and Economy, 
(sic) - Coherent European Commission 
Policies in a Global 
World 




Creative Industries Asian-Pacific Forum 19-22/9/2007 Berlin 
Conference Berlin 
Creative Industries: Centre for Research on 27/2/2008 Open University, 
Ten Years On Socio-Cultural Change Milton Keynes 
Caribbean National Cultural 5-6/5/2008 St James, Barbados 
International Foundation, Barbados 
Conference on the 
Cultural & Creative 
Industries 
Arte-Polis 2: Institute of Technology 8-10/8/2008 Institute of 
Creative Bandung Technology 
Communities and Bandung, 





Again, members of FOCI are at the frontline of this academic research effort. 
Within the UK the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) co-sponsored the 'Cultural and 
Creative Industries Seminar Network' put together by Andy Pratt and Paul 
Jeffcut of Queens University Belfast to run from 2003 until February 2007. This 
seminar series focused on the role the creative and cultural industries play in 
economy and society and was held every few months in a different UK city. 
Geoffrey Crossick of the AHRC made it clear that this was understood as more 
than a one-off, instead being part of a wider agenda in which the creative and 
cultural industries are a key research area connected to the business and cultural 
sectors: 
We decided to offer funding to this seminar series because the creative 
industries, and the wider creative and cultural sectors, are a key element in 
the AHRC's developing agenda ... They are supported by research in higher 
education which connects to a wide range of businesses and cultural 
organisations. The AHRC is keen to develop further this aspect of 
knowledge transfer and engagement (cited in AHRC, 2004). 
The seminar series is an opportunity for the research councils and the organisers 
to appropriate the emerging discourse of the creative industries in order to frame 
up a proportion of their research and direct the term's conceptual development. 
Since 2000 a number of university faculties and departments have been created 
or re-branded with the creative industries moniker and/ or have begun offering 
degrees and diplomas in the creative industries. Institutions where this has 
occurred include the Universities of Portsmouth, Glamorgan, Auckland, Wales-
Bangor and Kings College London. One such institute, the Creative Industries 
Faculty at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in Australia, 
established in 2001, has sought to become highly visible in debates about the 
creative industries. It has used two main strategies. First, through the production 
of knowledge about the creative industries. This involves promotion of the term 
as analytically useful for a range of cultural and economic concerns and the 
publication of research that deploys the concept of the creative industries, often 
alongside the concepts of the creative economy, the creative nation, and the 
creative class.27 This latter point highlights the fact that this work is also 
conceptual in the broadest sense and seeks a synthesis between international 
27 See the list of publications on the faculty website at http://tinyur1.com/61n2hn 
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scholarship that is regarded by the faculty members as closely aligned. An 
example of this is the Faculty Dean John Hartley's edited collection Creative 
Industries published in 2005. This volume collects together edited versions of 
work by a variety of authors, including Richard Florida on the creative class, 
Charles Landry on the creative city, Charles Leadbeater on the new economy, 
John Howkins on the creative economy, and Justin O'Connor on cultural 
industries, and juxtaposes them with the overarching concept of the creative 
industries. I will return to this in the next section. 
The second strategy has been the involvement of members of the faculty in 
international networks of creative industry researchers and theorists. An attempt 
to establish such a network came early in the faculty's life in late 2002 through 
the 'New Economy, Creativity and Consumption Symposium' held on the 
campus. This event invited researchers from Australia, the US and the UK -
including Andy Pratt and another FOCI member, the independent researcher 
Kate Oakley - in order to 'link universities where new things were being done 
institutionally in the general area of the creative industries' (Hartley, 2004: 5) and 
create a research 'chain or 'necklace' around the planet' (ibid.: 5). Some of the 
papers that were presented at the symposium are collected in a special issue of 
the International Journal of Cultural Studies (see Hartley, 2004). The faculty is 
attempting to situate itself in an influential position in the fomenting 
transnational epistemic community through the dual processes of linking 
internationally sourced research works and international researchers. 
Importantly both the seminar series and the QUT Creative Industries Faculty are 
interested in furthering the creative industries as an academic concept, not 
simply a policy one. This possibility will be further realised in 2008 with the 
launch of a new Journal of Creative Industries by the publisher Intellect Books. 
Although this is intended for scholarly as well as practitioner audiences there 
remain traces of the policy origins of the concept in the description of the scope 
of the journal as it incorporates the definition of the creative industries offered by 
theCIMD: 
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The ~c~pe of .~e. journ~l is global, primarily aimed at those studying and 
practicmg aC~VIties whIch have their origin in individual creativity, skill and 
talent, and whzch have the potential for wealth creation.28 
The activities they list as constitutive of these industries are also drawn from the 
CIMD. This shows the way the creative industries concept has made its way into 
scholarly research as a social scientific category in its own right (although its use 
is often problematised) rather than just as the New Labour policy concept (e.g. de 
Barranger and Meldrum, 2000; Banks et al., 2000; Blythe, 2001; Caves, 2002; 
Drake, 2003; Turok, 2003; Uricchio, 2004; Cunningham, 2004; Oakley, 2004; 2006; 
Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2005; Jayne, 2005; Evans and Smith, 2006; Rossiter, 2006; 
Yue, 2006; Lovink and Rossiter, 2007; Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2007). 
The status of the creative industries as an objective economic category further 
solidifies with the production of more and more experts and texts producing 
increasingly sophisticated knowledge about them. Their presence in dedicated 
university faculties and departments, and in scholarly journals, suggests the 
beginnings of a nascent disciplinarisation of the creative industries (Barnes, 
2001a; 2001b; 2002). The emergence of this substantial institutional framework 
means that space for studying and acting on them is growing and the 
infrastructure is in place to ensure their reproduction as an academic category. It 
is not just that this work continues and extends the constitutive process begun by 
the CIMD by rendering the creative industries in an increasingly multi-
dimensional fashion and linking them to a broad range of economic, cultural and 
social processes - it expands the epistemic community to include these 
researchers who can be, and often are, incorporated into policy networks and 
whose institutional associations endow them with the kind of scientific-academic 
authority useful to the community. 
7.4.3: Articulating policy knowledges 
The sites of knowledge exchange and production discussed in the previous two 
sub-sections often play another important role in further expanding the epistemic 
community through the articulation of knowledge about the creative industries 
with other consonant or congruent knowledge. This kind of translation can create 
28 See http://tinyurl.comJ4b8hjy 
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a link between different epistemic communities and potentially result in the 
creation of new knowledge. An example of how different knowledges can be 
made congruent through the simple work of juxtaposition was made in the 
previous section. The volume Creative Industries (Hartley, 2005) collects together 
writings which draw on the concept of creativity and arranges these into themes 
about 'creative world', 'creative identities', 'creative enterprises' and so on. In 
doing so it juxtaposes the work of Richard Florida, Charles Landry, Charles 
Leadbeater, Justin O'Connor and others writing around these themes. 
Importantly, the introduction Hartley penned for the volume attempts to 
synthesise the arguments and concepts used by many of these writers into a 
broader argument about the role of creativity in the economy. He argues that the 
rise to prominence of the creative industries and its accompanying discourses is 
indicative of this trend: 
The creative industries ... are not merely an area of economic development 
but an idea - namely that creativity can have decisive social and economic 
effects... The 'industry' part of 'creative industries' links that human 
attribute with large-scale organised enterprise. It sees imaginative 
innovation as the very heart - the pump - of wealth creation and social 
renewal (Hartley, 2005: 4). 
Such articulations do not only occur at universities and other research 
institutions. Policy-making sites often try to achieve a similar result. In 2005 the 
Auckland City Council produced a report on the city's creative industries 
(Auckland City Council, 2005). This drew on the concept of the creative 
industries as formulated in the Heart of the Nation report (HotNation Project 
Team, 2000) and reinvented in terms of their potential as enablers through the 
Better by Design project (Design Taskforce, 2003; NZTE, 2006). The result was a 
mapping document that produced quantitative measures of the city's creative 
industries augmented by an analysis of interviews conducted with 375 workers 
from the city's 'creative sector'. But the report goes a step further than the 
mapping studies carried out by HotNation and DCMS by marrying this research 
with arguments made about creative cities and the creative class by Charles 
Handy and Richard Florida. Florida's (2002) arguments in particular about the 
need to attract a certain type of 'creative' individual - considered the key for a 
vibrant economy - to a city by making it an interesting place to live are central to 
the argument of the report. The creative industries are economically significant in 
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their own right and as an enabler, but they are also part of what make the city 
attractive to Florida's creative class.29 
Florida's I three T's' formulation of talent, technology and tolerance has proved 
attractive and he has now spoken all over the world to cities in Europe, New 
Zealand, Australia and North America (Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Peck, 2005). 
The creative class is an idea that has been articulated in one way or another to an 
extraordinary array of policy programmes. For example, of the creative industry 
mapping studies cited in the previous section, Florida's defining idea is referred 
to in South Australia (Doust, 2005: 16-17), Zurich (Held et al., 2005: 8), the EU 
(Marcus, 2005: 11-14) and Singapore (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore; 
2003: 65, 71). Florida's operation has expanded into an organisation called the 
Creative Class Group30 which conducts studies invoking Florida's work all over 
the world. On the website a representative list of their clients includes 
organisations as diverse as New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the US 
Department of Labour, Newsweek Magazine, the International Development 
Council, the Da Vinci Institute and City Capetown.31 
Florida is one of a number of charismatic individuals - creative economy gurus -
who are associated with particular policy brands (Gibson and Klocker, 2004; see 
also Bryson, 2000; Thrift, 2005). These .people straddle the academic and 
consultancy worlds producing ideas which capture the imaginations of local 
government actors and offering solutions organised around particular 
conceptions of the role of creativity in different contexts. Charles Landry32 in his 
2000 book The Creative City draws on several years of experience in over thirty 
29 Florida's thesis comes from his 2002 book The Rise of the Creative Class. This argues that 
the most significant contemporary economic trend is the growth of a class of people for 
who work is about being creative: producing creative solutions for existing problems and 
creative possibilities for the future. The significance of this class is that it now constitutes 
some 30% of the US workforce and contributes 50% of GDP and growing. This creates a 
new link between culture and economy -the creative class is populated by people who 
want to live in interesting, culturally diverse, tolerant, 'happening' places. The policy 
crux of the argument is that if a city or region wants to develop economically in the 
future it must attract this class to its door through the development of a vibrant cultural 
scene. 
30 See http://creativeclass.com/ 
31 See http://creativeclass.com/ clients I 
32 See http://www.charleslandry.com 
185 
countries to offer a range of solutions to common urban problems which oscillate 
between culture and creativity as their core driver. Landry's years as head of the 
consultancy Comedia have positioned him as a leading expert on the future of 
the city and has enabled him to travel all over the world working with 
organisations as diverse as the World Bank, Wellington City Council, the OECD 
and the Western and South Australian State Governments, in the latter cases as 
their 'thinker in residence' (Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Stevenson, 2004). Like 
Florida, Landry not only reinvents the links between culture, creativity and 
economy, he transports his vision to a variety of places. Again these will often be 
articulated with the creative industries in policy documents, if not by Landry 
himself then by the policy-makers. Of the reports cited in Section 7.2, Landry and 
Comedia's work is cited in the South African (Department of Sport, Arts, Culture 
and Recreation, 2005: 3-4) and Viennese (Ratzenbock et al., 2004: 42) documents. 
The articulation of the creative industries concept with these other ideas serves to 
align these knowledges as of the same or similar orders. The circulation of the 
knowledge forms that achieve this across the different epistemic communities 
will cause them to overlap and converge into a larger, if less coherent, epistemic 
community and policy knowledge circuit. As a result the creative industries 
concept is perceived within a new tradition of books targeting politicians and 
policy-makers as well as academics and the general public which emphasise the 
role of 'creativity' in the economic and cultural futures of cities, regions and 
nations (e.g. Landry; 2000; Howkins, 2001; Caves, 2002; Florida, 2002; 2005; 2008; 
Hartley, 2005; Leadbeater, 2008; Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2007). Think-
tanks, research institutes, consultancies, government departments and city 
councils have also been producing research reports and papers along these lines 
but usually with a more specific focus on a particular place, sector or research 
methodology (e.g. DCMS, 1998; 2001b; Auckland City Council, 2005; Keegan et 
al., 2005; Gordon and Beilby-Orrin; 2006). Since the mid-1990s the London think-
tank Demos has been one of the most visible with several of its freely available 
publications referenced in more recent policy documents and research reports 
(e.g. Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Seltzer and Bentley, 1999; Leadbeater and 
Oakley, 1999; Florida and Tinagli, 2004). These pieces of codified knowledge vary 
in their focus, methodology and style. Some are legislative in their approach 
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(Osborne, 2004), trying to work through a particular vision of the economic or 
cultural in the spaces of the city or the nation. Some are far more prosaic, 
concerning themselves with techniques of data collection and analysis (e.g. 
Selwood, 2002; Higgs and Cunningham, 2007). 
The increasingly transnational epistemic community that has built up around the 
creative industries is a constitutive element of a larger, emerging community 
focused on the policy possibilities of the very concept of creativity in the 21st 
century global economy. Like the creative industries epistemic community this 
should not be thought of as amorphous. It is held together by diverse networks 
of actors linked across transnational space. It is co-constituted with creativity-
centred policy concepts and programmes to produce distinctive policy 
geographies. It is located in the variety of agencies and institutions that try to act 
on the various aspects of creativity, whether this is the creative industries, the 
creative economy or the creative class. It is populated by actors who try to 
constitute themselves as expert-subjects in some area of creativity in a variety of 
ways. It maintains its integrity by bringing actors together at sites of knowledge 
exchange and expands its knowledge base at sites of knowledge production. It 
works in and with spaces, subjects and sectors imagined and represented as 
creative in one way or another. It is unified by the continuing circulation of 
certain knowledge forms. Thinking geographically about these overlapping 
epistemic communities means recognising this complex landscape it is situated in 
and the way that it produces uneven distributions of policy knowledge. 
7.5: Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the transnationalisation of the creative industries policy 
concept has resulted in the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of 
creative industries experts supported by an emerging infrastructure of sites of 
knowledge exchange and sites of knowledge production. The epistemic 
community is comprised of a variety of actors situated in a variety of roles: 
policy-makers, academics, management gurus, consultants, politicians, activists, 
council officers and practitioners for example. These actors are all arranged in 
relation to one another to maximise their expert authority, supplemented by all 
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the codified knowledge that continues to be produced about the creative 
industries: all the books, policy documents, research reports, quantitative and 
qualitative analyses, and conference and research papers for example. These 
actors have all been reconstituted as experts following the emergence of creative 
industries policy in their own sphere of influence, and in some cases 
reconstituted again as the concept becomes increasingly transnational. Taken 
together as a community they constitute a powerful political actor. 
This collective transnational political actor IS supported by a transnational 
infrastructure of knowledge production and exchange sites, including 
conferences, consultancies, think-tanks and research institutes. This 
infrastructure supports the continuing circulation of knowledge forms with 
regard to the creative industries and as such the continuing expansion and 
reproduction of the epistemic community. It is an infrastructure that has 
emerged through the production of new sites and the reconstitution of old ones 
around the concept of the creative industries. It is an emergence that, despite 
being actively assembled at particular moments, overall has been uneven and 
unplanned. Although it was initially focused on the UK it is gradually 
incorporating sites in a variety of places as circuits of creative industries 
knowledge, co-constituted with this infrastructure, extend and deepen outside 
the country. Through this emergence the creative industries policy concept, and 
the concept of creativity more generally, has I globalised' (Sheppard, 2005) into an 
increasingly orthodox economic sector and policy object. 
Finally, the previous section indicated that this epistemic community overlaps 
with other communities developing complementary ideas that have emerged 
around the concept of I creativity'. This overlap has often been productive as 
different ideas are linked and hybridised into new policy concepts, ready to 
circulate through the different epistemic communities involved. Such linkages 
are not always welcomed and the integrity, or perceptions of the integrity, of the 
knowledge that defines the epistemic community will be policed by involved 
actors (Halfon, 2006). Nonetheless, the epistemic community described here is a 
constitutive part of wider communities and is linked into a variety of policy 
networks. This results in the creative industries becoming increasingly 
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naturalised in policy and academic discourses to the point where the idea that 
they are a political invention, put together in a particular place during a 
particular political moment (only a decade ago) and using particular (calculative) 
techniques, is forgotten, and they attain a character of universal application to the 
21st century economy. 
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8: Conclusion 
8.1: Assembling the creative economy 
This thesis has argued that creative industries policy has been co-constituted 
with creative industries policy expertise, and as this policy has become 
increasingly transnational, so there has emerged a transnational epistemic 
community of creative industries policy experts. This community is not aspatial: 
it is held together and supported by an emergent infrastructure of conferences, 
research institutes, think-tanks, websites, journals and policy networks which are 
linked together across transnational space. It has emerged over a period of time 
from often initially contingent policy developments and transfers but is now a 
key source of expert authority on the role of creativity in the economy. This 
conclusion will summarise the key theoretical and conceptual claims made in this 
thesis regarding the creative economy, epistemic communities and policy 
transfer. It will finish with a consideration of some of the methodological issues 
of the thesis and how these can direct us to possible future research pathways. 
The emerging policy focus on the role of creativity in the economy should not be 
understood as resulting from the perception that this is a previously 
unrecognised but increasingly important capacity for the economy, as is implied 
in many of these policy documents and their associated knowledges. For 
example, when the Cox (2005: 5) report on creativity in business, referred to at 
the beginning of this thesis, links the UK economy's future competitiveness to its 
'creative capabilities', arguing that it is 'one of the UK's undoubted strengths', or 
Richard Florida (2002: 56-66) periodises recent history so that we have moved 
from 'industrial capitalism', through the 'organizational age' and now into the 
'creative age', creativity is presented as a self-evident fact of economic life in the 
21 st century and, as a consequence, a capacity that must be nurtured, corralled, 
engaged and encouraged through policy interventions. Policy here is a response 
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to processes occurring beyond the policy-making site, in the sphere of the 
economy or sOciety, where creativity is increasingly consequential, or at least 
increasingly recognised as such. But, as this thesis has argued, this separation is 
not so clear-cut. It is, rather, an effect of the way that policy and policy 
knowledge claims to know and act on the world. By representing creativity as a 
capacity vital to the working of the economy, it invokes a world beyond the 
representation that more or less usefully maps onto it (Mitchell; 1991; 2002). 
Debates rage between epistemic communities and other policy actors about the 
extent to which the representation can guide policy actions that will be effective, 
but the debates are about different representations which maintain the separation 
and do not recognise the constitutive force of the representation itself. 
The creative industries, a policy concept that is a part of the policy suite that 
claims to be responding to the growing importance of creativity in the economy, 
emerged at a particular place and at a particular time as a result of particular 
political circumstances. Part of a contingently assembled reimagining of the UK 
economy in the late 1990s, and of an attempt to reinject culture into political 
discourse, the creative industries concept was an attempt by a new government 
to disassociate itself from 18 years of Conservative parsimony and the socialist 
imaginary of 'old' Labour and their 'cultural' industries. While other political 
ideas from this period, such as the 'Third Way' and 'Cool Britannia', have 
dropped away, the creative industries have survived, not least because the 
calculative fashion in which they were presented suggested the presence of a 
sector previously unrecognised but, with the aid of the authoritative neutrality of 
numbers, now able to be pointed to, articulated, justified and defended (Hacking, 
1991; Rose, 1999a; Mitchell, 2002; Christophers, 2007). And they have survived 
because a range of new and reconstituted sites and actors have mobilised the 
concept, in part because of the solidity the numbers of the CIMD lent it, 
multiplying the presence of the discourse and giving the concept an institutional 
framework that seems to confirm their presence as a coherent entity in the' real'. 
Thus, here a particular kind of policy that centres 'creativity' (the creative 
industries) was not the result of the self-evident existence of the sector to which 
policy-makers responded. Rather, the development of the policy concept in the 
circumstances of a particular political moment was an important constitutive 
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moment for its object as its introduction saw spaces and subjects shaped and 
reshaped around it. The policy concept was an important moment in the 
constitutive enframement of the sector (Mitchell, 1991; 2002), not a response to its 
pre-given existence. 
So the production of policy and policy knowledge is far more deeply implicated 
in the shape of the world than its usual presentation as a response to changes 
beyond its control. This is not only because policy produces, by definition, certain 
kinds of action on the world, it is a part of a wider social process of establishing 
what constitutes the 'real' through representation so that such actions can be 
taken. It is linked with the naturalisation of policy objects, such as the 'national 
economy', the 'global economy' and the 'knowledge economy', and of particular 
policy tools as the most appropriate response, such as marketisation, 
privatisation or welfare retrenchment. These are not neutral policy objects and 
tools arrived at after a period of reflection by policy-makers and closely 
calibrated with the 'real' conditions of the world, like the creative industries 
concept they are likely to have emerged in particular circumstances and for 
particular purposes, and have since been deployed in different ways and been 
linked with other objects and tools. As policy objects and tools circulate, they will 
often be disassociated from the conditions and intentions of their original 
conception to become a constitutive part of an emergent system. Thus regimes of 
government are assembled which link policies, concepts, agencies, institutions, 
practices, discourses, spaces and subjects (Rose, 1999a; Larner, 2000; 2001; Ong 
and Collier, 2005; Collier and Ong, 2005; Collier and Lakoff, 2005; Collier, 2005; 
Olds and Thrift, 2005; Ong, 2006; Li, 2007a; 2007b) and in which objects like the 
'creative economy' achieve a material existence. 
8.2: Spatialising epistemic communities, re-spatialising policy transfer 
This thesis suggests that the epistemic communities concept defined by Haas 
(1992: 3) as 'networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence 
in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area' has a lot to offer analyses of political-economic change in 
the contemporary moment. For one, it can be used to analyse the kinds of 
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changes often described as I globalisation' without resorting to the structuralist 
ontologies that have dominated social science. This is because they are networks 
whose boundaries are not coterminous with those of particular nation-states or 
other pre-defined institutions. And yet, despite the fact they avoid the kind of 
abstraction associated with structuralist ontologies, they provide a way for 
thinking about and explaining large scale change, or change that occurs across a 
large tract of space. And thirdly, it is useful for explaining the apparent power of 
expertise to shape the world today, and how particular types of expertise have 
come to be so widely influential. 
However, this thesis has argued that the epistemic communities concept has been 
relatively under-spatialised. Political science approaches that emphasise their 
internal, sociological qualities have been dominant (e.g. Haas, 1992). But when 
the implications of space are seriously considered particular questions that 
problematise these points of emphasis are immediately raised. For example, the 
question of how epistemic communities are distributed across space, in what 
kinds of sites, and with what kinds of links to other, policy-making sites raises 
further questions regarding how this distribution is linked to differentiation in 
the community around Haas's (1992) criteria of validity, causality and policy 
enterprise that members are assumed to share. Actors at different sites are likely 
to have different political concerns, and therefore inevitably different ideas of 
validity and so on. Does this mean that space threatens the coherency of, 
particular empirical epistemic communities, and as a result the coherency of the 
concept as a whole? 
A geographical reimagining of the epistemic communities concept has been 
conducted through this thesis to make it more spatially sensitive. The key 
conclusions are as follows: one, epistemic communities are emergent. They do 
not pre-exist to the particular political and knowledge questions they are 
concerned with. Rather they emerge out of spatially distributed actors forming 
networks with one another around particular knowledges. As this thesis has 
shown, knowledge forms like the CIMD are key elements in this process: 
networks have developed as different actors have engaged with it, resulting in 
the emergence of the transnational epistemic community of creative industries 
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experts. This is not to suggest that constituent actors and networks did not pre-
exist to this community, but as the case of FOCI shows, when these actors and 
networks mobilise around new knowledge forms and concepts, they will 
undergo particular internal changes - like FOCI becoming more formalised and 
focused on the creative industries concept - and external changes through the 
formation of new networks and new associations made possible by engagement 
with this knowledge form. Focusing on this spatially distributed emergence 
means a consideration of the politics - the hows and whys - behind the 
formation of the networks constituting the epistemic community. 
Two, epistemic communities grow in size and extend their influence through this 
kind of political work, not from some logic internal to the community itself. 
Epistemic communities do not extend simply because more and more actors buy 
into the principles of validity, causality and policy enterprise - the thesis has 
shown that it is often a consequence of contingent political decisions. The 
community's extension to New Zealand occurred because a variety of politicians 
and agencies adopted the language of the creative industries for political 
purposes. The resulting policy developments saw the creative industries become 
an integral part of national policy discourses and an object of analysis for 
academics, consultants and policy-makers (e.g. Blomfield, 2002; Walton and 
Duncan, 2002; Kaino, 2007). Examining the way that these extensions occur can 
provide insights into how and why these epistemic communities are 
differentiated across space. 
Three, this differentiation can result in tendencies towards incoherence in an 
epistemic community. As a result, epistemic communities can fracture, not only 
along geographical lines, but institutional, cultural or even individual lines. By 
considering epistemic communities as spatially distributed and differentiated, 
such fractures are conceivable. Just as likely, however, is that differentiation will 
be associated with disagreement and conflict between community members, but 
this will not necessarily mean they are not part of the same community. 
Although members of FOCI have tended to disagree on the validity and utility of 
the creative industries label, they still come together at particular events and 
conferences and in academic texts and edited collections (see for example 
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Hartley, 2005). Furthermore, understanding epistemic communities as cohering 
around notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise, as it is in political 
science treatments, writes out the conflict inherent in any process of knowledge 
development. Taking the geographical perspective advocated here keeps the 
focus on how coherence is maintained across a spatially differentiated community 
despite conflict and disagreement around these notions. 
Following on from this, the fourth and final conclusion is that epistemic 
communities require a lot of work to be maintained. This includes all the work in 
and around the conferences, meetings, seminars, forums, websites, publications, 
books, research projects and networks, personal relationships, social events and 
all the other practices that keep an epistemic community, even a transnational 
one, 'together' and sharing a similar intellectual space. The way that connections 
are made and maintained across geographical space to constitute the 'networks 
of professionals' (Haas, 1992: 3) that constitute an epistemic community is an 
integral but largely unconsidered aspect of their existence. A geographical 
perspective recognises the work that must go into maintaining the community as 
relatively coherent across space. 
In sum, taking a geographical perspective on the study of epistemic communities 
means a focus on the practices that produce, extend, differentiate, cohere and 
maintain a community across space, and on the particular institutions, agencies 
and people associated with these practices. This produces a different sense of 
what makes an epistemic community to that developed by Haas. Although it 
keeps the definition, it gives greater attention to the spatial form of the 
community instead of the notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise. 
Epistemic communities, as differentiated spatial forms, will come together 
around shared concerns (in this case, the relationship between 'culture' and 
'economy') that will continue to drive members to debate with each other. 
Although some members will certainly have shared and fixed notions of validity, 
causality and policy enterprise for thinking about these concerns, this approach 
recognises that not sharing these notions does not disqualify an otherwise active 
and contributing member from being recognised as a part of the community. 
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Epistemic communities understood from this perspective will be more 
differentiated, blurrier at the edges, in greater flux, and with more scope for 
conflict. On the other hand, this perspective recognises the opportunities this 
provides for new knowledge to emerge as the knowledge of the community 
overlaps with other knowledges at particular sites. Thus the creative industries 
have become a part of New Zealand's' economic transformation' when situated 
at NZTE. Finally, as the latter example also shows, they will not occupy a 
separate sphere to other actors, such as policy-makers, lobby groups and 
advocacy coalitions, but rather will be integrated and often inseparable from 
them. Epistemic communities are part of broader assemblages of government. 
This approach to epistemic communities also has important implications for 
thinking about policy transfer. Policy formation and transfer are driven in part by 
the testimonies of particular experts, so the geographies of epistemic 
communities are linked to the geographies of policy transfer. Policy transfer, 
then, needs to be understood in the context of changing assemblages of 
government. The way that particular epistemic communities come to be 
influential in different policy-making sites has a co-constitutive link with the way 
that policy-making is structured in those sites. By tracing the contours of the 
community and staying close to the networks and people involved, it is possible 
to see the role that policy transfer plays in reshaping a governmental assemblage. 
In this sense international policy transfer indicates not just changes in policy in 
pre-existing governmental structures, but changes in those structures themselves 
that range from subtle to substantial. 
This means recognising that apparently I global' public policy networks, such as 
those described by Stone (2004), are not situated in some kind of global space 
I above' nation-states and to which the latter are only ever able to respond 
through mitigation or acceptance. Rather, the actors, institutions and agencies 
that define these networks are often the same as those that define nation-states. 
The World Trade Organisation, for example, as one of the sources of what may 
be called a global public policy network, is both constituted by and constitutive of 
its member states through its work on the porosity of nation-state borders. The 
creative industries epistemic community described in this thesis is transnational 
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in scope but continues to shape and be shaped by the different national policy-
making sites it intersects with. By considering the geography of the epistemic 
communities that shape these policies it is possible to see how they are situated 
in, and in different ways co-constituted with, a whole variety of sites. As a result, 
the emergence of global public policy networks is linked to changes in how the 
nation-state system itself is structured - they are not separated from them. 
This also means recognising that policy transfer is not passive in the sense that it 
is not just an agent of wider processes. For example, analysing policy transfer as 
a way of showing the complex and uneven geographies of neoliberalisation (e.g. 
Peck, 2002; 2003; England and Ward, 2007) understates the potential for moments 
of policy transfer to cause a reshaping of the policy transferred and a redirection 
in those wider processes described as neoliberalism. Thus, at the time the creative 
industries concept was transferred from the UK to New Zealand it featured in the 
former mainly as the signifier of a sector that could be developed at regional and 
national levels, but in New Zealand it became a constitutive part of plans for 
'transforming' the national economy into one with a higher 'value-added' 
component. Here the transfer is an active moment where the translation of the 
policy concept resulted in it being deployed in new ways. 
Following on from this, an increase in policy transfer suggests that there are new 
geographies of policy formation emerging (d. Peck, 2003). Policy is forming in 
sites that are parts of increasingly transnationally constituted governmental 
assemblages. These sites are cut across by increasingly spatially complex 
networks and relationships of varying spatial extensiveness, ranging from the 
government ministry next door to the other side of the world. These geographies 
resemble the kinds of 'geographies of globalisation' described by Amin (2002), 
Massey (1993) and Latham (2002). In their different ways these authors argue for 
a sense of place that is not caught in a binary between 'local' and' global' but are 
always already multiply constituted by intersecting relations connecting 
particular places to a myriad of others. Epistemic communities are one source of 
such intersecting relations, and their spatial boundedness can range from being 
entirely in just one city to having multiple transnational dimensions. In this 
197 
sense, investigations of policy transfer are investigations of the increasingly 
transnational nature of policy formation. 
8.3: Tracing connections, making connections? 
A key challenge of this research was finding a way to track and trace a policy 
object that was constantly in formation and constantly moving and evolving. The 
approach of this thesis was to be open to the idea of a policy programme 
changing as it travelled, possibly in ways that could be regarded as fundamental. 
This meant regarding the creative industries policy concept as not possessing an 
essential identity. Any identity the concept possessed emerged only from the 
material forms of knowledge that existed and circulated about it. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the ethos of Foucault's genealogical method informed this approach. 
A genealogical history of a social form, such as a policy, is not a linear history 
that traces how the form developed from specific origins into the form it has 
today. Instead it traces how a social form at a particular moment of time was 
assembled together out of other, often quite disparate, social forms. Genealogical 
histories do not produce a smooth logic of development but a disjunctive history 
of continuous emergence and unexpected mutation. 
By spatialising genealogy, this thesis argued that this disparity between social 
forms can occur in space as well as time. This is a way of thinking about a 
process like policy transfer that resists reducing it to a singular logic, such as 
neoliberalisation. Resisting such reductionism allows for the consideration of the 
spatial and temporal complexity that results from a travelling policy form: the 
different agents involved, the different forms the policy concept takes, the 
different directions the form travels in, and so on. The difficulty that immediately 
arises is how to account for this complexity without becoming incoherent, or, 
conversely, how to trace a travelling policy without essentialising its identity 
across different places. 
The approach of this thesis was to focus on a very specific and distinctiv~ policy 
concept - the creative industries - and, importantly, its material existence in 
policy documents, particularly the CIMD. The advantages of this approach are 
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clear. The CIMD was a material document that I could follow and build a case 
around. Its travels allowed for a linear narrative to be produced despite there not 
necessarily being a linear logic. It was an obligatory point of passage (Callon, 
1986; Latour, 2005) for any actor who wanted to claim to be a creative industries 
expert and for anyone wishing to develop creative industries policy, and it was 
the document that brought all those actors into a shared community. In sum, it 
provided a point of orientation for the investigation. 
On the other hand, this approach had some risks. One of these was the risk that 
the UK would be unproblematic ally read as the 'origin country' for the creative 
industries. In one sense this is true; it was where the term I creative industries' 
was first coined. However, placing too much weight on this could reproduce 
colonial notions of particular ideas forming in certain places and then 
transferring to other places: a binary logic of colonisers and colonised. I wanted 
to avoid this and instead assert that actors at policy-making sites outside of the 
UK also had an agency denied them in colonial readings. In addition, although I 
was following the creative industries concept, staying true to the complexity of 
the policy transfer process meant demonstrating that all policy-making sites were 
constituted by many and varied relational geographies - in other words to 
demonstrate the transnationalness of policy formation. Chapter 5 shows this 
empirically by demonstrating that the creative industries concept was translated 
from the transfer of the creative economy concept from Australia and the cultural 
industries concept from the Greater London Council. The theoretical and 
methodological point is that the idea of I origin' is not that the concept was 
immaculately conceived out of nothing and from nowhere: it was simply where 
the concept was first I spoken' and therefore, in pragmatic terms, a logical starting 
point for investigation. 
A similar risk is that this approach would give the CIMD more agency than it 
deserves. By tracing and explicating the CIMD's travels to particular policy-
making sites and its role in the shaping of policy at those sites, it can create the 
impression that it was a major, or at least significant, constitutive force - perhaps 
more than it really was. Conversely, staying true methodologically to just those 
policy sites and documents that were citing the CIMD or the creative industries 
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concept in order to trace its travels may have meant missing sites and documents 
where it had more of an influence than was revealed in this fashion. Therefore it 
is important not to claim too much for the CIMD and the creative industries 
concept themselves. They provide a way of tracing links but it can be difficult to 
ascertain the strength or importance of those links. This requires a different kind 
of investigation. 
This research made a number of steps in this direction. Through interviews with 
key actors it was possible to get an idea of where important links were made and 
the effect that they had. The risk here is that interviewees will often smooth over 
conflicts that may have occurred, giving a seamless account of policy transfer and 
development, and introducing an element of pluralist logic to explain these. To 
counter this problem, participant observation at particular events enabled some 
insight into both how different actors were engaging the creative industries and 
the CIMD, and how conflicts between actors were played out and handled. This 
also provided an opportunity to see the J cutting edge' of policy and intellectual 
debates around the creative industries and the potential directions the creative 
industries concept may head as they emerge or get shut down. 
However, entering cold into these events can be difficult. There is always the 
possibility that events are just shop windows for more significant debates going 
on in the background, not to mention the importance of less public forms of 
knowledge production and exchange, such as personal conversations and gossip. 
Arguably, participant observation is too superficial a form of knowledge 
production to engage these aspects. More depth to the study is necessary to 
delineate connections more precisely and ascertain their true significance. 
8.4: Future research pathways 
These shortcomings should not overshadow the core contributions of this 
research. These include conceptual contributions, which are the spatialisation of 
the epistemic communities concept, enabling more nuanced analyses and 
discussions of these increasingly significant transnational actors, and the 
perspective on policy transfer that reveals it as a way into thinking about the 
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changing spatial constitution of state structures and governmental assemblages. 
And they include empirical contributions which, apart from denaturalising the 
status of the creative industries as an economic sector also raise questions about 
how all economic sectors, and the economy as a whole, are known and acted 
upon. It brings to the surface some of the ways that these objects of knowledge 
and policy are produced and maintained in technical and policy discourse, and 
the geography of expertise implicated in this. The shortcomings do, however, 
direct us to some future research possibilities. 
One of these is a closer consideration of the subjectification of experts. This 
research has shown that the resubjectification of experts occurs in certain 
directions as new possibilities for knowledge production and exchange emerge. 
This is often an active choice on the part of the expert and involves changes in 
their practices and discourses. How these changes are negotiated shapes what it 
is to be an expert with regard to the creative industries, and therefore how the 
particular power of expertise will be able to play out in emergent governmental 
assemblages. Linked to this is the possibility of investigating the practices of 
expertise, especially regarding the production of knowledge for different 
audiences and purposes. Both of these could be investigated using ethnographic 
methodologies, through an internship at a creative industries consultancy for 
example, with the intention for the researcher to become immersed in the day to 
day lives of creative industries experts - learning through doing of the practices 
and pressures of expertise. These investigations could shed light on the micro-
politics of expertise and how it shapes, and is shaped by, shifting relationships 
between institutions of government and institutions of knowledge. 
Finally, this approach could also be shifted horizontally to consider some other 
types of epistemic communities. The apparent prevalence of neoclassical 
economic thought in neoliberal styles of government raises questions about how 
epistemic communities of certain types of economists have come to be so 
influential. Unlike the recent study by Peck (2008), however, this would not be 
understood as all coalescing around a single project. Instead it would emphasise 
the temporal and spatial complexity of the epistemic communities associated 
with particular policy programmes. It would show how these programmes often 
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advanced across space and time in a contingent and disjunctive fashion (Lamer, 
2003). As this thesis has done, it can show how the categories and concepts that 
shape many of the policy interventions that shape our lives often had very 
specific and often innocuous beginnings, lashed together out of existing 
circulating concepts that were similarly constituted. But it can go further to show 
how the edifice of authoritative knowledge, the epistemic communities, that keep 
reproducing and using these concepts took shape. It can suggest that the power 
these communities seem to possess comes not from privileged access to some 
kind of truth, but from the strategies they use to make the knowledge they 
represent the basis of policy orthodoxy in a variety of places. 
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'Cool Aotearoa' Forum 
I (Transcript) 
Creative Industries Forum 
(Transcript) 
'Cultural Planning for the 
Twenty-First Century', part 












Creative New Maidment 
Zealand and Theatre, 









Panel discussion involving 
New Zealand and British 
cultural experts talking about 
the possibilities of New 
Zealand copying the British 
'Cool Britannia' programme. 
Public event for British 
Secretary of State for Culture 
Chris Smith to talk about the 
creative industries in the UK 
with a panel discussion 
involving representatives of 
three New Zealand 'creative 
industries': music, film and 
designer fashion. 
Panel discussion on how to 
increase the embeddedness 
of cultural planning 'in 
community and economic 
life. Panellists include Phil 
Wood - Co media, Paul 
Collard - Creative 
Partnerships, Guy Claxton -
Creativity 'guru', John 
Holden - Demos, Clare 
Cooper - Arts and Business. 
Significance 
This event was one of the first times 
that the creative industries policy 
concept was discussed in New 
Zealand in relation to policy 
programmes and strategies. 
This marked a significant moment in 
creative industries policy thinking in 
the New Zealand context as an 
overseas policy actor provided 
direct legitimacy for the creative 
industries policy concept. 
This event involved particular actors 
and agencies who have been 
involved in negotiating and 
translating the 'creative industries' 
policy concept into local and 
regional government discourses and 
policies through its articulation with 




























I Cities: Understanding 
German and UK 
Experiences 
City Salon: 'Do-It-Yourself' 
Cities 
'Economies of Enterprise, 
Innovation and Creativity', 
part of the Royal 
Geographical Society -






The Work The Work 
Foundation Foundation, 
London 
Demos The Tobacco 
Factory, 
Bristol 
Dr Tim Vorley, Royal 
Leicester Geographical 







Presentaion and discussion of 
four city case studies -
Munich, Glasgow, Leipzig 
and Bristol- for the Work 
Foundation's Ideopolis 
Project. 
This was one of a series of 
events run by the think-tank 
Demos in 2005 where local 
activists and other interested 
parties came together to 
discuss how cities can 
develop from the 'ground up' 
by involving the people 
involved in the life of the city 
itself rather than 'top down' 
through master planning 
strategies. 
Academic conference session 
on themes that overlap with 
the creative industries 
concept. 
I attended this event early-on in the 
research process to better 
understand how think-tanks and 
research institutes like the Work 
Foundation were talking about and 
acting on governmental themes that 
overlap with the creative industries 
policy concept in New Labour 
discourse, in this case on the 
potential of the knowledge economy 
as it applies to cities. 
Demos was closely involved in the 
development of New Labour 
strategies and policies in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. They have 
since explored ways that' creativity' 
can be developed and used in 
different settings. This event was an 
opportunity to see how they were 
negotiating and translating ideas 
through public forums. 
This event involved researchers 
explicitly engaging with the creative 
industries concept and other 
concepts seen as cognate. Presenters 
included actors from inside and 
outside the academy involved in 
debates on the creative industries 

















'Seminar 9: New Directions 
in Research: Substance, 
Method and Critique', part 
of the 'Cultural Industries 
Seminar Network' (called 
elsewhere the 'Cultural 
and Creative Industries 
Seminar Network') 
'Spaces of Vernacular 
Creativity', part of the 









Dr Andy Pratt, Royal Society 















Cultural and School of 
Media Performance 
Industries and Cultural 
research centre Industries, 
(CuMIRC), University of 
University of Leeds 
Leeds 
Final seminar in the series, 
intended to 'review some of 
the ground that has been 
covered and to pose issues 
and questions that will 
contribute to the 
development of future 
research agendas' (From the 
publicity material). The series 
was, ostensibly, a response to 
the 'chronic' lack of research 
in the area of cultural and 
creative industries despite its 
growing prominence in 
policy discourse . 
Academic conference session 
on themes that overlap with 
the creative industries 
concept. 
Symposium of academic 
researchers discussing issues 
arising from the emergence 
of creativity in policy 
discourses inn the last 
decade. 
This event involved researchers 
explicitly engaging with the creative 
industries concept and other 
concepts seen as cognate. The 
significance in the seminar series lay 
in the fact that it was funded by the 
AHRC and the ESRC and was 
attended and contributed to by 
scholars from the UK and around 
the world. 
This event involved researchers 
explicitly engaging with the creative 
industries concept and other 
concepts seen as cognate. The theme 
of the session meant they were 
engaging with the central ideas and 
practices held to unify the creative 
industries. It was indicative of how 
the creative industries were being 
thought about in the academy 
internationally. 
This event involved researchers 
explicitly engaging with the creative 
industries concept and other 
concepts seen as cognate. It included 
researchers who had previously 
engaged wi th concepts like the 
cultural ind ustries before the relt'else 










Appendix B: List of formal interviewees 
Note on Sources: The text of the thesis does not refer directly to any of the 
interviewees by name but by the particular capacity in which they are quoted. 
This provides for the anonymisation of the interviewees when they are quoted 
directly as each can be referred to in a variety of capacities, while each capacity 
describes a number of the interviewees. For example, an interviewee may be an 
academic, a FOCI member and a council official. However, each of these 
capacities will also describe a number of the other interviewees listed. 
1. Lyn Barbour 
Director 
Creative Industries Development Service (CIDS), Manchester, UK 
15 December 2005 
2. Dave Carter 
Director 
Manchester Digital Development Agency, Manchester, UK 
15 December 2005 
3. Phil Wood 
Partner 
CoMedia, Bournes Green, UK 
16 January 2006 
4. Simon Evans 
Director 
Creative Clusters, Sheffield, UK 
17 January 2006 
5. Martin Manning 
Director 
Cultural Industries Quarter Agency, Sheffield, UK 
17 January 2006 
6. Kate Jordan . 
Economic Regeneration Officer - Creative Industries 
Bristol City Council, Bristol, UK 
19 January 2006 
7. Dr Andy Pratt 
Reader in Urban Cultural Economy 
London School of Economics, London, UK 
23 January 2006 
8. Sarah Todd 
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9. David Humphries 
Project Manager and Export Policy Coordination - Creative Industries 
Division 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, London, UK 
24 January 2006 
10. Dr Justin O'Connor 
Lecturer 
Manchester Institute for Popular Culture, Manchester Metropolitan 
University, Manchester, UK 
25 January 2006 
11. Professor John Shutt 
Centre for Urban Development and Environmental Management 
Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds, UK 
8 February 2006 
12. Paul Owens 
Director 
Burns-Owens Partnership, London, UK 
28 February 2006 
13. Richard Naylor 
Consultant 
Burns-Owens Partnership, London, UK 
28 February 2006 
14. Dr Calvin Taylor 
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School of Performance and Cultural Industries, University of Leeds, 
Leeds, UK 
10 May 2006 
15. Michelle Templar 
Trade Commissioner 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, London, UK 
11 May 2006 
16. Tom Campbell 
Policy Director 
Creative London, London, UK 
11 May 2006 
17. Pippa Warin 
Executive Director 
Culture South-West, Exeter, UK 
19 May 2006 
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18. Richard Smith-Bingham 
Head of Policy and Research 
National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA), 
London, UK 
22 May 2006 
19. Kate Oakley 
Freelance Researcher, Adjunct Professor at the Queensland University of 
Technology Creative Industries Faculty, Associate of Burns-Owens 
Partnership 
London, UK 
22 May 2006 
20. Ken Worpole 
Author 
London, UK 
25 May 2006 
21. Duncan O'Leary 
Researcher 
Demos, London, UK 
30 May 2006 
22. Simon Parker 
Senior Researcher 
Demos, London, UK 
30 May 2006 
23. Paul Skelton 
Creative Industries Partnerships 
Sheffield, UK 
14 June 2006 
24. Cath Andersen 
General Manager 
New Zealand Music Commission, Auckland, New Zealand 
12 July 2006 
25. Tara Pradhan 
Creative Industries Manager 
Auckland City Council, Auckland, New Zealand 
12 July 2006 
26. J acqui Clarke 
Editor 
Big Idea Website, Auckland, New Zealand 
14 July 2006 
27. Cheryl Reynolds 
Director 
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Mediarts Creative Industries Research Centre, University of Waikato, 
Hamilton, New Zealand 
18 July 2006 
28. Jane Kominik 
Deputy Chief Executive & Policy Group Manager 
Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Wellington, New Zealand 
20 July 2006 
29. Matt Tait 
Policy Advisor 
Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Wellington, New Zealand 
20 July 2006 
30. Michael Bird 
Manager, Sector Development, Industry and Regional Development 
Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, New Zealand 
20 July 2006 
31. Anna Cameron 
Project Manager 
British Council, Wellington, New Zealand 
20 July 2006 
32. Dame Cheryll Sotheran 
Sector Director - Creative Industries 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, Wellington, New Zealand 
21 July 2006 
33. Jenna-Lea Philpott 
Creative Industries Sector Leader 
Canterbury Development Corporation, Christchurch, New Zealand 
24 July 2006 
34. Cath Cardiff 
Manager - Audience and Market Development 
Creative New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand 
26 July 2006 
35. Ruth Harley 
Director 
New Zealand Film Commission, Wellington, New Zealand 
27 July 2006 
36. Dr Michael Volkerling 
Head of Centre 
Centre for Creative Industries, Wellington Institute of Technology, 
Wellington, New Zealand 
27 July 2006 
37. Dr Deborah Jones 
240 
Senior Lecturer 
Victoria Management School, Wellington 
28 July 2006 
38. Brendan Smyth 
New Zealand Music Manager 
New Zealand On Air, Wellington, New Zealand 
28 July 2006 
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Appendix C: Government Terms of Reference: Heart of the 
Nation Project 
(Heart of the Nation Project Team (2000). The Heart of the 
Nation: a cultural stretegy for Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Wellington, McDermott Miller, pg. Annex A ii) 
Obtained from: Dr. Michael Volkerling 
26th July, 2006 
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heart of the nation 
Ie walrua te mauri Ie manawa 
GOVERNMENT TERMS OF REFERENCE 
HEART Of THE NATION PROJECT 
A.l CONTEXT 
• The Governmenfs vision is for: 
Vibrant art, and cultural activities which all New Zealanders can enJoy and through which a strong and 
confident cultural identity can emerge; and 
• A strong and vibrant creative industry sector which provides sustainable employment ,md econOlll1C 
growth within an innovative environment. 
• The Government is committed to establishing structures and processes that work in the best interest of the 
cultural sector. 
• The Government wants to play a supportive role in relation to the cultural sector, but to do this most 
effectively, we believe the sector must have a dear sense of its own vision and strategies to achieve it. 
• The Government is committed to ensuring proper dialogue takes place through the Heart of the ~ation 
project, with stakeholders in the cultural sector before any firm decisions are taken which \ViII impact on till' 
long term development of the sector. 
A.2 HEART Of THE NATION 
• The overall aim of the Heart of the Nation project is to: 
• Facilitate the development by the cultural sector 01 a strategic plan. 
• The Heart of the Nation prOject wi!! be convened by Hamish Keith and he will embark on a consultativp 
process with key stakeholders and interest groups in the cultural sector to: 
a. Identify overarching goals for the cultural sector and the principles that underpin these. 
b. Identify objectives for the sector to achieve by 2010, which overall will contribute to the New Zealand 
economy and society 
c. Recommend strategies for achieving the goals and the objectives in (a) and (bj above. 
d. Identify issues lor government consideration, to support the implementation of the sector plan 
• The purpose of the Heart of the Nation exercise is not to simply identify options for increased Government 
funding. \VhHe the Government is committed to more extensive support of the sector, the plan which is 
developed should not be dependent on significant increases in Government funding for it, effectivel)(,~'i. 
• Hamish Keith will report to the Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage by May 31 2000. 
New Zealand Covernment Heart of the Nation Press Release, 30 march 2000. 
heart of the nation project team 
June 2000 
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Annex A II 
Appendix D: Defining the Cultural Sector 
(Heart of the Nation Project Team (2000). The Heart of the 
Nation: a cultural stretegy for Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Wellington, McDermott Miller, pg. 5) 
Obtained from: Dr. Michael Volker ling 
26th July, 2006 
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heart of the nation 
te walrua te Illaun Ie manawa 
2. THE CUl rURAL SECTOR rODA Y 
2.1 DEfiNING THE CULTURAL SECTOR 
The cultural sector comprises two diverse, bllt inter-related <;pheres of productivE' 
activity: 
• Cultural Enterprises - the arts sector, in its broadest definition, where 
creativity embraces expressive and communicative purposes and \~here 
profit or commercial gain is not a primary motivator. 
• Creative Industries - a range of commercialiy-<iriven businesses whose 
primary resources are creativity and intellectual property dnd which are 
sustained through generating profits, 
Within these categories are a range of activities which have their origin in 
individual creativity, skill and talent. These include design (including craft and 
fashion), advertising, film, broadcasting (television and radio), multllneriia, the 
recording industry, the performing arts, heritage, visual arts and literature. Most 
of these categories of activity are included within the ;\:ew Zealand framework 
for Cultura! Statistics (1 '.)<) 'i i under the following headings: 




• Performing Arts 
• Visual Arts 
• Him and Video 
• Broadcasting 
• Community and Government actiVities. 
heart of the nation project team 
june 2000 
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4th June, 2007 
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TE MANATO TAONGA 
MINISTRY FOR CULTURE AND HERITAGE 
Report to the Minister on the Heart of 
the Nation Document 
13 July 2000 
Rt Hon Helen Clark Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage 
cc: Hon Judith Tizard Associate Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage 
HEART OF THE NATION 
The Ministry received a finalised report on Heart of the Nation on 23 
June 2000. We have reviewed the report and have a number of 
observations to make. 
Overall Comment 
1. In our view the report does not address the Terms of Reference. 
2. The summary of the report contains what is purported to be "the 
proposed strategy" (pages xvii-xx). The strategy is also set out in Part 
3 of the report (pages 120-125). The strategy is, however, 
substantially a plan to implement structural changes to Government. 
3. The Ministry does not consider that the strategy presented is 
consistent with the overall aim of the project which was stated in the 
Terms of Reference as being to "facilitate the development by the 
cultural sector of a strategic plan". 
4. In the context set out in the Terms of Reference it was stated that 
"the Government wants to playa supportive role in relation to the 
cultural sector, but to do this most effectively, we believe the sector 
must have a clear sense of its own vision and strategies to achieve it". 
5. Heart of the Nation does not set out a vision and strategies that the 
cultural sector will, itself, pursue. Rather, it sets out a series of 
strategies which are primarily dependent on Government action and, 
particularly, a significant restructuring of governmental arrangements. 
Development of a strategy for governmental action was not the 
purpose of the project. 
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The Situation: Data and Commentary (pages 4-74) 
6. A substantial part of the report presents data and commentary on a 
range of matters in connection with cultural activity. In many respects, 
the material provides an interesting stocktake of issues that could be 
used as an input to a programme of strategic policy development. 
7. With regard to the use of statistics, McDermott Miller has addressed 
some of the Ministry's concerns in the final report and has made 
amendments, particularly in terms of explaining the assumptions on 
which its projections are based. The Ministry still takes issue with the 
way in which some of the statistical information presented and its 
interpretation 
8. In particular, the final report continues to maintain that excluding 
broadcasting expenditures, over 50% of cultural investment was in 
"bricks and mortar" in 1990/91 and 1998/99 and even higher during 
the peak of construction of Te Papa. Bricks and mortar is categorised 
as capital in Vote appropriations. For Lottery Grants Board funding, 
estimates have been made of the proportion of cultural funding on 
capital projects. Our recent joint publication with Statistics New 
Zealand, Government Spending on Culture, shows that capital 
expenditure as a percentage of total Government cultural expenditure 
is much lower than 50%. In 1998/99 for- example, capital expenditure 
was 15.7% or 10.9% of cultural spending depending on whether NZ 
On Air funding is included in the total. The percentage was 
considerably higher during the construction of Te Papa but even then 
was still below 500/0, compared to the 70% asserted in the McDermott 
Miller report. 
9. In the absence of any evidence to support McDermott Miller's 
contention, it can only be assumed it has developed its own very broad 
definition of "bricks and mortar" that it has not made explicit but 
presumably includes any Government funding to a national institution 
regardless of its purpose. 
10. The data and commentary raise a number of issues that we would 
have expected might have been reflected in a Cultural Sector StrategiC 
Plan. For example, strategies to: 
• 
increase the share of domestic discretionary spending (pages 
25-39) ; 
expand consumer choice (refer page 43); 
capitalise on new project opportunities (refer page 43); and 




The Issues (pages 76-107) 
11. The report sets out a series of issues which it states have been 
identified from its research, consultation and feedback through the 
website. 
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12. From our review of the report we have no basis on which to assess 
the extent to whi~h the issues reflect views expressed by those 
consulted. There IS no summary that indicates the key issues raised by 
those who were consulted nor do we think the issues reflect, to any 
great extent, the commentary contained in the preceding section of 
the report. 
The Strategy (pages 108-125) 
13. In respect of the strategy to restructure government we would 
observe: 
• the proposed expansion in the number of governmental entities 
will be costly and is likely to result in small, fragmented structures. 
This strategy would appear to be in conflict with at least two major 
concerns expressed elsewhere in the report: 
i the claim that too much funding has been applied to 
supporting government's own structures (pages 60-63). 
A significant restructuring of government, with an 
increase in the number of government agencies, would 
only accentuate this concern further; and 
ii the lack of sector wide strategy (page 104). A 
coherent government strategy is likely to be more 
difficult to achieve with a larger, more fragmented, set 
of government agencies. 
• a separate stream of Maori cultural agencies within government 
is proposed. Concerns are expressed about governmental support 
for Maori culture (pages 106-107) and three options for enhancing 
support are identified (Annex B). The option of enhancing existing 
arrangements is not mentioned. It is not clear to the Ministry as to 
why the proposed arrangements are preferable. 
Where To From Here? 
14. The Terms of Reference for Heart of the Nation said: 
"The Government's vision is for: 
• 
• 
Vibrant arts and cultural activities which all New Zealanders can 
enjoy and through which a strong and confident cultural identity 
can emerge; and 
A strong and vibrant creative industry sector v:h~ch pr?vides . 
sustainable employment and economic growth wlthm an mnovatlve 
environment. " 
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The development, by the sector, of its own vision and strategies was 
seen as key to the achievement of these ends. This has not been the 
outcome of Heart of the Nation, although the Government's vision and 
the overall aim of the project remain sound. The issue that therefore 
arises is what the Government might now do in pursuit of its vision? 
15. We continue to believe the key to success is in the sector itself 
having a clear sense of its own vision and strategies to achieving it. 
Such a vision and strategies must be developed by the sector, for the 
sector. This challenge must be put to the sector. One possibility for 
doing this would be to bring together the leaders of key cultural sector 
organisations and to challenge them to work together to develop a 
cultural sector plan. The benefits and capacity to develop a plan could 
be illustrated by reference to similar such initiatives in areas such as 
the Tourism Industry. 
16. The Ministry could give further consideration to this or other 
options if you require. 
17. Heart of the Nation's report is extensive and contains a 
considerable amount of information and ideas in relation to 
government policy. Many of these could provide a useful input to the 
development of a strategic policy programme for the Ministry. They 
could also provide a useful input to the policy and programme 
development of agencies such as Creative New Zealand. 
Recommendation 
18. It is recommended that you: 
(i) note the content of this report. 
Martin Matthews 
Acting Chief Executive 
Rt Hon Helen Clark 
Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage 
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Appendix F: Table 7.1 (full version) 
Table 7.1: Creative industries policy documents 
Document Author Year Space of Action 
Heart of the Nation Heart of the Nation Project 2000 New Zealand 
Team (for New Zealand 
Government) 
As discu~se~ in Ch~pter 6, this document used the CIMD definition but changed it so that 
the creative mdustnes could be understood as a commercial sector that sat alongside and 
fe~ off the core I c~ltural industries'. Thus, the creative industries in this report were 
strIpped of those mdustries seen as I cultural': art, performing arts, film and music that was 
being produced not-for-profit. 
Creative Industries in Hong Hong Kong Trade 2002 Hong Kong 
Kong Development Council 
This document draws directly on the CIMD and incorporates its definition. The industrial 
list is slightly changed with crafts substituted for comics. The statistical analysis is 
presented in the same way as the CIMD and compared with the UK, Australian and New 
Zealand results. 
Creative Industries in New New Zealand Institute of 2002 New Zealand 
Zealand: Economic Economic Research (for 
Contribution Industry New Zealand) 
Under the direction of Industry New Zealand, who commissioned the report, this was 
expected to use the same definitions as used for the UK Creative Industries Mapping 
Document (pg. 1). Thus the report used the CIMD definition, the same set of industries 
(although it collapsed arts, antiques and crafts into the same category and did the same 
with music and performing arts), and measured their contribution according to: 
revenue/market size; employment; expense and value added; exports and imports; 
industry structure; regional dimensions; and secondary economic impacts. 
Creative Industries Economic Review 2002 Singapore 
Development Strategy: Committee, Government of 
Propelling Singapore's Singapore 
Creative Economy 
This document argues that the I creative cluster' constitutes the Singapore I creative 
economy' and defines the former using the CIMD definition. The industries that comprise 
the cluster are divided into three groups: Arts and culture - including performing and 
visual arts and such like from the CIMD list and adding museums, archives, auctions, 
festivals and heritage sites - design - advertising, architecture, fashion and so on - and 
media - film, television, music and publishing. A statistical analysis of the contribution of 
the industries is provided. A more comprehensive statistical analysis is carried out in 
Heng et al. (2003) in a report for the Minister of Trade and Industry in which the industrial 
classification used in the CIMD is followed more closely with the addition of photography 
and the collapsing of some industries in with each other due to the nature of the statistics. 
Cultural Policy White Paper Council for Cultural 2004 Taiwan 
Affairs 
The document refers to the approach taken in Taiwan of combining the creative industries 
concept with that of the cultural industries and makes it clear that the promotion of the 
'cultural and creative industries' is a key part of Taiwanese economic development plans 
under conditions of 'globalisation'. In defining these it draws directly on the UK and 
251 
UNESCO definitions,.ar~ing that the 'British government's creative industry olicies are I 
the most comprehensIve mternationally (sic), (Ch 3 Pg 2) The list f· d tr· p. I d d· • 
the same as the UK with the exception of antiques ~nd ·the· m. 1 . 0 mf thus les IImcdu e IS , 'lif l' c USIon 0 e so-ca e , 
esty e s.ector. T~e document is concerned with the role the cultural agency that ; 
produced It plays m promoting the c ltu I d .. . . 
u ra an creative mdustnes. This programme has 
been on th: agenda for the Taiwanese Government since 2003 when the Taiwan Institute 
of Ec?no~mc Re~ea~ch carried out an analysis of the productive value of the cultural and 
creative mdustnes m the counJ:ry. 
An Analysis of the Ratzenbock et al. on behalf 2004 Vienna 
Economic Potential of the of the City of Vienna 
Creative Industries in 
Vienna: English Summary 
!~is ~ocu~ent contains an extended discussion of the creative industries concept, placing 
It m hIStoncal and geographical context as follOWing on from the Adorno and Horkheimer 
concept of the 'culture industry' and the Greater London Council's cultural industries 
strategy. It argues that the shift to the creative industries made by DCMS allows for 
thinking of culture and creativity as factors of production. The industrial categories 
include all of those in the CIMD, with the exception of antiques and crafts, and introduce 
museums and galleries. The statistical analysis of the sectors draws on Andy Pratt's 
Cultural Industries Production System (in here referred to as the Creative Industries 
production System) which he would later develop for the DCMS Evidence Toolkit. The 
re~ort emphasises the geoNaphical specificity of the creative industries in Vienna. 
Creative New York Keegan et al. for the Centre 2005 New York, USA 
for and Urban Future and 
Mt Auburn Associates 
This report uses the term creative industries to describe the kind of economic units that 
constitute the city's 'creative economy'. It does not refer directly to the CIMD or DCMS but 
does state that '(s)ince 1997, the UK has made its creative sectors a major focus of economic 
planning, with particular emphasis on supporting its workforce and entrepreneurs to spur 
future economic growth' (pg. 25) in the context of referring to initiatives carried out in UK 
cities developing their creative industries. As such, it refers to the work of the Greater 
London Authority's Creative London agency, the Creative Industries Development Service 
in Manchester, and the Round Foundry Media Centre in Leeds. The report bases its 
arguments for more of a focus on this sector on a statistical analysis of the contribution of 
the creative industries to the New York economy. 
Future of the. creative Marcus, for the European 2005 EU 
industries: implications for Commission 
research policy: Working 
Document 
This document begins with a discussion on the different terms that have been used to 
describe this particular sector, including the' entertainment' and' content' industries. It 
settles on the creative industries but explicitly argues that the cultural industries are an 
important subset of them. The definition it uses from this point for the creative industries 
is the CIMD definition. The report produces a number of recommendations for research, 
for example on the impact of technology and intellectual property law on the creative 
industries. One study it recommends follows a European Parliament call to the 
Commission to produce a 'European map of cultural industries'. The report notes that the 
UK is the only country to have done this through the CIMD. 
The creative industries in Doust, for Arts South 2005 South Australia 
South Australia: a report Australia: Cross-
prepared for the Cross- Government Steering 
Government Steering Committee 
Committee: Arts SA 
In defining the creative industries for South Australia this report refers t? the ~~. 
definition, the Scottish definition and the Queensland State Government 5 defIrution. It 
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r~co~~es ~he ~I~D definition as influential but critiques it for being' insufficiently 
dlscnmmating ':lth re~ard to those sectors that are truly' creative' as opposed to other 
sectors that are sunp.ly ne~ media or economy industries like software. As a result they 
recom~end a set of mdustrles that are basically the same as those in the CIMD \vith the 
ex.ception of software, .at the same ti~e recognising that some software, such as games, 
will need to be re~ogrused as exceptions and included in the creative industries sector. The 
re~ort refers to Rlchar~ Florida in arguing that a well-developed creative industries sector 
will attract the economIcally powerfu~ 'creative class'. 
Snapshot: Auckland's Auckland City Council 2005 Auckland, New 
Creative Industries Z I d 
ea an 
This report uses the definition of the CIMD. It splits the creative industries sector into six 
sub-sect?rs: design comprising advertising, architecture and graphic design; screen 
producti?n and radio; publishing; visual arts, crafts and photography; performing arts; 
and mUSIC. The study measures their contribution to the Auckland economy and 
supplements this with interviews with 375 creative sector workers and 30 key informants 
from government, business and media. The report articulates the creative industries 
concept with that of the creative class (Richard Florida) and the creative city (Charles 
Handy), arguing the creative industries can attract the kind of creative professionals 
Florida claims are the key to the future of cities. 
Zurich's creative industries: Held et al., on behalf of the 2005 
synthesis report Economic Development 
Departments of the Canton 
and City of Zurich 
Zurich, 
Switzerland 
This report uses the concept of the creative industries as an organising concept for a 
comparatively sophisticated analysis of the sector in Zurich. The UK is listed as a one of a 
number of European countries that recognises this sector, although their specific 
authorship of the term' creative industries' is acknowledged. These industries are 
recognised as existing in state, private sector and civil society organisations and 
enterprises in the context of an argument that creative practitioners increasingly work 
across this tripartite structure, resulting in the particular organisations and enterprises 
previously separated into these three domains becoming increasingly interdependent. The 
creative industries themselves are separated into 'broader' and 'narrower' senses of the 
term, with the narrower industries being those directly concerned with cultural 
production, such as performing arts and music, and the broader industries being those that 
work with what has been ~oduced, the advertising and recording industries for example. 
Creative Industries Department of Sport, Arts, 2005 Gauteng, South 
Development Framework of Culture and Recreation: Africa 
the Gauteng Provincial South Africa 
Government 
This report elides any distinction between the cultural and creative industries arguing they 
are 'that bundle of activities where creativity is a prime condition of its existence' (pg. 7). 
They include the same sectors of the CIMD with the exception of architecture while 
advertising is referred to within the 'graphic arts' and software and computer games are 
part of 'multimedia'. It also brings in 'cultural tourism' and the 'cultural heritage' sector. 
The report also refers to the presence of' soft' infrastructure such as libraries, ~estiv~ls and 
markets as key aspects of the 'creative economy' and uses the concepts of the creative 
cluster', the 'creative workforce' and the 'creative community'. 
Our Creative Potential: Brinkhorst et al., 2005 Netherlands 
Paper on Culture and 
Economy 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Ministry of 
Education, Culture and 
Science 
This paper explicitly distinguishes itself from the approach of the CIMD by ca.lling the . 
creative industries creative business sectors because' a considerable part of that mdustry IS 
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not engaged in industrial production' (pg. 12). It uses, or the most part, the same industries 
as the.CIMD, separa~g them into ~ree broader categories: the arts - including theatre 
and VISual arts - medIa and entertamment - including television and film - and the 
cre~ti~e busines~ service~ - including advertising and architecture. The paper performs a 
statistical mappmg function and attaches this to a strategy for developing the sector, 
arguing that these industries, and creativity in generat are increasingly important parts of 
the Dutch economy. The statistics are taken from another paper published in Dutch which 
has as its only English phrasing the words 'Mapping Document' in the title (Raes and 
Hofstede, 2005). The paper also incorporates the 'creative class' concept of Richard Florida 
in describing the creative make-up of the country. 
The Economy of Culture in Kearn European Affairs 2006 European Union 
Europe (KEA), for the European 
Commission 
The approach taken in the CIMD is referred to explicitly (and first) in a section discussing 
how this study would approach the 'economy of culture' alongside the approaches of 
France, the Nordic countries, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (the' content industries') and the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) (the' copyright industries'). It is argued that these are comparable definitions and 
produces a synthesised definition of the 'cultural and creative sector' which ranges from 
the core arts and cultural industries - including the visual arts, film, television and video 
games - 'radiating outwards' (pg. 53) in concentric circles to the creative industries - such 
as architecture and advertising. The document makes an attempt to establish a statistical 
profile of the sector across the whole of Europe and describes this as 'mapping out the 
economy of culture in figures' (pg. 60, emphasis added). 
Understanding Creative The Global Alliance for 2006 Global 
Industries: Cultural Cultural Diversity and 
Statistics for Public Policy UNESCO 
Making 
This position paper for UNESCO points to the CIMD as the key first document in 
establishing the concept of 'mapping' the creative sector: 'Cultural mapping has become 
the favoured approach at national level for governments to study and understand their 
creative industries sectors before making policy decisions ... The UK is widely recognised 
as having played a ground breaking role in developing these an~lytical ~odels, w~th the 
government's Department for Culture, Media and Sport producmg the fust Creative . 
Industries Mapping Document in 1998 and 2001' (pg. 6). The stated goal of the agency IS to 
further develop this approach to provide relevant data to policy-makers on the sector. 
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Appendix G: Table 7.3 (full version) 
Table 7.3: Conferences on the creative industries 
Event Organisers Date Location Creative Clusters Creative Clusters Inc. Annually since Locations around 
2002 the UK 'Cre~tive Clusters is an independent policy conference examining the growth of the 
creative economy. We are interested in initiatives from around the world that are 
designed to hav~ an impact in both cultural and economic terms ... Our goal is to help 
people engaged In the development of the creative economy to communicate and share 
resources with one another' (From the website). 
JWebsite: www.creativeclusters.com. accessed 6/9/2007) 
From 'Made in Chinese Academy of 7-9/7/2005 
China' to 'Created in Sciences, Humanistic 
China': International Olympic Studies 
Creative Industries Centre at Renmin 
Conference University of China, 





This event was organised by John Hartley of the Queensland University of Technology's 
Creative Industries Faculty alongside colleagues from Australia, China and the UK 
including Justin O'Connor of the Manchester Institute for Popular Culture. It was billed 
as 'the first event to discuss the theme of creative industries and innovation in China' 
(Hartley and Keane, 2006: 260) and brought together policy-makers, entrepreneurs, 
'creative professionals' and academic researchers to discuss' the pros and cons of 
thinking about China as a 'creative economy' in the international environment of 
globalized content, marketing and national branding' (ibid.: 26). (See the special issue of 
the International Journal of Cultural Studies, 2006, v. 9 i. 3, esp. Hartley and Keane (2006: 
259-262». (Website: httpiltinvurl.com/4ciov2 3/7/2007). 
CARICOM-WIPO Caribbean Community 8-9/2/2006 
Experts Meeting on (CARICOM and the 
Creative Industries World Intellectual 




I (T)he purpose of the Meeting was to discuss the mapping of the Creative Industries in 
the Caribbean, to determine appropriate strategies for their development and 
strengthening (with a view to increasing their social, economic, and cultural contribution 
to the Region), to assist in pointing the direction for future CARICOM/WIPO 
collaboration and to initiate the development of a Regional Creative Industries Mapping 





EUCLID 20/3/2006 Tate Modem, 
London 
'This conference will bring together experts from across Europe to present their analysis 
and practical experiences, for both information and debate. In the light of the recent 
re£ort from DG research of the European Commission on the future of the creative and 
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cultural industries in Europe, delegates will hear about specific projects and initiatives i 
that seek to promote the creative and cultural industries and address the challenges faced I 
by our European colleagues. This conference is aimed at both policy makers and 
practitioners, at local~ regional or ~ationallevel, as it will highlight examples of successful 
(and less successful) Ideas, strategIes and actions that have endeavoured to develo and 
sustain the creative and cultural industries in cities, regions and neighbourhoods' ffr 
the publicity material). om 
(Website: http://www.euc1id.info/accessed 3/12/2007) 
MyCreativity: Institute of Network 16-18/11/2006 Amsterdam 
Convention on Cultures, Hv A 
International Interactive Media, and 
Creative Industries Centre for Media 
Research Research, University of 
Ulster 
, A Convention ~n Internatio~al Creative Industries research. MyCreativity is a two-day 
conference that mtends to brmg the trends and tendencies around the Creative Industries 
into critical question. It seeks to address the local, intra-regional and trans-national 
variations that constitute international creative industries as an uneven field of actors, 
interests and conditions. The conference explores a range of key topics that, in the 
majority of cases, remain invisible to both academic research and policy-making in the 
creative industries' (from the publicity material). 
JWebsite: http://www.networkcultures.org/mvcreativity/ accessed 6/6/2007) 
Culture-Creative Office for Cultural 3-4/5/2007 Berlin 
Industries in Europe 
(sic) - Coherent 
Policies in a Global 
World 
Policy and Economy, 
European Commission 
This conference, organised by the European Commission, draws directly on the study 
'The Economy of Culture in Europe' (Kearn European Affairs, 2006) discussed in Table 
7.1. It slips between the cultural and creative industries concepts.: 'Culture industries (sic) 
have gained a new importance for Europe, as the European Council of Ministers of 
Culture stated in 2006 ... This raises the issue of developing more efficient European 
policies to support the creative industries in their struggle to produce and sell cultural 
goods under the conditions of global competition ... The conference aims at developing a 
strategy for the co-ordination of culture industries policies (sic)' (From the Website). 
(Website: http://tinvurl.com/ 4sk3v6 accessed 4/2/2008) 




'The Creative Industry sector is an integral part of the new knowledge economy and in 
this workshop we are looking to develop new ideals and impetus for the businesses, 
infrastructure and governance of the Creative Industries' (from the publicity material). 
Creative Industries Asian-Pacific Forum 19-22/9/2007 Berlin 
Conference Berlin 
Part of the' Asia-Pacific Weeks' in Berlin intended to foster connections between Europe 
and Asia Pacific. This stated aim of the conference is to 'focus on the interplay between 
German-European and Asian-Pacific partners in the creative industries sectors (which) 
will increase mutual understanding, but also add most-needed intercultural value to the 
European enterprises in the East at large'. 
(website: http://tinvurl.com/ 46te7x accessed 12/2/2008) 
Creative Industries: Centre for Research on 27/2/2008 Open University, 
Ten Years On Socio-Cultural Change Milton Keynes 
'What has happened in the decade since 1997? On the one hand the creative industries 
can be seen to have gone from strength to strength. The DCMS has re-Iaunched its 
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creative industry strategy with renewed vigour. The Creative Economy Programme sets out 
an ambitious strategy which once again places the creative industries at the heart of the 
UK's economic future. The 'UK model' has been internationally exported, across Europe, 
and into territories as diverse as Australia, China and South Korea, shaping and being 
shaped by pre-existing policy frameworks, contributing to the rapid globalization of 
creative industry debate. Yet there are some hard questions to be asked and key issues to 
be addressed - this symposium attempts to address these issues and in doing so take 
forward an agenda for critical debate on the creative industries' (From the publicity 
material). 
Caribbean National Cultural 5-6/5/2008 StJames, Barbados 
International 
Conference on the 
Cultural & Creative 
Industries 
Foundation,Barbados 
'(The event will) stimulate discussion at the level of policy, programming and successful 
case studies' (from the publicity material). 
(Website: http://tinvurl.com/5mohae, accessed 12/2/2008). 
Arte-Polis 2: Institute of Technology 8-10/8/2008 
Creative Bandung 
Communities and 








'In an era of globalization, activities of the creative economy such as fashion, film, 
television, theater, music, dance, visual arts, design, architecture, advertising, publishing, 
multimedia and information technology, have contributed significantly to local economy, 
community life and the creation of places in cities. Such cities have taken advantage of 
the trend in natural agglomeration of creative industries as clusters, given that 
information, imagination, opinions and cultural sensibilities are transmitted through 
them ... (The) objective is to share international experiences and knowledge regarding 
current issues, best practices and policy implications on the relationship between creative 
communities and place-making.' (From the email announcement). (Culturelink website: 
httv:l / tinvurl.com/52sxh8 accessed 12/2/2008). 
